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ABSTRACT 
Narrative States: 
Human Rights Discourse in Contemporary Literature 
by 
Jennifer Rickel 
Human rights have become a dominant framework through which to narrate and read 
political violence in contemporary literature concerning Africa, the Caribbean, and the 
Indian subcontinent. This dissertation argues that human rights discourse depoliticizes 
crises that result from histories of colonialism, inequitable development policies, and the 
growth of transnational capital. The testimonial narrative structure of human rights treats 
political violence as trauma and portrays the narrator as testifier and reader as witness. It 
assumes that in the exchange between these figures a cathartic process takes place and 
that by proxy the original political violence may be resolved. The language of human 
rights is thus deployed to illuminate the suffering of others without interrupting processes 
of global capitalism or narratives of US exceptionalism. This dissertation examines the 
intersection of human rights discourse and postcoloniality. It analyzes the decolonial 
strategies through which postcolonial texts challenge human rights discourse and shift 
focus from trauma and catharsis to the national and international policies, business 
practices, and cultural narratives that sustain inequitable power structures. 
IV 
This dissertation begins by critiquing the concept of literary humanitarianism, 
which suggests that the reader may fulfill a humanitarian act by reading a story of 
suffering. After showing in the introduction how this literary trend is connected to 
changes in the nation-state system, the first two chapters analyze the narrative mechanics 
of the testimonial narrative structure. As these opening essays examine depictions of 
apartheid in South Africa, genocide in Rwanda, and slow violence in India, they 
problematize the expansion of the 'universal' humanist narrative voice and critique the 
construction of a humanitarian reader. Chapter three then compares methodological 
approaches to storytelling to analyze the relationship between literature, the archive, and 
lived reality in post-apartheid South Africa. Moving into a discussion of the economic 
and cultural imperialism that characterize the postcolonial condition, the final two 
chapters reveal how representations of old and new diasporas across Africa, the 
Caribbean, Europe, and the Americas resist the language of human rights. Together, these 
chapters argue that the political potential of literature is not in staging humanitarian 
resolutions but in interrogating the frameworks that sustain inequality. 
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1 
INTRODUCTION 
In the preface to Dave Eggers's What Is the What: The Autobiography ofValentino 
Achak Deng, the Sudanese refugee on whose life the novel is based addresses the reader: 
I am blessed to have lived to inform you that even when my hours were darkest, I 
believed that some day I could share my experiences with others. This book is a 
form of struggle, and it keeps my spirit alive to struggle. To struggle is to 
strengthen my faith, my hope and my belief in humanity. Since you and I exist, 
together we can make a difference! (xv). 
This preface engages the reader as a humanitarian; it suggests Achak is blessed by way of 
the reader and his purpose for living is defined via the reader's engagement with this text. 
It frames the novel according to an understanding of justice in which a person who has 
been wronged, or who has witnessed the way another has been, may redress injustice by 
testifying to one's struggle against it. In telling Achak's story, the novel endeavors to 
declare his humanity against the 'inhumanity' he has suffered. 1 Imploring the reader, 
"Since you [reader] and I [the real life incarnation of the fictional narrator] exist, together 
we can make a difference!" (xv), the preface reveals how literary humanitarianism is 
premised on a relationship between text and reader that treats literature as testimony and 
the reader as a witness to trauma.2 The novel testifies to Achak's suffering and details 
how his development has been stunted by conflicts between warring factions. Along with 
the accompanying preface, the novel suggests that the injustices Achak has experienced 
may be overcome through the process of writing him into the collective psyches of the 
book's readership. Eggers, an American author turned activist, takes up this project by 
partnering with Achak to tell his story after he has arrived as a refugee in the US. 
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The positive reception of the novel demonstrates the widespread acceptance of the 
human rights conception of justice in popular culture. In fact, the novel was met with 
acclaim for facilitating literary humanitarianism. For instance, the New York Times 
commends the text: "What Is the What is an extraordinary work of witness, and of art" 
(Francine Prose). As a work of witness, the novel testifies to Achak's suffering, inviting 
the reader to be a third-party witness in order to validate his humanity against the 
'inhumanity' he has endured. As a work of art it enlarges the scope of the juridical, 
insisting literature may fulfill a social justice function. The justice the novel seeks is 
conceptualized within a rights paradigm, meaning human rights discourse constitutes the 
framework through which Achak's story may be told. 
As a refugee seeking to rectify the injustices he experienced, Achak is compelled 
to testify to an international community of humanitarian readers about his state's failure 
to protect his human rights. Because rights are allocated through the state, the rights 
paradigm reduces individuals to juridical subjects, and the international human rights 
movement attempts to regulate the way states allocate 'universal' rights to these subjects. 
By relegating the political to the juridical, the rights model of justice generates a paradox 
in which individuals may only gain rights by submitting their autonomy to the state and 
subjecting themselves to its normative parameters. Literary humanitarianism, in turn, 
requires individuals to narrate themselves in a way that is legible to the state in order to 
prove their eligibility for rights. In Achak's case this means allowing himself to be 
translated into a literary form that endeavors to unite a cosmopolitan readership in 
support of an international human rights project that promises "to improve the lives of 
Sudanese in Sudan and elsewhere" (Eggers xiv). As human rights discourse increasingly 
3 
structures articulations of political violence, Eggers's novel has become representative of 
a growing number of texts that present stories of suffering as literary testimony in order 
to appeal for rights. 
"Narrative States" examines contemporary Anglophone literary representations of 
political violence directed against migrants, refugees, and former colonial subjects in 
Africa, the Caribbean, and the India subcontinent. Rather than assume that the language 
of human rights is neutral, I read the increased circulation of human rights discourse in 
the literature that I critique as a symptom of the conflict between national and 
international sovereignty. I approach testimony as a narrative mode that reflects and 
shapes power relations between nation-states, national citizens, international 
collectivities, and extra-national individuals. 
When popular, literary, and scholarly accounts of international violence, 
inequality, and injustice are structured as testimonial narratives within a human rights 
framework, they disconnects suffering from its political and economic contexts. In 
contrast, my study considers how such political crises are connected to histories of 
colonialism as well as to the growth of multinational capital. Viewed in this context, I 
argue, human rights discourse depoliticizes failures of development. Moreover, when this 
discourse employs literary texts to assert rights, it plots individuals in a narrative of 
universal humanism that casts agents alongside dependents. Such literature presents itself 
as testimony, enlarging the category of "witness" to include privileged, "humanitarian" 
readers. At the same time, it marks members of a transnational underclass as perpetually 
dependent on humanitarianism. 
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My investigation of human rights discourse examines literary testimony alongside 
texts that challenge this discourse as they narrate the structural inequalities that 
characterize the postcolonial condition. Joseph Slaughter has already shown a connection 
between the Western reader's demand for stories of postcolonial development and 
"literary humanitarianism," which he identifies with the bildungsroman (314 ). I expand 
Slaughter's notion of literary humanitarianism beyond the bildungsroman to refrarne the 
discussion of human rights through a critique of testimonial narrative structure. Engaging 
literature that presents itself as testimony, its narrator as one who testifies, and its reader 
as a witness to testimony, I challenge the assumption that one may perform a 
humanitarian act by reading, and thereby witnessing, stories of trauma and suffering. My 
interrogation of human rights discourse in "Narrative States" is focused through analyses 
of texts that problematize the narrative conventions of literary humanitarianism. 
My examination of the narrative mechanics of literary humanitarianism, and some 
of its exemplary alternatives, spans contemporary novels, nonfiction prose, and epic 
poetry. Charting the narrator-reader relationship across the first two narrative forms, the 
opening two chapters of this project critique the universal humanist narrative voice and 
the humanitarian reader. Rather than asking literature to archive political violence as 
trauma through a testimonial exchange with a humanitarian reader, chapter three 
interrogates the way different methodological approaches to storytelling engage the 
archive and lived reality. Continuing to work through the intersections of fiction, 
historiography, and testimony central to the opening chapters of "Narrative States," in the 
final two chapters, I show how contemporary texts re-imagine conventional literary forms 
such as the postcolonial development novel and popular genres such as the refugee 
narrative. 
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Instead of approaching the relationship between literature and human rights 
through a study of the cathartic process at issue in trauma theory/ I probe the rights 
framework through a critique of its relationship to historical and contemporary 
imperialism. Representing political violence in terms of trauma too often renders 
politically complicated histories unspeakable and attempts instead to heal trauma victims 
by articulating their humanity against the supposed inhumanity of those who have 
inflicted the trauma. This study responds to the ethical turn in literature and political 
philosophy by analyzing the intersection of postcoloniality and human rights discourse in 
contemporary literature. Rather than debating the cathartic and political efficacy of 
human rights, I identify the literary and historical contexts within which this discourse 
operates and how dissenting narratives re-imagine the ethico-political. 
The genealogy of human rights is deeply intertwined with the history of the 
nation-state. In the mid-twentieth century there was a transition from nation-based 
modern human rights, as they are articulated in the late eighteenth century French 
Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen and the US American Declaration of 
Independence, to contemporary international human rights, which are outlined in the 
United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). Modern human rights, 
which were conceived as natural law, were established along with the modern nation-
state, and they were based in Kantian ideas about rational man being guided by moral 
truths and Lockean notions of a social contract with the state. Modern human rights 
reinforced the sovereignty ofthe nation-state by locating rights in the state. 
Contemporary human rights emerged after World War II with the UDHR, which 
positivized individual human rights in international law. The institutionalization of 
contemporary human rights law put into place a structure through which international 
governance could challenge state sovereignty in order to protect individuals from the 
state. Notably, the international human rights regime has increasingly challenged state 
sovereignty since decolonization, during which time post-independence states have been 
attempting to establish their sovereignty against former colonial powers and the 
increasingly influential forces of multinational capital. 
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The expansion of contemporary human rights is indicative of a significant 
transformation in the current political landscape. Discussions of late twentieth and early 
twenty-first century globalization have supported the notion that a shift is underway from 
a nation-state-based political system to, what Arjun Appadurai terms, "a postnational 
political world" (22). While Appadurai's observation that collectivities are expanding 
beyond the boundaries ofthe state is certainly true, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak's more 
nuanced understanding of the changing role of the nation-state reveals that human rights 
violations are actually a symptom of the conflict between the nation and the state that has 
resulted from the evolution of capital. 
Spivak notices that the state is bound by financial commitments to international 
entities, and it serves these rather than the nation. Describing "the loosened hyphen 
between nation and state," Spivak explains, "the latter is mortgaged further and further by 
the forces offinancialization" (A Critique 364). So, states now have more of a vested 
interest in global capital than in the nation. Yet, according to Spivak, the "genealogical 
force" of the nation-state persists in the way a managerial state oversees the movement of 
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capital on the free market (Butler and Spivak 79). The state is still structured by the 
nation, but the growth of global capital has shifted the priorities of states. As states 
attempt to harness global capital they too often compromise the wellbeing of the nation in 
order to manage the flow of capital. 
As the best interests of the nation and state diverge, there is greater pressure on 
cultural narratives to redefine the relationship between nation and state in a way that 
resolves the conflict between the two. As Spivak notes, "the lines of contact between 
imperialism and de-colonization on the one hand, and the march of world capitalism on 
the other, constitute the most encompassing crisis of narrative today -the problem of 
producing plausible stories so business can go on as usual" (A Critique 340). Neoliberal 
narratives that present free trade as a way to develop struggling nations promise the 
benefits of capitalism to those inside and outside 'developing' nations, and in this way 
they help to gain support for business as usual. Furthermore, couching development talk 
within a narrative of human rights (as if development facilitates the recognition of human 
rights) depoliticizes the failures of development and dissociates suffering from the 
socioeconomic conditions that result from economic imperialism.4 By diffusing the crises 
that neoliberal economic policies fail to resolve and often exacerbate, human rights 
discourse reinforces a development narrative, which casts free trade as the progenitor of 
universal economic development, as a plausible story. 
The discourse that supports the "juridico-legal arm" of"extra-state collective 
action" (Butler and Spivak 83) often locates rights in shared humanity,5 but human rights 
exhibit a tension between national and international sovereignty that undermines the 
notion that rights are inherent to humanity.6 In the mid-twentieth century Hannah Arendt 
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noticed the paradox of rights: in order to claim rights an individual must be endowed with 
the "right to have rights" (294). This right to have rights is tied to the nation-state, for as 
Arendt shows, human rights are actually the rights of citizens (297). International 
organizations and institutions endeavor to require nation-states to enforce human rights 
law. 
Besides making attempts to regulate how states allocate rights, the contemporary 
human rights movement increasingly focuses on humanitarianism in an effort to provide 
aid and relief for those whose rights are not being met. Humanitarianism attempts to 
separate rights from national citizenship and depoliticize conflicts by treating people as 
bodies in need. In short, it endeavors to transcend struggles between competing 
sovereignties by imagining a post-national world and invoking a universal human. As 
Wendy Brown recognizes, humanitarian activism "presents itself as something of an 
anti politics" ( 453) and "casts subjects as yearning to be free of politics" ( 456). However, 
the right to have rights generates politically situated subjects who become part of 
struggles between national and international sovereignties. 
Brown distinguishes between the discourse of human rights, which portrays 
human rights efforts as politically neutral, and the political realities in which human 
rights projects operate, noting: "rights are not just defenses against social and political 
power but are, as an aspect of governmentality, a crucial aspect of power's aperture. As 
such, they are not simply rules and defenses against power, but can themselves be tactics 
and vehicles of governance and domination" (459). 'Politically neutral' rights language is 
deployed to support conflicting agendas, and Brown insists, "there is no such thing as 
mere reduction of suffering or protection from abuse - the nature of the reduction or 
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protection is itselfproductive of political subjects and political possibilities (460). Rather 
than being politically neutral, human rights discourse categorizes and disciplines 
individuals according to various political motives. 
I investigate the literary interactions ofthe political subjects who populate the 
dominant narrative of human rights, keeping in mind Spivak's point that human rights 
produce both agents and dependents and Alain Badiou's explanation of the 'universal' 
human as a split subject made up of victims and benefactors (Spivak "Righting" 1; 
Badiou 12-13). I locate agents and dependents and victims and benefactors in literary 
texts, concentrating especially on the narrator and reader. My analysis of the political 
relationship between these figures is informed by debates about state sovereignty and 
political possibilities, to which Giorgio Agamben and Judith Butler have made 
contributions. Whereas Agamben's discussion of sovereignty focuses on the positions of 
the homo sacer and the sovereign in relation to the rule of law,7 Butler acknowledges 
people are more than the identities the law assigns, and the law cannot render life bare. 
For Agamben humanitarianism keeps the refugee a refugee: "humanitarian 
organizations ... can only grasp human life in the figure of bare or sacred life, and 
therefore, despite themselves, maintain a secret solidarity with the very powers they 
ought to fight" (Agamben 133). Indeed, an important premise of this dissertation is that 
human rights projects do not resolve the inequalities that generate violence, and they 
sometimes even maintain or extend conditions of inequality. But, rather than 
understanding the refugee, or others who lack the right to have rights, as bare life as 
Agamben does, I concur with Butler who argues, "[ n ]o one is ever returned to bare life, 
no matter how destitute the situation becomes, because there are a set of powers that 
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produce and maintain this situation of destitution, dispossession, and displacement" 
(Butler and Spivak 1 0). Butler insists the very marking of a person as bare life means this 
person is not bare life. She clarifies: "they are without legal protection but in no way 
relegated to a 'bare life': this is a life steeped in power ... power is not the same as law" 
(8-9). Butler observes that even ifthe law does not recognize a person, he or she is still 
subject to the machinations of power. 
The popular discourse of human rights that I critique attempts to extend the 
juridical into a literary space by requiring representations of political violence and 
inequality to adhere to a testimonial narrative structure. Joseph Slaughter's findings 
concerning the relationship between human rights law and literature provide useful 
background for my literary analysis of human rights discourse and the testimonial 
narrative structure. He argues that human rights law and the Bildungsroman are 
"mutually enabling fictions" (4), and both attempt "to imagine, normalize, and realize 
what the Universal Declaration and early theorists of the novel call 'the free and full 
development ofthe human personality'" (4). He notices both assume "to become a 
subject (a freely and fully developed person) within a particular sociopolitical formation 
is to be capable of fully exercising the rights enabled by that formation, which entails, at 
the same time, a 'free' submission to its norms" (9). Slaughter demonstrates that the 
common narrative trajectory of both human rights law and the Bildungsroman presumes 
it is through development that one may achieve the subject's right to have rights. He 
identifies a structural analogy between fiction and law and facilitates a discussion about 
the way novels that subscribe to a developmental logic reinforce the idea that nations, and 
their subjects, are located at various points along a developmental trajectory. Whereas 
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Slaughter analyzes the institutionalization of contemporary human rights, I am interested 
in the more recent popularization of the language of human rights. 
Rather than further analyzing the relationship between human rights law and 
literature, I focus on what Samuel Moyn calls the ''vernacularization" (218-19) of human 
rights. This dissertation is concerned with the increased circulation of the language of 
human rights and how this popular discourse operates in literature. As Moyn has shown, 
the expansion of the language of human rights began in the late 1970s and is connected to 
the perceived failure of anti-colonial nationalism.8 By this moment, Moyn explains, "self-
determination, like other transformative political utopias, had lost its appeal to Western 
observers, especially because of its frequently violent outcomes. An idealism based on 
human rights served as an alternative" (173). This dissertation asks how this "idealism 
based on human rights" ( 173) shapes contemporary literary articulations of political 
violence, inequality, and injustice in the postcolony. 
As human rights discourse has entered the popular lexicon, literature has become 
a space from which to do the work of the contemporary human rights movement. Kay 
Schaffer and Sidonie Smith reveal how heavily "human rights discourses, norms, and 
instruments depend upon the international commitment to narratability" (3). They 
explain, "for rights discourse to become activated victims need to come forward and 
testify" (3), and they regard literature as an opportunity for victims to do so. Arguing for 
the effectiveness of what they call "life narratives" (1), they proclaim: 
These stories demand that readers attend to histories, lives, and experiences often 
vastly different from their own. As people meet together and tell stories, or read 
stories across cultures, they begin to voice, recognize, and bear witness to a 
diversity of values, experiences, and ways of imagining a just social world and of 
responding to injustice, inequality, and human suffering. Indeed, over the last 
twenty years, life narratives have become one of the most potent vehicles for 
advancing human rights claims (1). 
Celebrating storytelling as testimony, Schaffer and Smith exhibit a hope that persists in 
the contemporary human rights movement: that autobiographical texts, third-person 
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narrative accounts, and novels detailing trauma will function as testimony, and a cathartic 
exchange between a testifying narrator and a reader-witness will inspire people to remedy 
injustice. 
While narrative certainly can unite people in an imagined community of readers, 
the relationship that the human rights framework constructs between the narrator and 
reader is problematic. Even if its readers engage in more than a literary humanitarianism 
in which they fulfill their perceived function by reading alone, problems arise in the way 
agency is assigned. A testimonial narrative structure distributes agency disproportionately 
amongst narrators, readers, and those who may not be either and are more likely part of 
an underclass in need of rights. This creates an imagined community of readers that 
corresponds to a privileged class, which cuts across national boundaries and divisions 
between 'developed' and 'developing' worlds.9 For this imagined community of 
humanitarian readers, united by economic privilege and called upon to relieve the 
suffering Other, the language of human rights is an innocuous way to protest injustice 
and inequality without disrupting structures of global capitalism. 
This dissertation not only argues against narrating and reading political violence 
in terms of human rights but also asks how literature might decouple what it means to be 
human from its normative discursive framing and in doing sore-imagine the ethico-
political. Because there are many ways of being human, difference should not undermine 
an individual's humanity, and one should not have to prove this humanity. However, 
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within the human rights framework difference (including subalternity) often puts an 
individual's humanity into question and forecloses the right to have rights. This 
dissertation explores the potential of a posthumanist mode of narrating and reading. The 
purpose of such a methodology is to critique the frameworks through which humanism 
reproduces an exclusionary 'universal' that enables dehumanization, discrimination, and 
subalternity. As Bart Simon clarifies, "the posthuman is figured not as a radical break 
from humanism, in the form of neither transcendence nor rejection, but rather as 
implicated in the ongoing critique of what it means to be human" (8).10 I ask what it 
means to be human in the postcolony and how challenging normative conceptions of the 
human might offer a way to rethink the portrayal of political violence as trauma and shift 
the focus from the spectacle of suffering onto the harmful material conditions, 
government policies, and transnational business practices that generate suffering. 
Moreover, I consider how reframing inequality and injustice through posthumanist 
narrative analysis might provide a useful way to critique contemporary forms of 
imperialism. 
My first two chapters problematize the way the human rights paradigm equates 
narrative voice with agency and allows a privileged reader to contemplate suffering as 
evidence of a universal ethical crisis rather than a situated political conflict. Chapter one, 
"Speaking of Human Rights: Narrative Voice and the Paradox of the Unspeakable in J.M. 
Coetzee's Foe and Disgrace," critiques the way human rights discourse treats narrative 
voice as a metaphor for agency and requires individuals to perform a particular 
subjectivity to access rights. While Foe problematizes the project of writing back for 
reinforcing the agency of those who speakfor the subaltern, Disgrace destabilizes the 
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supremacy ofthe 'universal' humanist narrative voice as it comments on post-apartheid 
South Africa's public, political staging of human rights. Disgrace gestures toward a 
posthumanist implementation of justice by refusing to personify the endangered dogs its 
main character attempts to honor and by undermining the verifiability of cognitive 
assumptions. 
Moving from narrator to reader, chapter two, "Witnessing Political Violence: 
Literary Testimony and the Crisis of the Humanitarian Reader," argues that the narrative 
structure of literary humanitarianism encourages privileged readers to contemplate 
suffering as a depoliticized crisis of the imagination. I detail how Philip Gourevitch's 
account of genocide in Rwanda and Antjie Krog's representation of the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission hearings in South Africa present political violence as 
unspeakable trauma and attempt to overcome it by engaging a humanitarian reader. Then, 
I analyze how Indra Sinha's Animal's People challenges such a project by mixing the 
metaphors of seeing and hearing, unsettling 'the human,' and critiquing humanitarian 
journalism for effacing economic and political realities like those of the 1984 gas leak in 
Bhopal, India. 
Following these critiques of literary testimony and the inequality it reinforces 
between narrator and reader, chapter three, "Literature and the Archive: Narrating 
Uncertainty in Zoe Wicomb's David's Story," compares conflicting narrative 
methodologies for engaging the historical archive in the transition out of apartheid. I 
show how Wicomb' s novel transgresses a rights framework as it explores the relationship 
between archival memory and political reality in post-apartheid South Africa. The novel 
presents gender as a metaphor that illustrates different approaches for representing 
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apartheid-era violence. I argue that David's Story is able to confront taboo apartheid-era 
torture, sexual abuse, and systemic gender inequality within the political party that led the 
country out of apartheid, because it rejects the idealized humanist narrative of a "New 
South Africa" and reinterprets ruptures within the archive as openness to unknown 
political possibilities. 
While the previous chapters show how human rights discourse depoliticizes 
violence and fetishizes suffering related primarily to armed conflict, chapter four, 
"Narrating Transnational Identity and Remapping the Postcolonial in Three Caribbean 
Texts," asks how representations of contemporary economic and cultural imperialism 
may resist literary humanitarian readings. I analyze how Jamaica Kincaid's A Small 
Place, Michelle Cliff's No Telephone to Heaven, and Derek Walcott's Omeros challenge 
the rubric of human rights as they narrate histories of colonialism and continued 
economic and cultural imperialism. Together these texts not only reveal how the 
supremacy of transnational capital exploits postcolonial subjects regardless of their 
humanity and national citizenship, but they also reveal the limitations of identity politics 
and imagine what revolution might look like in the postcolony. 
My discussion of economic and cultural imperialism in chapter four leads me to 
ask in chapter five what happens when the postcolonial subject seeks refuge from the 
inequalities and injustices in the postcolony as part of a new diaspora. Chapter five, 
"Refugee Stories: Contemporary Imperialism and the New Diaspora," reveals how 
Abdulrazak Gurnah's By the Sea and Edwidge Danticat's The Dew Breaker problematize 
cultural narratives about the contemporary refugee whose migration occurs after 
decolonization. Rather than rigidly defining people and states as victims, perpetrators, or 
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saviors, these refugee narratives enact a politics beyond the limited frame of the juridical. 
They destabilize the boundaries of victimhood and reveal the complexities of a new 
diaspora that cannot simply be collapsed into the nation-state system. I synthesize the 
critiques I present in "Narrative States" as I analyze how Gurnah's and Danticat's novels 
plot the transnational intersection of postcoloniality and human rights and unhinge 
representation from individual subjectivity. These novels provide compelling evidence 
that the value of literature is not in staging humanitarian resolutions but in interrogating 
the logical frameworks that sustain inequality. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Speaking of Human Rights: Narrative Voice and the Paradox of the Unspeakable in J.M. 
Coetzee's Foe and Disgrace 
Human Rights discourse recognizes storytelling as a·technology of both empowerment 
and subordination. It situates literature as an important site from which to assert one's 
rights and plots individuals within a narrative of universal humanism. In order to lay 
claim to human rights, individuals must write themselves into the humanist narrative by 
successfully articulating themselves as fully developed human persons. In this chapter I 
analyze narrative voice in J.M. Coetzee's Foe and Disgrace. Both novels acknowledge 
the implications of speaking and being spoken in a story: Foe conceptually and 
historically in relation to structures of imperialism and patriarchy and Disgrace in the 
contemporary, ethically and politically complicated context of post-apartheid South 
Africa. I frame my reading of these texts through the problematics of testimony and 
discuss how this discursive apparatus for achieving the "right to have rights" structures 
the way stories addressing political violence and inequality may and may not be told. 11 I 
elaborate on the way each of these novels rejects a testimonial function for literature by 
declining to make silenced voices speak and by forcing the reader to dwell within the 
unsettling paradox of the unspeakable. Both novels depict fragments and offer glimpses 
of voices that cannot be fully articulated within current discursive structures. Rather than 
forcing the encapsulation of a voice that is made to speak according to a fixed rights 
framework, Foe and Disgrace call attention to the inadequacy of the testimonial narrative 
voice to transform the conditions about which it speaks. 
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Coetzee's writing in these two novels aims not to develop and introduce subaltern 
voices so as to supplement or broaden a narrow humanist universal, but instead to 
interrogate this universal and appeal for a posthumanist articulation of political violence. 
Foe reveals the ultimate futility of attempting to insert new narrators within the 
framework of human rights to expand the notion of the universal human. The novel 
suggests it is necessary instead to question the way narrative functions within this 
framework. As it encounters the limitations of the postcolonial project of writing back to 
master narratives, Foe casts doubt on the cathartic and political potential of articulating 
one's experiences of oppression and trauma. In refusing to conform to the universal 
humanist framework that Foe challenges, Disgrace demonstrates the need for a 
posthumanist implementation of justice. Rather than concentrating on developing and 
integrating hitherto silenced narrative voices to inflate the humanist universal, the 
posthumanist approach toward which Disgrace gestures problematizes the application of 
narrative voice as a determinant of one's right to have rights. It thereby rejects the 
humanist ideal of personality development as a way to define proper subject formation. 12 
Written in late-apartheid and post-apartheid South Africa, respectively, Foe 
( 1986) and Disgrace ( 1999) not only comment on the power dynamics of storytelling but 
are also caught up in arguments over the political responsibilities that literature should 
fulfill. In fact, the most prominent debate that structures analyses of Coetzee's fiction is 
whether or not it appropriately addresses apartheid. As Brian Macaskill and Jeanne 
Colleran explain, "The charge most commonly leveled against Coetzee by South African 
critics is that of political quiescence, of producing novels that neither sufficiently address 
nor affirm the contiguities between the literary domain and historical-economic political 
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realities" ( 432). Michael Marais seconds this evaluation, specifying, "During the 1980s, a 
perennial criticism of Coetzee' s fiction was that it did not engage with the depredations 
of apartheid" ("From the Standpoint" 229). 13 A considerable amount of scholarship is 
also devoted to responding to this contention. 14 Samuel Durrant insists the fiction 
Coetzee writes is in conversation with the political reality of apartheid. He suggests, 
"Coetzee' s novels testify to the suffering engendered by apartheid precisely by refusing 
to translate that suffering into narrative" ( 430-1 ). As a white South African of a relatively 
privileged class, Coetzee perhaps self-consciously does not attempt to narrate the 
perspectives of black or coloured South Africans. Instead, he presents metanarratives that 
comment on the complications of trying to speak for people whose position one does not 
inhabit. Thus, his literary works not only analyze relationships of power in South Africa, 
but are also relevant in trying to understand how human rights discourse shapes power 
dynamics more widely. While many critics comment on the way Coetzee's novels refuse 
to narrate the Other, I argue this refusal operates within and against an all-consuming 
discourse of human rights that threatens to overwrite non-normative perspectives by 
absorbing them into its teleology. 
The human rights framework that Foe and Disgrace resist constructs testimony as 
a forum for establishing rights, and it assigns literature the responsibility of narrativizing 
testimony. Kay Schaffer and Sidonie Smith discuss how heavily "human rights 
discourses, norms, and instruments depend upon the international commitment to 
narratability" (3). They explain, "for rights discourse to become activated victims need to 
come forward and testify" (3), and they regard literature as an opportunity for victims to 
do so. Arguing that literature is an effective form of testimony, they stress, "over the last 
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twenty years, life narratives have become one of the most potent vehicles for advancing 
human rights claims" (1). 15 In their celebration of storytelling as testimony, Schaffer and 
Smith exhibit a hope that persists in contemporary human rights movements: that 
autobiographical texts, third-person narrative reports, and novels detailing human rights 
abuses will function as testimony and that this evidence of suffering will inspire people to 
remedy injustice. 
Writing back - a trend that emerges in the literature of the mid-twentieth century 
out of anti-colonial movements -reinforces the human rights construction of literature as 
testimony. Such literature, written from the perspective of the (post)colonial Other, poses 
increasing challenges to canonical Western literary representations that present the West 
as the ideal of universal humanism. Writing back becomes a way to establish agency and 
demand the right to have rights. 16 It focuses on recovering colonial or pre-colonial bodies 
and attempts to access the stories that colonialism silenced. 17 As Elleke Boehmer 
recognizes in her discussion of Foe in the early nineteen nineties, "in postcolonial 
nationalist discourses of the last number of decades, images of the scrutinized, scored 
subject body have become the focus of attempts at symbolic reversal and transfiguration. 
Representing its own silence, the colonized body speaks; uttering its wounds, it negates 
its muted condition" (272). Popularized in anti-colonial literature and supported by 
postcolonial criticism, this move to establish the authority of the colonial Other and write 
back to the imperial cultural apparatus is an important step in anti-colonial and early 
postcolonial movements. 18 
However, over time writing back has become a function of the human rights 
infrastructure insofar as it operates according to the notion that one may right a wrong by 
21 
invoking a discursive apparatus to speak the subaltern condition. In the fiction associated 
with writing back, the colonized body is "converted into language, often into 
autobiography" (Boehmer 272), which is ideally "a process not of reclamation only, but 
importantly of self-articulation, healing through speaking one's condition" (272). Human 
rights discourse promotes storytelling as a way to expose wrongs and overcome their 
traumatic effects. It suggests that by defining rights against wrongs, literature may claim 
rights for those who have previously been denied them within universal humanism. 
Responding to the ethical turn in politics and philosophy, Alain Badiou offers an 
incisive critique of the human rights logic that supports the project of writing back. 19 
Badiou undermines the existence of the "abstract Subject" (40) that universal humanism 
suggests is endowed with natural rights?0 He argues, "There is only a particular kind of 
animal, convoked by certain circumstances to become a subject- or rather, to enter into 
the composing of a subject" ( 40). The construction of this subject, in turn, produces the 
idea of the Other who has not yet developed into a proper subject. Against 
humanitarianism's perception that it is "the uncivilized that demands of the civilized a 
civilizing intervention" (13), Badiou objects to the way "ethics requires that the Other be 
in some sense carried by a principle of alterity" (22). He instead posits, "Infinite alterity 
is quite simply what there is" (25). His theorization of "infinite alterity" challenges a 
rights framework that conceives of difference within a binary structure. He observes that 
human rights logic tolerates differences only insofar as they function within the 
boundaries of a 'universal' subject that is bifurcated into victims and saviors. 
Presumably, this split subject is united in its struggle against the 'Evil' that threatens to 
destroy the 'universal' human.21 In the project of writing back, subaltern victims are 
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united with literary benefactors who are eager to challenge the various 'Evils' that inhibit 
proper subject development within the narrative ofuniversal humanism. Writing back 
thus reinforces narrative voice as a determinant of proper subjectivity and reconstitutes 
the narrative of universal humanism. 
Foe models the project of writing back, exposing not only the silences in a master 
narrative but also the complications of this premise. It reconfigures Daniel Defoe's 
Robinson Crusoe by way of Susan Barton, a narrator culled from Defoe's Roxana and 
revealed as a fellow castaway on Cruso's island?2 In Foe Susan pursues and even haunts 
Mr. Foe, who is already a well known author.23 She beseeches him to compose a story 
about the time that Cruso, his servile companion Friday, and she were on the island. In 
letters, scattered recollections, and vaguely addressed musings that appear throughout the 
novel, Susan relays details about Cruso and Friday as well as her own arrival on the 
island. According to Susan, they were all rescued, but Cruso died aboard the ship that 
brought Friday and her to England. Susan is a complex character who experiences both 
subordination as a woman within a patriarchal society as well as privilege as a First-
World subject within the system of imperialism. Throughout Coetzee' s novel she relays 
the details of her story to Mr. Foe - who later presumably leaves her out of his novel 
Robinson Crusoe. But, in relation to Friday, who is mute in Coetzee's novel, Susan finds 
herself in a position of power. When she realizes the tale she hopes Mr. Foe will tell will 
be incomplete without Friday's story, she becomes obsessed with overcoming Friday's 
silence so that she might assert her own narrative authority. Her desperation to access 
Friday's story reveals how the project of writing back to Robinson Crusoe depends on a 
ventriloquism that attempts to speak that which remains unspeakable within the master 
narrative. The novel thus both acknowledges the potential value of writing back and 
reveals its limit point. 
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My analysis of Coetzee' s reinterpretation of Robinson Crusoe is informed by the 
connection Joseph Slaughter identifies between Defoe's novel and the definition of the 
'universal' person in human rights law. Slaughter calls attention to the way the Third 
Committee of drafters of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) 
"extrapolated from Crusoe transcendent literary proof to substantiate their ideal of human 
personality development" (50).24 Defoe's novel, to which Coetzee writes back in Foe, 
depicts Crusoe cultivating a 'civilized' space on an uninhabited island using salvaged 
tools and the labor of a 'native' from a nearby island who he captures and names Friday. 
Slaughter notes that the drafters of the UDHR pointed to Crusoe to support the idea that 
the rights-bearing human personality must be developed through a societal connection?5 
As Slaughter explains, "From the point of view ofthe law, 'person' is a technical term 
designating a 'right-and-duty-bearing unit"' (58)?6 Yet, ifpersonhood is achieved 
through societal recognition, which the laws of a state formalize, human beings do not 
originate as "right-and-duty-bearing unit[s]" (58). Since human rights are not actually 
inherent, the human being must develop a legal personality by way of the state in order to 
establish what Hannah Arendt calls "the right to have rights" (294)?7 Contemporary 
human rights law, as it is articulated in the UDHR imposes a particular narrative 
trajectory. It upholds the Crusoe model as an ideal by which those without the right to 
have rights may gain recognition from a state. 
While Slaughter briefly acknowledges the UDHR drafters' inattention to 
Robinson Crusoe's Friday, he does so in order to make a point about their understanding 
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of Crusoe's human personality development, rather than to analyze Friday's subaltern 
condition (and he also does not reference Foe)?8 In his discussion of the UDHR drafters' 
interpretation of Robinson Crusoe, Slaughter limits his commentary regarding Friday in 
order to focus primarily on the relationship between contemporary human rights law and 
the bildungsroman. He identifies these forms of law and literature as "mutually enabling 
fictions" (4) that project a humanist ideal of personality development.29 I consider Friday 
in more depth to show how the Crusoe model that substantiates human rights law relies 
on Friday's subjugation. I build on Slaughter's observations regarding Robinson Crusoe's 
impact on the UDHR and his discussion of the bildungsroman insofar as I approach Foe 
as a refusal to articulate a postcolonial bildungsroman through Friday. Foe shows that 
both Cruso's and Susan's personhood depend on Friday's subjugation. Friday's 
personhood may only be established if he subjects himself to a narrative trajectory 
through which he overcomes his supposed savagery. The novel thus provides an 
opportunity to both analyze the postcolonial project of writing back to the false universal 
that Robinson Crusoe establishes and to understand the need to move beyond writing 
back. 
Foe stages the project of writing back via Susan since Friday does not speak. It 
imagines a scenario in which Friday, with Susan as his witness and sponsor, might parrot 
Cruso's supposedly universal narrative voice to establish himself as a fully developed 
person. However, it refuses to follow through with this narrative trajectory. Instead of 
portraying Friday's personal development via Susan, who also attempts to subject Friday 
to her will, Foe exposes the politics that narrative voice takes on in a postcolonial critique 
that is structured by the discourse of human rights. Susan's attempts to establish her own 
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rights by speaking for Friday reveal the internal hierarchy within the human rights 
movement. Representative of a particular feminist agenda to empower women as agents 
of universal humanism, Susan seeks to administer the development of Friday's narrative 
voice in order to establish her own authority. 
In order to understand the hierarchy within which a human rights framework 
positions Friday and Susan, I invoke Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak to distinguish between 
the subaltern who cannot speak from within the discourse of human rights and those 
oppressed persons whose citizenship and class position allow them to engage the rights 
infrastructure. Spivak emphasizes the distinction between the term "subaltern" and 
"oppressed" or "Other." She reminds those who conflate these terms that subalternist 
historians define subaltern as "everything that has limited or no access to the cultural 
imperialism" (Spivak in Leon De Kock 45). Moreover, she clarifies that her argument 
that the subaltern cannot speak is based on the premise that the subaltern are those who 
are denied dialogue within the hegemonic discourse. 30 In terms of human rights, Friday 
represents the subaltern who are denied the right to have rights. In contrast, Susan, who is 
able to engage in dialogue to work against her own and Friday's subordination, is not 
subaltern; her right to have rights is recognized, even if some or all of her rights are 
ultimately not honored. 31 
Susan's right to have rights is accentuated by Friday's condition of subalternity. 
She acknowledges the disparity between Friday and herself as she attempts to explain 
their different silences to Mr. Foe: 
You err most tellingly in failing to distinguish between my silences and the 
silences of a being such as Friday. Friday has no command of words and therefore 
no defence against being re-shaped day by day in conformity with the desires of 
others. I say he is a cannibal and he becomes a cannibal[ ... ] what he is to the 
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wo~ld is wh~t I make of him. Therefore the silence of Friday is a helpless silence. 
He IS the child of his silence, a child unborn, a child waiting to be born that 
cannot be born. Whereas the silence I keep regarding Bahia and other matters is 
chosen and purposeful: it is my own silence (Coetzee, Foe 121-2). 
For most of the narrative Susan is able to exercise both her right to speak and to remain 
silent about those things that she chooses. Her moments of silence in Foe (like Lucy's in 
Disgrace, which I discuss later in this chapter) are primarily a matter of choice, while 
Friday's silence is imposed upon him. Friday cannot speak within either the discourse of 
colonialism in Defoe's master narrative or within the rights discourse that writes back to 
that master narrative. He is figured as a "child unborn" (122), because he is unable to 
articulate himself as a fully formed subject. Having "no command of words" imprisons 
him in a "helpless silence" (122). In one sense this suggests that his silence renders him 
helpless, meaning subaltern. But, it also implies that there is no help for this silence and 
that subalternity itself cannot be helped -meaning it cannot be prevented or eradicated 
because it serves a function. 
The subaltern condition cannot be helped so long as human rights discourse 
fetishizes the subaltern. In this vein Mr. Foe points out to Susan, "We deplore the 
barbarism of whomever maimed him, yet have we, his later masters, not reason to be 
secretly grateful? For as long as he is dumb we can tell ourselves his desires are dark to 
us, and continue to use him as we wish" (148). By establishing narrative voice as a 
measure of one's right to have rights and then determining which stories may be 
articulated and how, human rights discourse disallows narrative voices like Friday's that 
do not fit within its discursive framework. In turn, it allows some, such as Friday's "later 
masters" (148), to articulate their own agency as humanitarians by working for the 
development of subaltern voices. Thus, human rights discourse surfaces as literary 
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humanitarianism in the project of writing back.32 Mr. Foe continues, "as it was a slaver's 
stratagem to rob Friday of his tongue, may it not be a slaver's stratagem to hold him in 
subjection while we cavil over words in a dispute we know to be endless? [ ... ] Friday 
follows you: you do not follow Friday. The words you have written and hung around his 
neck say he is set free; but who, looking at Friday, will believe them?" (150). When 
literary narratives attempt to speak for the subaltern by plotting their development as a 
challenge to a master narrative, literature holds those in a position such as Friday's "in 
subjection" (150). Writing back can only expose Friday's subalternity, and it actually 
keeps him subaltern because it is stuck in the moment of identifying this subalternity. 
Through the relationship between Susan and Friday, the novel shows how literary 
humanitarianism actually sustains subalternity as it attempts to aid the subaltern by 
speaking for them. The testimonial narrative on which literary humanitarianism depends 
produces some as agents and some as dependents. As Spivak remarks, "'Human Rights' 
is not only about having or claiming a right or a set of rights, it is also about righting 
wrongs, about being the dispenser of these rights" (Spivak, "Righting" 169), and "the 
work of righting wrongs is shared above a class line that to some extent and unevenly 
cuts across race and the North-South divide" (171).33 Because there is great power in 
allocating rights, concentrating this power above a class line results in a kind of 
stratification that associates economic privilege with an inherent right to allocate rights. 
This in turn naturalizes the connection between poverty and a lack of rights. Within the 
contemporary context in which Coetzee inserts Susan as a character in the Robinson 
Crusoe narrative, she is representative of those above a class line who work to right 
wrongs. 
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Susan initially appears to be a figure who will challenge Robinson Crusoe on 
behalf of all those whom that master narrative renders unspeakable. She is able to 
articulate the feminist project of women's empowerment by establishing her position 
within the master narrative and exposing its patriarchy. However, though Susan's story is 
incomplete without Friday's, she cannot tell his story for him. She thus laments, "To tell 
my story and be silent on Friday's tongue is no better than offering a book for sale with 
pages in it quietly left empty. Yet the only tongue that can tell Friday's secret is the 
tongue he has lost!" (Coetzee, Foe 67). Friday's continued subjection reveals a problem 
with the hegemonic discourse of human rights. As Susan expands the universal to include 
women, she reinforces the authority of a liberal humanist narrative voice. Those like 
Friday who do not articulate themselves within the confines of this voice are excluded 
from structures that promise rights. In her effort to help Friday express himself, Susan 
imposes a testimonial narrative structure that forecloses other narrative possibilities. This 
is problematic because, as Spivak asserts, "you don't give the subaltern voice. You work 
for the bloody subaltern, you work against subalternity" ("Can the Subaltern Speak?" 46). 
Ultimately, rather than imagining Susan speaking for Friday, the novel focuses on his 
silence. It brings this silence to the fore but declines to fill it by constructing a story for 
Friday to tell. Foe thus calls attention to Friday's subaltern condition so as to challenge 
subalternity itself. It analyzes a particular moment, dwelling in it, rather than attempting 
to expand the boundaries of the 'universal' human by depicting Friday's testimonial 
narrative. 
Foe not only acknowledges the distinct position of subalternity, but also questions 
the very agency of narrative voice. Whereas it seems at first that Susan will be 
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empowered as a narrator in Foe, in the end she recognizes that she has gone from 
speaking her story to being spoken as a story. She appeals to Mr. Foe to relay the story 
she wants to tell rather than turn her into a story, arguing, 
I am not a story, Mr Foe ... my life did not begin in the waves. There was a life 
before the water[ ... ] which makes up a story I do not choose to tell. I choose not 
to tell it because to no one, not even to you, do I owe proof that I am a substantial 
being with a substantial history in the world. I choose rather to tell of the 
island[ ... ] for I am a free woman who asserts her freedom by telling her story 
according to her own desire ( Coetzee, Foe 131). 
Susan insists that she should not have to provide "proof' that she is "a substantial being," 
but as it turns out, she is not free to tell her story "according to her own desire" (131). 
Rather, her narrative voice takes on symbolic meaning that renders her an abstraction- a 
literary device deployed to participate in a larger political debate. She thus remarks, "In 
the beginning I thought I would tell you the story of the island and, being done with that, 
return to my former life. But now all my life grows to be story and there is nothing of my 
own left to me ... Nothing is left to me but doubt. I am doubt itself. Who is speaking me?" 
(133). Susan has become a story so much so that she is no longer a person in her own 
right. She instead finds herself to be a device through which to write back to a master 
narrative: she is "doubt itself' (133) undermining Robinson Crusoe. Her narrative in Foe 
is contained in quotes; she asks, "Who is speaking me?" (133); and she ruminates, "When 
I reflect on my story I seem to exist only as the one who came, the one who witnessed, 
the one who longed to be gone: a being without substance, a ghost beside the true body of 
Cruso. Is that the fate of all storytellers?" (51). For Susan, storytelling becomes a form of 
witnessing in which she disappears. She becomes a mechanism through which the text 
bears witness to the relationship between Cruso and Friday and to the gendered and raced 
erasures that occur in the grand narrative of universal humanism. In terms of the way that 
30 
testimony functions in the human rights framework, Susan is an example of a witness 
disappearing in the shadow of her testimony. Though she attempts to speak her story, she 
is ultimately spoken by the discursive framework of human rights. 
While Susan's efforts to speak her own and Friday's story in Foe shows how 
human rights discourse defines the way individuals are able to express themselves, 
Disgrace considers how speaking a story and being spoken within a story materializes in 
the political circumstances of contemporary South Africa. In this former settler colony 
where apartheid structured the relationship between the former colonizer and formerly 
colonized, a new post-apartheid nationalism invokes ubuntu in its attempts to unite a 
nation divided by institutionalized racial violence.34 Its Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (TRC) hearings lauded narrative voice as a way to testify to the occurrence 
of apartheid-era violence and reconcile a divided and traumatized nation. Disgrace 
problematizes the TRC's use of narrative voice, challenging the logic of human rights 
that informs it and suggesting it is necessary to implement a posthumanist perspective to 
address suffering and violence. 35 
In Disgrace David Lurie narrates his fall from a position of influence and 
power.36 Initially a university professor who deploys poetry to assert and excuse his 
sexual domination over women, he becomes a "dog-man" (Coetzee, Disgrace 146). He is 
not only fired but also burned, robbed, and violated (insofar as he reads his daughter 
Lucy's violation as his own) by three attackers who invade Lucy's home. Analyzing 
Foe's Susan and Disgrace's Lucy side-by-side illuminates the complexities and the 
stakes of speaking versus being spoken. 37 Each of these women may choose to speak or 
not to speak within the normative discursive framework, and from a relatively privileged 
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position each may challenge the politics of human rights that structure narrative voice. 
Lucy, however, refuses a disappearance into a symbolic abstraction similar to that which 
Susan experiences in Foe. Whereas Susan struggles against being portrayed solely as a 
story as she fights to have her story told, Lucy declines to speak within a rights 
framework. Disgrace thus takes a stand against converting Lucy into a narrative device 
within a politically charged post-apartheid story. 
Lucy's refusal to speak about her rape by two of the three attackers who invade 
her home enrages her father, David. He regrets that the rapists' story is circulating rather 
than Lucy's, and he worries, "Like a stain the story is spreading across the district. Not 
her story to spread but theirs: they are its owners. How they put her in her place, how 
they showed her what a woman was for" (115). David is outraged that Lucy is being 
spoken rather than speaking, because in the rapists' story Lucy is further degraded. She is 
cast as having deserved that which was done to her, and each time the story is told her 
violation is repeated. 
What David does not acknowledge is that he is speaking Lucy within his story. 
He is like Lucy's rapists not just in forcing himself on his student, Melanie Isaacs. He 
also bears a similarity to them by telling a story in which Lucy is figured as an object of 
ownership in a struggle between men on varying sides of a political conflict. He positions 
Lucy's rape within a narrative defined by racial politics and characterizes it as an act of 
vengeance for apartheid. To David, Lucy's refusal to speak her story is an admission of 
feelings of white guilt for apartheid. He argues that she must speak about her rape 
because otherwise she will be indicating that she is seeking salvation through acceptance 
of her rapists' account of the attack. He thus reads her rape symbolically, suggesting that 
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it is crucial that she participate in shaping how it will be interpreted. David struggles to 
negotiate control over the symbolic meaning of Lucy's rape because to him her rape is 
part of his fall into disgrace; he regards it as his own violation. Lucy protests this, 
admonishing her father: 
You behave as if everything I do is part of the story of your life. You are the main 
character, I am a minor character who doesn't make an appearance until halfway 
through. Well, contrary to what you think, people are not divided into major and 
minor. I am not minor. I have a life of my own, just as important to me as yours is 
to you, and in my life I am the one who makes the decisions (198). 
Lucy resists being assigned a symbolic meaning and cast as a character in David's story. 
She is adamant that it is her decision to speak or not to speak about her rape or anything 
else in her life. She not only rebukes David for attempting to turn her experiences into 
episodes in the story of his life, she also refuses to be defined purely as a testifying voice 
and will not allow herself to be reduced to an allegorical figure of victimhood. 
Ironically, though David is furious that Lucy's attackers are allowed to narrate her 
rape, he does not acknowledge that his account of his own transgressions against his 
student, Melanie, extends his domination over her. David is brought before a university 
disciplinary committee after he uses his position of authority to have sex with Melanie, 
for whom, he acknowledges, the sex is "undesired to the core" (25). In its depiction of the 
university hearing at which David is asked to respond to the grievances against him, 
Disgrace comments on the hearings the TRC held throughout South Africa as the 
apartheid system was being dismantled.38 The novel records David's testimony, but since 
the events in it are focalized through David, it omits Melanie's account to the committee. 
In fact, Disgrace provides only glimpses of the effects that David's transgressions have 
had on Melanie. It never discloses her story and always shows David mediating her voice 
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himself or filtering it through her boyfriend, her father, the university, or the organization 
Women Against Rape. 
By leaving Melanie's testimony out of the narrative, which is focalized through 
David, the novel shows how the testimonial process has failed to reconcile David's and 
Melanie's perspectives. Being faced with the accusations of Melanie's testimony and 
providing his own testimony to the committee does not cause David to discontinue his 
subjection of Melanie within the narrative account that he provides in the novel. Even 
after Melanie provides her testimony David is still able to control the story in Disgrace. 
The novel thus exposes a breakdown of the liberal humanist narrative voice and the 
testimonial structure within which it operates to address injustices. It suggests by proxy 
that the TRC hearings may not resolve conflicts on the ground level for those individuals 
who suffer the effects of the apartheid system and the violence that it institutionalized. 
In its attempts to define Melanie's rights against David's wrongs, the committee 
offers David amnesty if he will provide a truth and reconciliation story that acknowledges 
wrongdoing and expresses repentance. The committee declares: "We would like to help 
you, David, to find a way out of what must be a nightmare" (52). In exchange for a 
confession given in "[a] spirit of repentance" (58), the committee will allow David to put 
his misdeeds behind him and continue as a professor. However, David is not willing to 
cooperate and instead retorts, "What goes on in my mind is my business, not yours ... I 
make no confession. I put forward a plea, as is my right. Guilty as charged. That is my 
plea. That is as far as I am prepared to go" (51). He cites his "right" to put forward a plea, 
because "[t]here is a difference between pleading guilty to a charge and admitting you 
were wrong" (54). David poses his "right" to plead guilty rather than admit he is wrong 
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against the rights that the committee is attempting to define on Melanie's behalf. He 
clings to an outmoded juridical system whose boundaries have shifted in the era of the 
TRC. Citing "Freedom of speech. Freedom to remain silent" (188), he attempts to retreat 
to his former position of power. The novel thus illustrates how the right to speech and the 
right to silence are being redefined in post-apartheid South Africa. 
David's inflexibility exhibits a clash between competing systems of meaning 
making. He is dumbfounded that the committee expects an affective response from him 
and argues, "I have said the words for you, now you want more, you want me to 
demonstrate their sincerity. That is preposterous. That is beyond the scope of the law" 
(55). The process by which the committee judges David's violation of Melanie's rights is 
beyond the scope of the law, because the law does not include a calculus for measuring 
the level or quality of emotion that David does or does not demonstrate. David continues 
to protest, "I won't do it. I appeared before an officially constituted tribunal, before a 
branch of the law. Before that secular tribunal I pleaded guilty, a secular plea. That plea 
should suffice. Repentance is neither here nor there. Repentance belongs to another 
world, to another universe of discourse" (58). David resists a reconciliation of the various 
worlds that he implies the committee is attempting to upend and meld together. It is as if 
he himself belongs "to another world, to another universe of discourse" (58). In his 
suddenly archaic world he was a master of discourse (and he abused this power). Now, 
however, David finds that the committee is deploying the discourse of universal 
humanism in an effort to reconcile his and Melanie's rights. By complicating the dialectic 
between rights and wrongs, the novel poses a question about whether rights are possible 
for both the victim and victimizer. Judging rights against wrongs may actually relegate 
individuals to subjectivities within which they are spoken as either right or wrong. 
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Though both David and Lucy refrain from telling a truth and reconciliation story 
(he as a persecutor and she as a victim), David does not at first realize their positions in 
relation to each other. He begins to sense the correlation between Lucy's rape and his 
unwelcome sexual encounters with Melanie as Lucy's comments become more pointed. 
Lucy says to him, "You are a man, you ought to know. When you have sex with someone 
strange- when you trap her- isn't it a bit like killing? Pushing the knife in; exiting 
afterwards, leaving the body behind covered in blood- doesn't it feel like murder, like 
getting away with murder" (158). Indeed, David did "trap" Melanie. Part of the appeal of 
his former authority was that it allowed him to pursue his sexual desires without regard to 
the way their fulfillment impacted those whom he sought to possess. David even 
describes his impression that Melanie "had decided to go slack, die within herself for the 
duration" (25) of one of their "undesired" (25) sexual encounters. So, the questions David 
considers as he recalls Lucy's words to him are loaded: "You are a man, you ought to 
know: does one speak to one's father like that? Are she and he on the same side?" (159). 
The novel thus exhibits how gender complicates the racial and political divides that have 
resulted from a history of apartheid. It also alludes to the fact that David's actions against 
Melanie and other women have perpetuated the gendering of power and powerlessness. 39 
David's resemblance to Lucy's attackers becomes clearer to him as he considers 
Lucy's rape from the point of view ofher attackers but has difficulty conceiving of it 
from her position. The text reveals, "he can, if he concentrates, if he loses himself, be 
there, be the men, inhabit them, fill them with the ghost of himself. The question is, does 
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he have it in him to be the woman?" (160). David is reluctant to inhabit a position of 
powerlessness. He insists he knows what happened to Lucy, but he can only imagine it 
from the vantage point of the rapists. To "be the woman" would mean encountering the 
violent act Lucy was forced to absorb within her body. It would require him to admit his 
treatment of Melanie was wrong, empathize with the position he put her in, and 
comprehend how his actions have impacted her. Moreover, it would mean intimately 
understanding the powerlessness of such a violation rather than conceptualizing it in 
terms of a larger raced or gendered political narrative. As David struggles with this type 
of personal identification, the novel is careful not to reproduce a humanist framework 
through which he might receive absolution and reestablish his authority. 
Disgrace acknowledges the political contexts in which both Melanie's and Lucy's 
violations occur, but unlike Foe's use of Friday and Susan, Disgrace resists turning its 
character's experiences into allegories for larger political phenomena. These novels take 
up similar characters but plot them differently. Foe challenges the enlightenment 
narrative within which contemporary human rights law is rooted, while Disgrace 
disallows the perpetuation of the humanist framework that Foe problematizes. Both 
novels comment on the way that national politics impact individual lives. But, by 
depicting characters who refuse to deliver truth and reconciliation stories, Disgrace 
avoids conflating history and biography within a humanist approach to justice. In a 
comparison of each novel's characters, it is evident that both Susan and Lucy are in 
precariously gendered positions. They each struggle against male storytellers to define 
themselves. In turn, Mr. Foe and David each personify the authoritative voice of 
universal humanism. However, while Susan seeks validation for herself and Friday 
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through a testimonial narrative, Lucy refuses to speak herself through the discourse of 
human rights. And, while Friday occupies a position of subalternity in Foe, in Disgrace 
the dogs at the clinic where David volunteers stand in for those without the right to have 
rights. I will return to a discussion of the dogs in Disgrace shortly, because they form a 
crucial aspect of Disgrace's posthumanist complication of the rights framework. 
However, in order to understand the implications of the posthumanist move in Disgrace, 
it is first necessary to recognize another significant parallel between the two novels. 
Both Foe and Disgrace also explore music as a site for communicating that which 
seems incommunicable. In an attempt to reestablish his sense of purpose, David sets out 
to compose an opera. His opera reimagines the later years of the British Romantic poet 
Lord Byron's life from the unexplored perspective of Teresa, Byron's young mistress. 
Since Lucy prohibits David from telling her story and he is too self-absorbed to attempt 
to understand Melanie's, he believes "Teresa may be the last one left who can save him" 
(209). For David the project of locating Teresa's voice seems to be his last chance to 
reclaim his authority. His hope to hear Teresa's story in the music he composes 
resembles Susan's desire to hear Friday's story by conversing through what she regards 
as a musical collaboration (Coetzee, Foe 96). Susan soon admits the music they play is 
not only discordant but also that Friday has not been playing with her at all. David 
similarly concludes that he is incapable of hearing the meaning he seeks in his opera. 
And, though David contemplates the possibility that a future scholar might be able to 
recognize that which remains undetectable to him in his music, he acknowledges that his 
work will never have an audience. 
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In both novels art, in the form of music, fails to recover a lost voice or produce a 
voice for one who does not speak. Both texts stage the recovery of a figure from an 
already established narrative and an attempt to speak an unspoken story. David's 
partially-written opera repeats the structure of Foe, exhuming and reimagining Teresa as 
Foe does with Susan. Even the fact that David's opera in Disgrace is incomplete and will 
remain so echoes the way that Susan's story is scattered and appears throughout Foe as 
notes for a story that Mr. Foe will not write. In Disgrace David recognizes the disservice 
he has done to Teresa: "Poor Teresa! Poor aching girl! He has brought her back from the 
grave, promised her another life, and now he is failing her. He hopes she will find it in 
her heart to forgive him" (Coetzee, Disgrace 214). Perhaps such regret at exhuming a 
character from the depths of the Western literary canon extends to Susan as well. The 
way David fails Teresa bears similarity to the way Foe, as a novel, fails Susan, who 
ultimately functions as a literary device in the political project of writing back. Even if 
one of the aims of Foe is to show how Susan is objectified in such a project, the novel 
still reproduces the process by which she is unwritten. Disgrace acknowledges this 
erasure and the extent to which the project of writing back is an exercise in establishing 
agency by way of another's dependency. 
More importantly, Disgrace does not end with the success or even promise of 
David's opera redeeming him; it concludes instead with him as a "dog-man" (146) 
helping to euthanize and dispose of dogs at a clinic near Lucy's home. In turning to dogs, 
Disgrace presents a different plotting of the figures both novels depict. While Friday is 
compared to a dog several times in Foe,40 emphasizing the way he is disregarded as a 
fully developed person through dehumanizing comparisons, Disgrace depicts actual dogs 
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to comment on the position of subalternity. This focus on dogs avoids reinforcing a racial 
or gender divide that marks one group as subordinate. Rather than speakingfor a 
particular subaltern individual or group, the text highlights the condition of subalternity 
to question the humanist conceptualization of justice. 
The text's challenge to subalternity takes shape as David considers how the dog 
corpses are handled. He disposes of their bodies himself in order to prevent the 
incinerator operators from using shovels to "beat [the] corpses into a more convenient 
shape for processing" (146). While he believes "[h]e saves the honour of the corpses" 
(146), David acknowledges, "[h]e may not be their saviour, the one for whom they are 
not too many, but he is prepared to take care of them once they are unable, utterly unable, 
to take care of themselves" (146). Rather than regarding his care for the dogs as 
something that elevates him above them or rescues them, David approaches this work as 
a way to honor them. He accepts that he is not their savior and his capabilities are finite, 
but in caring for them he attempts in a small way to implement a posthumanist notion of 
justice. 
Disgrace supports a posthumanist perspective insofar as it resists comparing all 
life to humans on an evolutionary scale that celebrates the ascendancy of man. Such 
humanist logic has been cited to elevate some humans over others, such as Friday, in a 
developmental narrative. Disgrace attempts to think outside of that framework. Thus, 
David "tries not to sentimentalize the animals he kills" (143) at the clinic, and the novel 
treats the dogs as dogs. It does not personify them or make them an equivalent to humans 
in some sort of evolutionary success story in which they are revealed to embody a legal 
personality and the right to have rights. Rather than calling for an extension of the rights 
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framework to animals, Disgrace's portrayal of dogs calls attention to the condition of 
subalternity to which all life is vulnerable. As dogs they remain Other, unincorporated 
life forms outside of a humanist narrative, and the novel dwells in the ethical paradox that 
they pose. 
The dogs at the clinic are disposed of because they are "too many" ( 146), the 
implication being that because of their perceived overpopulation there are not enough 
resources to care for them. Disgrace asks how the conception of justice might change if 
the focus were not on how to care for the dogs as dependents. Realizing he cannot be "the 
one for whom they are not too many" (146), David acknowledges his efforts to care for 
the dogs would be misplaced. Instead, he approaches them not as "too many" in terms of 
their population, but as "too many" insofar as they exceed the ethical boundaries within 
which current systems of justice operate. 
Rather than trying to expand ethical boundaries, and thereby reinforce the logic 
that imposes them, David attempts to start from nothing. This becomes clear in the 
novel's last pages as David reflects on the impending death of a particular dog. Noting 
that saving this one dog would only mean another dog would die in its place, he decides 
not to postpone or prevent the euthanizing process. Instead, he decides he will carry the 
dog to the operating room, provide support and comfort, and see that the corpse is 
properly burnt; "[h]e will do all that for him when his time comes. It will be little enough, 
less than little: nothing" (220). The significance ofthis line near the end of the novel is 
informed by an earlier conversation between Lucy and David, in which she says, 
"Perhaps that is what I must learn to accept. To start at ground level. With nothing. Not 
with nothing but. With nothing. No cards, no weapons, no property, no rights, no dignity" 
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(205). He responds, "Like a dog" (205), and she confirms, "Yes, like a dog" (205). By the 
end of the novel David is beginning to come to terms with starting from nothing. To start 
at ground level with nothing, like a dog, means abandoning the developmental course 
along which all life is measured as lesser, equal, or greater than. 
Disgrace does not offer a model for the kind of narrative that would provide such 
an alternative conceptualization, but it allows for the possibility of a reading that renders 
its narrative a posthumanist story. This opportunity surfaces because of the relationship 
the novel produces between the text and the reader. As Marais observes, "the novel seeks 
not to render futile the reader's endeavor to say the unsayable, to imagine the 
unimaginable, but rather to inscribe infinite distance between itself and its own reading, 
and thereby attempt to make of reading an event in which the reader encounters what 
exceeds the cognitive categories of his culture and over which he can thus exercise no 
control" ("Task of the Imagination" 88). Such a confrontation defies a humanist reality 
that operates according to the teleological conviction that man will ultimately conquer the 
unknowable and exhibit control over that which was hitherto out of his control. 
Disgrace destabilizes the verifiability of cognitive assumptions. It compels its 
reader to make logical conclusions to determine key elements within its story. However, 
it refrains from verifying allusions as facts so that doubt lingers and undermines the 
reader's confidence in his or her cognitive reasoning. For example, the novel never says 
outright that Lucy is raped,41 but her characterization as a lesbian and her pregnancy 
subsequent to the home invasion serve as clues from which to make an informed, but 
never confirmed, reading of the events.42 By encouraging and even forcing its reader to 
construct meanings where it omits information, the novel showcases narration and 
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reading as distinct sites. Through a copious use of italics, the text also shows David 
continually reading, and more importantly often misreading, those whose stories he 
attempts to mediate. This further undermines the reliability of cognitive reasoning, which 
supports a humanist conception of reality. Disgrace draws attention to the way that 
narration and reading interact to produce meaning that is forever in flux and ultimately 
indeterminable. In the next chapter I will elaborate on the role of the reader and the 
textual exchange between narrator and reader. 
This chapter has focused on narrative voice in particular, citing both Foe and 
Disgrace to illustrate how the master narrative of universal humanism defines the 
dominant discursive framework of human rights. Literary humanitarianism associates 
narrative voice with agency and endeavors to provide a space from which the subaltern 
might speak. However, by imposing a universal humanist narrative, it reinforces rather 
than challenges the subaltern condition. Foe questions the classic enlightenment narrative 
and problematizes the project of writing back to it; Disgrace comments on South Africa's 
public, political staging of human rights, resisting its discursive hegemony. Plotting 
similar characters within different stories, Foe and Disgrace stage the implications of 
being spoken within the discourse of human rights. They show how testimony, which 
materializes in postcolonial literature in the form of writing back, operates within a 
discursive framework that at once restricts which stories may be articulated and produces 
narrative voice as a gauge of one's right to have rights. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Witnessing Political Violence: Literary Testimony and the Crisis ofthe Humanitarian 
Reader 
The startling title of Philip Gourevitch's 1998 nonfiction bestseller, We Wish to Inform 
You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed With Our Families: Stories from Rwanda, 
exemplifies how stories that seek to cultivate humanitarianism establish an affective 
dialectic between the narrator as testifier and reader as witness. Commanding immediate 
attention, the title addresses the reader with an unsettling wish: to inform you about the 
killing of families. But, because these killings have actually already taken place, this is 
really a request for the reader to bear witness to the killings. Using the pronoun "We," the 
title also implies that those who wish to inform the reader are Rwandans who have 
themselves experienced genocidal violence. In fact though, the author is an American 
journalist who has aligned himself with the victims of genocide, portraying himself as a 
medium through which knowledge of genocide may be transmitted to willing readers. 
The title not only hails an outsider reader, but also directly identifies this reader as a 
significant participant in the narrative the text will provide about the hundreds of 
thousands of people killed in the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. This focus on the reader 
becomes problematic when, in its preoccupation with orienting an international 
humanitarian reader, the book decontextualizes events such as the ones surrounding its 
title. 
As it turns out, the title originates from a letter written by a group of Tutsi 
Adventist pastors to a Hutu pastor who was the head of the Adventist church in 
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Mugonero. The letter asked Pastor Elizaphan Ntakirutimana to intercede to prevent his 
fellow pastors and their families from being killed in a Hutu raid on the church, which 
Pastor Ntakirutimana was later proven to have helped organize. The "We" of the title 
remains ambiguous until page forty-two where a translation of the complete letter 
appears, and by this time the implied dialectic between the victims of genocide and the 
humanitarian reader has been established. The immediate effect of the title is to catch the 
attention of an otherwise disconnected reader by way of a shocking direct address, but the 
original exchange was not meant to be between storytellers and international literary 
humanitarians. The title thus decontextualizes the original plea to a fellow Rwandan, 
marking the failure of Rwandans to exhibit a common humanity that it then calls on the 
reader to express by extending this plea beyond the space of the state to an international 
(and primarily American) readership. 
This chapter analyzes the logic by which the "you" of the original address is 
transposed into the "You" that hails the reader. I consider the effects of translating the 
reality of situated events into representations that are primarily concerned with garnering 
the attention of an international, humanitarian readership. In the case of Gourevitch' s 
book, the temporal incongruity of the title and the killing of which it warns exposes the 
text as contrived; it calls out to the reader in the present concerning a "Tomorrow" that 
has already passed and killings that have already taken place. Invoking a moment before 
these killings, it inserts the reader within a temporality that, if not entirely prelapsarian, 
allows one the space from which to imagine oneself responding to this information. That 
the killings have, in reality, already taken place absolves the reader from the guilt of not 
having intervened to prevent atrocity; it enables the reader to reason that if only this 
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warning were administered in real time to the proper recipients the killings may have 
been stopped. Furthermore, it allows the reader to look on innocently at the way in which 
not only Pastor Ntakirutimana in this particular case, but also Hutus in Rwanda more 
broadly, failed to intercede to prevent the killing of Tutsis and actively participated in 
their decimation.43 
In addition to Gourevitch's We Wish to Inform You, I also read Antjie Krog's 
Country of My Skull: Guilt, Sorrow, and the Limits of Forgiveness in the New South 
Africa and Indra Sinha's Animal's People.44 Works of nonfiction, semi-fiction, and 
fiction, respectively, each demonstrates how the politics of human rights shape the 
narrator-reader relationship and how this reflects national-international power dynamics. 
This chapter is thus concerned with the intersection of several factors: that between text 
and reader, fiction and nonfiction, and state and international communities. It is at this 
nexus that each of the texts I analyze attempts to express the suffering related to 
historically and politically situated events: genocide in Rwanda, apartheid violence and 
its post-apartheid aftermath in South Africa, and an industrial disaster similar to the 1984 
Bhopal gas leak and subsequent toxic contamination that killed - and is still killing -
thousands. 45 In this chapter I am particularly attentive to the way that each of these works 
configures its relationship to the reader. Each provides an opportunity to comment on 
conventions of literary humanitarianism, which operate according to the conviction that 
one may engage in a humanitarian act by reading, and thereby witnessing, stories of 
trauma and suffering. Literary humanitarianism approaches literature as testimony, the 
narrator as one who testifies, and the reader as a witness to testimony. The way these 
subjects relate to each other in the literature within which they appear reflects power 
dynamics between the state and the international community. 
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Whereas in chapter one I critique the way human rights discourse equates 
narrative voice with agency, requiring individuals to perform a particular subjectivity in 
order to access the right to have rights, in this chapter I move from narrator as testifier to 
reader as witness. While chapter one discusses how a humanist conception of narrative 
voice, and its relationship to subjectivity and the right to have rights, excludes the 
subaltern from the rights infrastructure and reinforces the agency of those who endeavor 
to speak for them, this chapter questions the function that literary humanitarianism 
institutes for the reader. I analyze Gourevitch's and Krog's texts as examples ofliterary 
humanitarianism that present political violence as unspeakable trauma and attempt to 
overcome it though a testifier-witness dialectic between narrator and reader. I show how 
this treatment of political violence as trauma dislocates suffering from complex histories 
and politically and economically situated conflicts.46 Then, reading Animal's People for 
its critique of the type of literary humanitarianism I identify in the first two texts, I build 
on my argument that the testimonial narrative structure is limiting and that a 
posthumanist approach to narrative offers an effective way to rethink the portrayal of 
political violence as trauma. The posthumanist approach that I identify in Animal's 
People not only decenters the human in conceptualizations of the world but also disrupts 
narratives of development that are grounded in humanist ideas about the formation of a 
'civilized' subject. This posthumanist perspective is critical of the human rights discourse 
that often frames political violence, because within that framework difference (and often 
subalternity) undermines an individual's humanity and forecloses the right to have rights. 
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Each of the three texts in my analysis encapsulates a story within a metanarrative 
that illuminates the way stories are constructed according to the political circumstances in 
which they are told and who might be listening. They each not only attempt to cultivate a 
particular relationship to the reader but also present models of reading within their 
narratives. Paying particular attention to tropes of the senses (particularly seeing and 
hearing), I interrogate Gourevitch's and Krog's attempts to translate suffering via sensory 
descriptions that are intended to overcome what they each perceive to be a crisis of the 
imagination. I analyze how Sinha problematizes this exchange with the reader by mixing 
the metaphors of seeing and hearing. Whereas We Wish to Inform You and Country call 
on the reader to bear witness to testimonies of violence and trauma, Animal's People 
complicates attempts to manage violence in terms of trauma and to convert the corporeal 
experience of trauma into story. The first two texts critique how people witness trauma, 
encouraging them to improve as witnesses but maintaining the testifier-witness dialectic 
as a way to manage complex political histories; the third challenges literary 
humanitarianism and demonstrates the utility of a posthumanist orientation. 
Imagining in Nonfiction: A Journalist's Guide through the Rwandan Genocide 
In its depiction of the genocide in Rwanda, We Wish to Inform You is representative of a 
growing body of literature that seeks to address politically situated events as human 
rights concerns by representing life within such contexts as trauma to a reader-as-witness. 
Orienting its narrative about the genocide in Rwanda around a humanitarian reader, We 
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Wish to Inform You broadly surveys the political climate, details victims' stories, and 
attempts to dissect the psychology that supports genocide. Gourevitch depicts his travels 
throughout Rwanda and its surrounding countries from May 1995 to April 1998, relaying 
his encounters with both victims and perpetrators, his experiences visiting prisons, 
refugee camps, and former killing fields, and his musings on trauma, storytelling, and a 
series of existential questions. 
While the text sharply criticizes the international community for failing to 
intercede quickly enough to stop the violence in Rwanda and for mishandling the 
situation in refugee camps thereafter, in its structure it undermines what might otherwise 
be a powerful political critique. The narrative suggests that by properly witnessing 
testimony, the reader might overcome the metaphysical crisis that genocide poses for 
universal humanism. It subsumes all of the historical, economic, and political information 
it provides within a human rights framework so as to conceptualize genocide for its 
reader. A careful reading will show that Gourevitch's discussion of the way economic 
instability transformed into 'ethnic' rivalry between Tutsis and Hutus and his depiction of 
the struggle for sovereignty between the Rwandan state and the UN is ultimately eclipsed 
by his portrayal of genocide as a crisis of the human imagination. Because the text 
reproduces an inequitable relationship between its Rwandan subjects and its primarily US 
readership that represents genocide in terms of its effect on its privileged reader, it really 
confronts the genocide in Rwanda only insofar as it endeavors to explain how genocide 
fits into its literary humanitarian reader's understanding of the world. Such a focus on a 
privileged, international reader reinforces the fantasy of the 'global citizen' as a human 
rights advocate and the victimized subject as one whose suffering is endemic, but can 
supposedly be overcome through a relationship with a humanitarian reader. 
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At the outset, Gourevitch informs the reader "this is a book about how people 
imagine themselves and one another- a book about how we imagine our world" (6). In 
this statement he incorporates the reader into an indistinct "we" and embraces a 
postmodem conception of reality as that which is continually defined through the 
convergence of an infinite number of cognitive perceptions. He continues his discussion 
of imagining the world to offer a shorthand way of explaining genocide in Rwanda: "The 
government, and an astounding number of its subjects, imagined that by exterminating 
the Tutsi people they could make the world a better place, and the mass killing had 
followed" (6). Gourevitch invokes the idea that power lies in the ability to cultivate and 
control perception. He connects the power of imagining to storytelling, reflecting, "to a 
very large extent power consists in the ability to make others inhabit your story of their 
reality" (48). We Wish to Inform You is thus about confronting the way that a national 
government and a significant portion of its citizenry imagined the Rwandan state as a 
space from which Tutsis should be exterminated. 
Faced with the prospect of incorporating genocide into his and his reader's reality, 
Gourevitch interprets genocide as a crisis of imagination that forces his reader to confront 
ugly things about the nature of man. He describes those in power in Rwanda as having 
inappropriately imagined their nation-state,47 and he constructs a textual space in which 
he and his reader might imagine their own response to genocide. Acknowledging that the 
international community, represented by the UN and the US government, did not react 
sufficiently to revoke the sovereignty of what he depicts as a dysfunctional state, 
50 
Gourevitch stages We Wish to Inform You as an opportunity to restore a healthy function 
for imagination via an alliance between individual Rwandan storytellers and a collection 
of international readers. Presenting the text as Rwandan storytellers' articulation of 
events, Gourevitch settles in as a spectator and invites his reader to join him in this role. 
He offers a closer look at the genocide by presenting first hand accounts and physical 
descriptions so his reader might imagine and bear witness to mass killing and thereby 
align with Rwandan storytellers to reclaim imagination and incorporate genocide into a 
shared, internationally oriented reality. 
Though the narrative within which Gourevitch embeds his critique of 
humanitarianism actually repeats the way that humanitarianism dislocates violence and 
suffering from its sources, it is useful to distinguish some of the valuable points he does 
make. He accurately points out that the genocide "remained, as it had always been, a 
political crisis, but the so-called international community preferred to treat it as a 
humanitarian crisis, as if the woe had appeared without any human rhyme or reason, like 
a flood or an earthquake" (167). In Rwanda in 1994, under the guise ofhumanitarian 
rhetoric, politically situated subjects became part of a struggle between the state and the 
international community, and the international humanitarian treatment of these subjects 
primarily as bodies in need exacerbated the political crisis within Rwanda. Regarding the 
mass killing as an aberration, the humanitarian response to the genocide sought to rescue 
suffering bodies while maintaining the appearance of political neutrality. In other words, 
the international community attempted to address genocide in Rwanda outside of the 
juridico-political structure as an inexplicable eruption of chaos that humanitarianism 
might remedy. As Gourevitch recalls, once the humanitarian campaign began, "[t]he 
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whole world was there to save the Africans from their sad, confusing, ugly story ... 
[carrying out] the largest, most rapid, and most expensive deployment by the 
international humanitarian-aid industry in the twentieth century" (165). Gourevitch points 
out that this incredible amount of energy and resources "effectively made them [the 
international community] accessories to the Hutu Power syndicate" (166), because the 
refugee camps sheltered many of the leading perpetrators of the genocide. 
Gourevitch recognizes the way humanitarianism attempts to separate rights from 
national citizenship and depoliticize conflicts by treating people simply as bodies in need. 
Indeed, humanitarianism tries to transcend struggles between competing sovereignties by 
imagining a post-national world and invoking a universal human. As Wendy Brown 
recognizes, humanitarian activism "presents itself as something of an antipolitics" ( 453) 
and "casts subjects as yearning to be free of politics" ( 456), but "there is no such thing as 
mere reduction of suffering or protection from abuse - the nature of the reduction or 
protection is itself productive of political subjects and political possibilities" ( 460). 
Treating the victims ofthe genocide in Rwanda as bodies "yearning to be free of politics" 
diverted attention from the way Rwanda's history of colonization under Germany and 
then Belgium led to political factions in the postcolonial state, and World Bank and IMF 
policies promoting structural adjustment intensified economic turmoil and allowed 
corrupt leaders to manufacture 'ethnic' tensions in order to wield power. Gourevitch 
acknowledges that attempts to bypass this complex history and neutralize the resulting 
socioeconomic and political struggles rather than resolve them, exacerbated the political 
crisis in Rwanda. He censures the United Nations, and the US government in particular, 
for allowing the genocide to occur and even exacerbating violence against Tutsis through 
its administration of refugee camps that sheltered the Hutu leadership amongst Tutsi 
inhabitants. 
However, while Gourevitch criticizes the UN and the US government, he 
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qualifies his condemnation with extended discussions about the difficulty of 
incorporating a corrupt way of imagining the world into his and his reader's reality. In the 
sentence following his shorthand explanation that the predominant way of imagining the 
world in Rwanda led to mass killing (6), Gourevitch abruptly shifts his focus remarking, 
"All at once, as it seemed, something we could have only imagined was upon us - and we 
could still only imagine it. This is what fascinates me most in existence: the peculiar 
necessity of imagining what is, in fact, real" (7). This hasty transition from "they" (as in 
those who imagined "they could make the world a better place" [6; emphasis added] by 
killing Tutsis) to a "we" who is suddenly faced with comprehending such a way of 
imagining the world sets those who killed Tutsis apart as deviant Others who are unlike 
"us." What is more, this is a vague "we" that shifts its meaning. It seems at first to refer 
to all those who were victimized by or opposed to the way the Rwandan "government, 
and an astounding number of its subjects" (6) imagined the world, but it is then amended 
to describe those who can "still only imagine" (7) the reality to which this led. This "we" 
seems then to refer to those who did not experience the genocide from within but are now 
faced with the prospect of incorporating it into their reality. As an exercise in "imagining 
what is, in fact, real" (7), the text considers the genocide from the position of a spectator, 
reinforcing the boundary between "us" and ''them." 
Even as Gourevitch provides historical facts about the history of colonialism in 
Rwanda and the way the postcolonial development policies of the World Bank and IMF 
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contributed to the circumstances in which the genocide took place, he still upholds the 
moral superiority of the international community. Explaining how the economic 
instability brought about by a history of German and Belgian colonialism was worsened 
by World Bank and IMF policies promoting structural adjustment, Gourevitch 
acknowledges that these economic tensions were manipulated by corrupt leaders and 
solidified as an 'ethnic' rivalry between Tutsis and Hutus.48 But, he then undermines this 
discussion by citing international human rights law in his evaluation of the Rwandan state 
and insinuating that the genocide, rather than resulting from systemic problems, was an 
aberration of this particular state that the international community could have prevented if 
it had properly enforced human rights law. According to Gourevitch's narrative, Rwanda 
was a failed state on the eve of the genocide, and the international community was its 
only hope for preventing genocide, but this community did not properly assert its political 
sovereignty and enforce human rights law. Reading the genocide as a failure of the state 
and citing "the Convention of 1948" (153),49 Gourevitch suggests that the Rwandan state 
failed to uphold the contract between the state and its people that the UDHR calls for and 
the UN and its most powerful state-members did not adequately respond to this breach. 
Interrogating the Rwandan state is an undercurrent that runs throughout We Wish 
to Inform You. Using the stories he collects as evidence, Gourevitch characterizes 
Rwanda during the genocide as a failed state that no longer served Rwanda as a whole 
but rather allowed for a corrupt state dominated by Hutu extremists. For example, having 
detailed several accounts of the way that the genocide was carried out by neighbors 
killing neighbors, Gourevitch concludes the vignette describing pastor Ntakirutimana's 
involvement in the murders of the people of his church and his fellow pastors by 
54 
emphasizing the words of his translator, Arcene: "The people who did this ... didn't 
understand the idea of country. What is country? What is a human being? They had no 
understanding" ( 43). The implication here is that not only did people who murdered their 
countrymen not properly perform their citizenship in the state, but also that notions of 
country and of the human being have become so unstable that genocide has emerged as a 
symptom of their deterioration. Gourevitch's reliance on this explanation underscores the 
way that tensions between the state and international community - and the way that 
human rights discourse is deployed to negotiate these tensions - structure understandings 
of the genocide in Rwanda. 
We Wish to Inform You situates its readership in a position from which to perform 
the role of peacekeeper and savior that it suggests the international community failed at in 
1994. In an effort to facilitate an international response to genocide from within a textual 
space, Gourevitch provides his primarily US readership with a sensory experience and 
attempts to train this reader to be a better witness to trauma (which also implicitly 
disassociates the reader from any of the causes of the trauma). Similar to the way that the 
title functions, the structure of the text frames the genocide as something from which the 
reader is removed and then, revealing vivid representations of the genocide, it encourages 
the reader to imagine him or herself as an innocent witness whose purpose it is to restore 
the humanist ideals that such violence threatens. Acknowledging the anxiety that 
surrounds his discussion of genocide, Gourevitch writes: 
I presume that you are reading this because you desire a closer look, and that you, 
too, are properly disturbed by your curiosity. Perhaps, in examining this extremity 
with me, you hope for some understanding, some insight, some flicker of self-
knowledge - a moral, or a lesson ... I don't discount the possibility, but when it 
comes to genocide, you already know right from wrong. The best reason I have 
come up with for looking closely into Rwanda's stories is that ignoring them 
makes me even more uncomfortable about existence and my place in it ( 19). 
Characterizing his readers as having the proper balance of curiosity and apprehension, 
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Gourevitch establishes a kinship with them, thus reassuring the reader that it is acceptable 
to want "a closer look" (19). Yet, he insists that "examining this extremity" with him will 
probably not provide "understanding," "insight," or "self-knowledge" that will teach a 
"moral, or a lesson," because "you already know right from wrong" (19). He at once 
classifies the genocide as a dangerous yet distant occurrence to be studied and suggests 
that learning anything new from this activity is not likely since his reader is already 
equipped to navigate "right from wrong." The "desire [for] a closer look" is then really 
about tending to this "extremity" so as to feel less "uncomfortable" that it makes up part 
of the body of man (19). This focus on the metaphysical impact of genocide amongst 
those supposed outsiders who seek to get "a closer look" (19) reveals a preoccupation 
with salvaging the humanist contract, which genocide undermines but current human 
rights law promises for citizens of the state and subjects of the international community. 
Portraying the genocide as something that is removed from his reader's reality, 
Gourevitch presents himself as his reader's eyes and ears on the ground where the 
killings occurred and suggests that through this textual exchange both he and his reader 
might relieve the discomfort that incorporating genocide into their reality causes. 
Likening his own journey through Rwanda to the reader's engagement with the text, he 
acts as a guide through the process of confronting the mass killing. He encourages his 
reader to take a closer look with him as he describes his own apprehension upon 
encountering dead bodies for the first time at Nyarubuye: "I had never been among the 
dead before. What to do? Look? Yes. I wanted to see them, I suppose; I had come to see 
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them" ( 16). Gourevitch steers the reader through the decision to look at the dead and 
portrays spectatorship as a meaningful act. Acknowledging his own desire to see the dead 
and admitting that looking at them will fulfill the purpose of his trip to Nyarubuye, he 
grants the reader permission to look as well. He then expresses the act of looking at the 
dead as a momentous event that serves a useful function, commenting, "Those dead 
Rwandans will be with me forever, I expect. That was why I had felt compelled to come 
to Nyarubuye: to be stuck with them -not with their experience, but with the experience 
of looking at them" (16). Distinguishing between their experience and the experience of 
looking at them, Gourevitch emphasizes the importance of the latter, suggesting that 
being "stuck with[ ... ] the experience of looking at them" has changed him. The 
implication is that looking is a responsibility that he willingly takes on and that in doing 
so he is transformed into a witness who may fulfill a purpose. 
The act of witnessing, rather than experiencing, positions Gourevitch and his 
reader outside of the trauma of the killing in a position to observe, study, and 
conceptualize. This anthropological approach of the outsider looking in renders the 
witness capable of overcoming trauma, purportedly by intellectualizing it in a way that 
the victim, who may not be able to articulate trauma from within, is unable to do. Thus 
the text is primarily concerned with orienting the reader as a witness, and ultimately it 
remains "stuck with[ ... ] the experience of looking" ( 16) unable to move beyond this into 
action. This becomes clear as Gourevitch remarks, "I couldn't settle on any meaningful 
response: revulsion, alarm, sorrow, grief, shame, incomprehension, sure, but nothing 
truly meaningful. I just looked, and I took photographs, because I wondered whether I 
could really see what I was seeing while I saw it, and I wanted also an excuse to look a 
bit more closely" (19). Encouraging the notion that genocide is something to get a look 
at, and take pictures of so as to be able to observe, verify, and study it in more detail, 
Gourevitch admits that he is unable to respond in a productive way. In the text, looking 
leads to more looking, which develops into collecting. Thus Gourevitch elucidates, "I 
traveled around the country collecting accounts of the killing" (23). He embeds these 
accounts within his narrative of witnessing, presenting them as testimony. 
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One of the more prominently featured personal accounts of Rwandan history and 
the genocide that We Wish to Inform You presents is Odette Nyiramilimo's, a Tutsi doctor 
whom Gourevitch interviews. He includes a lengthy narrative account of the life story 
Odette tells, which she suggests coincides with the history of the genocide. While 
Gourevitch acknowledges, "Odette spoke as a genocide survivor to a foreign 
correspondent" (71), he does not simply relay what she communicates, but rather he 
editorializes her story within the larger framework of his narrative in order to discuss his 
own metaphysical concerns. Commenting on the moments Odette chooses to emphasize 
in her story, Gourevitch remarks, "This is how Rwandan Tutsis count the years of their 
lives: in a hopscotch fashion- 'fifty-nine, 'sixty, 'sixty-one, 'sixty-three, and so on, 
through 'ninety-four- sometimes skipping several years when they knew no terror, 
sometimes slowing down to name the months and the days" (64).50 Odette recalls the 
history that culminated in genocide, explaining how violent political struggles between 
Tutsis and Hutus (and their international sponsors) affected her and her family from the 
time of the 1959 revolution when she was three years old through the 1994 genocide. 
But, rather than accepting that Odette is attempting to report her experience of political 
crises to a foreign correspondent and his readership, Gourevitch subsumes her story 
within his own narrative agenda. 
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More specifically, as Gourevitch interprets Odette's narrative style, he attempts to 
extract meaning from her story so as to inform his reader's understanding of memory and 
comment on its relationship to the crisis of imagination with which he is concerned. He 
thus pontificates, "She was keeping everything that was not about Hutu and Tutsi to 
herself' (70), because, "if others have so often made your life their business[ ... ] then 
perhaps you will want to guard the memory of those times when you were freer to 
imagine yourself as the only times that are truly and inviolably your own" (71). First of 
all, if the stories that Gourevitch is able to access and share with the reader are structured 
by the way that others have imagined the victims and not how they have imagined 
themselves, this calls into question the viability of such an exchange between storyteller 
as testifier and reader as witness. What is more though, Gourevitch discusses Odette's 
story to the extent that it allows him to contemplate the crisis of imagination that 
genocide poses for him and his privileged reader. He approaches the personal history that 
Odette shares as an aesthetic articulation of her psychology, explicating, "Her theme was 
the threat of annihilation, and the moments of reprieve in her story - the fond memories, 
funny anecdotes, sparks of wit - came, if at all, in quick beats, like punctuation marks" 
(71). Gourevitch reduces Odette's explanation of a complicated political history to an 
abstract "theme" and condescendingly analogizes the sequence of challenges and 
pleasures in her story to variations in grammar and syntax. 
Rendering Odette an abstraction, Gourevitch reads her symbolically so as to 
analyze how memory functions not simply for her but also by extension for all of 
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humanity. 51 In fact, in the midst of narrating Odette's account, Gourevitch discusses his 
own parents' and grandparents' memories as refugees from Nazism, revealing how We 
Wish to Inform You presents genocide in Rwanda through the lens of an entirely different 
sociopolitical crisis. This not only undermines the specificity of the genocide in Rwanda, 
but also diminishes the history Odette attempts to communicate. Rather than focusing on 
the political discussion in which Odette is attempting to engage a foreign correspondent 
and his readership, the text presents personal stories as a way to confront and potentially 
resolve anxiety about incorporating genocide in Rwanda (which it implies is 
interchangeable with the holocaust) into an international humanitarian reader's 
understanding of the world. 
Similar to the way in which We Wish to lriform You undermines its own critique 
of humanitarian intervention in Rwanda by co-opting Odette's and others' stories within 
a narrative structure that positions its readers as literary humanitarians, Country - the 
next text I analyze -presents testimony from the TRC hearings within a narrative 
framework in which its narrator guides the reader through a textual encounter with 
trauma. In Country the narrator shares her struggle to deal with the physical, 
psychological, and emotional effects of bearing witness to tremendous suffering. By 
identifying the similarities between Gourevitch's work of nonfiction and Krog's 
fictionalized account of historical facts, I will demonstrate how human rights discourse 
operates similarly across nonfiction and fictionalized narratives. 
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Semi-Fictional Representation: Literary Testimony in Post-Apartheid South Africa 
Like Gourevitch, Krog is also a journalist; but, rather than publishing a purely nonfiction 
text, Krog, who is additionally an established Afrikaans poet, 52 features actual testimony 
from the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) hearings in South Africa within a 
fictionalized frame narrative. Country narrates the hearings in a rough chronology, 
illustrating how "[o]ne sorrow-filled room flows into another[ ... ] but the language, the 
detail, the individual tone ... it stays" (Krog 51). It depicts the different people involved, 
from the TRC commissioners and their staffs to those who testify (victims in the first set 
of hearings and perpetrators in the second set) to translators, journalists, and grief 
counselors, amongst others. Within the world of the TRC hearings that the. text portrays, 
the narrator - a fictionalized version of Krog - tells her own story about being a witness 
to the hearings and how this impacts her as a journalist, a poet, a South African (and 
Afrikaner), a mother, a wife, and a daughter. 
As it moves between nonfiction and fiction Country eludes easy categorization. 
The narrator is never explicitly named, but other characters occasionally address her as 
Antjie, and several iterations of the author's name appear within the text,53 marking its 
first-person narrator's various professional and personal identities (Antjie, Antjie Krog, 
Antjie Samuel, and Antjie Somers) as well as the text's slippage between nonfiction and 
fiction.54 To a certain extent the narrator shares Krog's experience of the hearings as a 
radio journalist for the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC), but Antjie is 
ultimately a fictional character. Additionally, the text sometimes includes testimonies 
verbatim but other times presents an amalgamation of different people's testimonies. It is 
a mixture of actual and imagined legal testimony, poetry, prose, historiography, and 
literary and theoretical analysis that is focalized through a narrator whose identity 
continually shifts. The narrator's unstable identity not only reveals the text's 
preoccupation with securing its narrator's position within post-apartheid South Africa, 
but also how literary humanitarianism is often motivated by privileged subjects' 
compulsion to retain control and moral authority as they confront the atrocities 
committed within the power structures from which they benefit. 
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While We Wish to Inform You operates as nonfiction and Country maneuvers 
between nonfiction and fiction, both are concerned with making sense of political 
violence that challenges the way that a group of privileged people imagines their world. 
Both Gourevitch and Krog also define their positions in relation to political violence by 
way of their sensory experiences as witnesses of trauma. Similar to Gourevitch who says 
he will forever be "stuck with ... the experience of looking" (16) at the dead bodies at 
Nyarubuye, Krog insists, by way of her fictional persona, her sensory experience of 
suffering will "haunt [her] for ever and ever" (57). Both chronicle political history in 
terms of trauma. Country, in particular, portrays a post-apartheid state in crisis as it 
attempts to recover from a traumatic history, and it operates according to the idea that one 
may gain control over trauma by translating and containing it within a repeatable story. 
Describing Antjie's sensory experience as a witness both prior to and during the TRC 
hearings, Country draws the reader in as a witness by extension and portrays Antjie as a 
model for the reader. Like the narrator though, the identity of the text's intended reader 
also shifts. As I will show in the next several pages, the relationship that the text imagines 
between its fragmented narrator and its inconsistent narratee exemplifies the problematic 
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dialectic through which literary humanitarianism attempts to overcome conflict between 
domestic factions as well as friction between the state and the international community 
by articulating national and international political conflicts as personal trauma. 
Whereas Wish to Inform You focuses on the experience of looking to incorporate 
the reader as a witness by proxy, Country emphasizes sound to narrate a story of 
violence, trauma, and recovery and expand a community of witnesses to reinforce the 
establishment of a new South Africa. It is after all part of Antjie's job to sift through the 
"web of infinite sorrow" (Krog 45) to which she is exposed at the TRC hearings and 
select the "perfect sound bite" ( 45) to broadcast. In the text this attention to sound 
becomes a metaphor for the power that Antjie suggests the TRC hearings have to forge a 
new South Africa. The opening pages of Country are set at a public hearing to collect 
input on drafting legislation to establish a Truth Commission. The hearing begins with 
the reading of a list of 120 names ofpeople who died in police custody, and the text 
emphasizes the aural effect of this litany, commenting, "name upon name upon name. 
They fall like chimes into the silence" (3 ). These names punctuate the silence of the room 
accentuating the extent to which people are "stunned by this magnitude of death that is 
but a bare beginning" (3). But, moments later "[s]uddenly another kind of noise fills the 
hall" (4). It is Eugene Terre'Blanche, founder ofthe Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging 
(A WB; the party of the Afrikaner Resistance Movement), who has come to the meeting 
to announce the conditions under which the A WB will cooperate with the government. 
Antjie describes this man, observing, "he is a master of acoustics. He drenches us with 
sound- every tremor, boom, reverberating comer of that space, under his command" (4). 
The text depicts his power through his control of the sound in the room; Antjie suggests 
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he has a physical impact on those at the hearing, illustrating the way he "drenches us with 
sound" ( 4). The sound that he evokes weighs on those in the room, drowning out the 
names of those who have died and filling the room instead with booming tremors that 
evoke the tyranny of apartheid-era governance. 
The text juxtaposes the power evident in Terre'Blanche's command of sound to 
the power that Antjie identifies in Nomonde Calata's testimony at the TRC hearings. 
Calata is the wife of the deceased Fort Calata, one of the Cradock Four who disappeared 
after being stopped at a road block by South African security forces in 1985, and an 
activist in her own right. 55 Antjie focuses on the sound of Calata crying, suggesting that it 
renders the devastation of apartheid-era violence undeniable but that its potential power is 
dependent on the ability of those who witness it to find words for it: 
that sound ... it will haunt me for ever and ever[ ... ] to witness that cry was to 
witness the destruction of language ... was to realize that to remember the past of 
this country is to be thrown back into a time before language. And to get that 
memory, to fix it in words, to capture it with the precise image, is to be present at 
the birth of language itself. But more practically, this particular memory at last 
captured in words can no longer haunt you, push you around, bewilder you, 
because you have taken control of it[ ... ] So maybe this is what the commission is 
all about- finding words for that cry ofNomonde Calata (57). 
The text insinuates that Calata' s cry is a poignant expression of South Africa's violent 
past that requires translation into words. It suggests that Calata, along with other victims 
of apartheid-era violence, is unable to fully articulate her suffering and it is therefore up 
to the witnesses to whom she testifies to find a way to represent it. The implication is that 
if the testifier expresses suffering and the witness absorbs it and articulates it then 
together they may gain control of a traumatic national past and through this alliance 
reconcile a previously divided country. For Antjie, bearing witness to the sound of 
Calata's cry and working "to fix it in words" (57) is a way for her to regain control and 
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establish a valuable position in the new South Africa. Country extends what Antjie 
perceives to be the project ofthe TRC by expanding the community of witnesses through 
its readership and endeavoring to find words for Calata's cry. 
One of the assumptions that frames the TRC hearings is that victims of political 
violence, like Calata, contain a toxic past in their bodies, 56 and by communicating their 
pain to a community of witnesses, they may (at least partially) release trauma from their 
bodies, and thus from the body of the nation. Krog identifies instances of trauma in the 
testimony from the TRC hearings, and she seeks to represent this perceived trauma by 
situating it within a larger narrative that portrays non-linguistic communication -like 
Calata' s cry - as an indication of trauma. By setting the trauma in question down in 
textual form, Krog assumes the role of translator, articulating what the individual testifier 
supposedly cannot to the reader-witness. Country attempts to augment what it perceives 
to be the work ofthe TRC hearings by expanding the community of witnesses and 
establishing a more extensive narrative space from which to manage the past as trauma. 
Antjie expresses what it is about the TRC hearings that the text endeavors to replicate, 
reflecting, "For me, the Truth Commission microphone with its little red light was the 
ultimate symbol of the whole process: here the marginalized voice speaks to the public 
ear; the unspeakable is spoken - and translated; the personal story brought from the 
innermost depths of the individual binds us anew to the collective" (311 ). The suggestion 
here is that acting as a witness to testimony provides a dialectic space within which to 
conceptualize and manage trauma. Country imagines this dialectic establishing a new 
national space, implying that the relationship between testifier and witness is the 
foundation of a new South Africa. 
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In her analysis of Country, Ashleigh Harris argues that Krog fails to properly 
communicate trauma and violates the testimonial process by effacing those who testified 
at the hearings within a narrative that is primarily concerned with defining her own 
subjectivity.57 Faulting Krog for relying on a postmodern definition of truth to excuse her 
lack of citation, Harris suggests Krog violates the ethical code that the testimonial process 
demands of a secondary narrative. Harris's discussion of Country is useful insofar as it 
clearly outlines the -ideal of testimony toward which Country strives; she describes 
testifying at the TRC hearings as "a psychological descarification process in which the 
body is relieved of the duty to archive the traumatic past; a duty that is now passed onto 
the testimony and, more broadly, onto the TRC itself' (Harris 31). However, Harris takes 
issue with the way that Country presents a traumatic past; she does not question this ideal 
of testimony or the effects of understanding a history of political violence as trauma. 
While Harris calls for poetic accountability and suggests Country does not properly bear 
witness to historical trauma, 58 I contend that the depiction of apartheid-era violence as 
trauma is problematic because it renders a politically complicated history unspeakable 
and then focuses on articulating the suffering this trauma has caused rather than 
accounting for and dealing with the sources of trauma. 
While Harris argues that as Country subsumes others' voices within K.rog's voice 
it "is in danger of effacing, rather than archiving, the traumatic past" (51), I question the 
very project of archiving the past as trauma. Certainly Harris rightly points out that 
Krog's preoccupation with establishing her voice verges on effacing those whose 
testimony she appropriates, but this is indicative of a larger issue that has to do with 
representing political violence as trauma and relying on a testifier-witness dialectic to 
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relieve the nation of this trauma. Casting a complicated political history as trauma and 
setting out to archive it at once deems the sources of this history unrespresentable and 
insinuates that it can be compartmentalized and accessed as part of the past via 
testimonial narratives. This relegates the political conflict to the past without resolving it, 
and it suggests that political conflict can be fully addressed metaphorically. It is this 
assumption that allows political violence to be understood in terms of trauma and 
necessitates a secondary narrative to represent trauma that is otherwise inexpressible. 
Certainly trauma is a part of the history of South Africa, but Country represents 
South Africa's entire history of apartheid as trauma. My point is that the text's 
postmodern theorization of truth that critics, including Harris, criticize along with its 
narrative fragmentation and the production of different editions for national and 
international readerships are symptomatic of a larger problematic. By depicting the 
moment of interaction between testifier and witness as the "birth of this country's 
language" (Krog 42), Country connects the foundation of a new South Africa to a human 
rights inflected narrative, and it positions Krog and her reader-witness as the agents upon 
whom the realization of a new South Africa is dependent. In short, the text attempts to 
establish a national narrative within which violent political conflict is conceptualized in 
terms of trauma and then overcome through the dialectic between a narrator-testifier and 
reader-witness. It is this dynamic with which I take issue, because attempts to understand 
political violence as trauma and overcome it through a testifier witness dialectic defer 
structural changes that might prevent further suffering, and they detract attention from the 
political and economic realities that define power struggles both within the state and 
between the state and the international community. The logic of human rights that 
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perceives political violence as trawna and relies on testimony to overcome it also poses 
rights against wrongs in a binary that evaluates political crises in direct proportion to the 
perceived humanity (read innocence) ofvictims and inhwnanity of perpetrators. A 
concern with the subjectivity ofthe victims and perpetrators of suffering overshadows 
material reality and structural problems as it requires individuals to perform a particular 
subjectivity in order to either demonstrate their rights against others' wrongs or, as in the 
case of the perpetrators who testified at the TRC hearings, admit their wrongs and appeal 
for amnesty. 
Country imagines that Antjie's well-being and the future ofthe new South Africa 
hinge on the representation oftrawna, but the paradox of representation that Antjie faces 
exposes the narrowness of this view. As Antjie struggles to fulfill her role as a witness, 
she questions the ethics of representing others' personal trawna and finds it difficult to 
live with the trawna she has supposedly internalized. Referring to the paradox of 
narrating the testimony she has heard, she claims, "If I write this, I exploit and betray. Ifi 
don't, I die" (66). At the risk of exploitation and betrayal she determines she must write 
this narrative of the testimonies at the TRC hearings or the trauma will destroy her. The 
text implies that such a defeat would indicate failure not simply for Antjie personally but 
also for the nation, and Country is concerned with preventing the premature death of a 
new, inclusive, post-apartheid South Africa. Narrating the history of apartheid-era South 
Africa as a series of hwnan trawnas, the text attempts to manage contradictory loyalties 
toward various factions within the state and the international community, but Antjie's 
concern about betraying those whose suffering she represents, along with the text's 
continual references to betrayal,59 exposes the paradoxical situation that arises from 
addressing political history as trauma. 
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The anxiety about betrayal that Antjie experiences manifests in the narrative in 
her inconsistent identity,60 which is an effect of conceptualizing political violence in 
terms of trauma and requiring individuals to identify themselves in relation to this 
trauma. The text represents a national political conflict as a personal crisis in the shifting 
identity of both its narrator and narratee. If the text is ultimately an attempt to speak the 
South African nation, it is useful to analyze the fragmented narrator it imagines speaking 
the nation and the alternating narratee to whom it represents South African history as 
trauma. Scholars have commented on the inconsistent identity ofboth,61 but I suggest this 
fragmentation is a sign of the inadequacy of conceptualizing political violence as trauma. 
By incorporating testimony from the TRC hearings into a storyline in which its narrator 
internalizes the national crisis that post-apartheid governance poses, Country theorizes 
political conflict in terms of its narrator's personal trauma and expresses it as narrative 
fragmentation. As it alternates between Krog's names, the text reveals its narrator's 
fragmented identity, which it relates to a crisis of national identity in post-apartheid South 
Africa. Krog's married name, and the name she uses as a journalist for the SABC, is 
Antjie Samuel while her poetry written in Afrikaans is published under the name Krog.62 
Shifting between these names in the text, the narrator invokes the various identities that 
she is attempting to negotiate in order to determine her own post-apartheid persona.63 As 
Antjie's identity shifts as her name appears in its different iterations, her role as a narrator 
fluctuates as well so that the text performs what Moss calls a "micro-Truth Commission" 
(92) that is focalized through its Afrikaaner narrator's preoccupation with securing her 
own place in a post-apartheid nation. 
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Not only does Country shuttle between Krog's different names in an attempt to 
negotiate a position for her within the new South Africa, these changing names coincide 
with the text's slippage between nonfiction and fiction, signaling an attempt to use 
literature to gain control in an unstable political reality. Krog turns to literature as a space 
within which to imagine the otherwise improbable work of developing an inclusive 
national community after decades of institutionalized racism and pervasive structural 
violence. The text manipulates the boundaries of fiction because it is otherwise unable to 
reconcile the various political factions that Krog's fragmented identity represents. As it 
darts between nonfiction and fiction it exposes the ambiguity that results from treating 
political violence as trauma and attempting to resolve political conflict metaphorically. 
The text thus exhibits the failure of both nonfiction journalistic narratives and fiction to 
address political violence by representing the suffering it causes within a testifier-witness 
dialectic. My point here is not that Country fails to fulfill the potential literature has to 
enhance an idealized testimonial process or that literature is an inadequate space to 
address political violence. Rather, I mean to say that narrating political violence as 
trauma, as both We Wish to Inform You and Country do, depends on representations of 
suffering that depoliticize violence and attempt to neutralize it so as to fit it into the 
dominant imagination of the world rather than challenge the unequal power relations that 
produce suffering. 
In addition to her narrator's fragmented identity and the corresponding movement 
between nonfiction and fiction, Krog's preoccupation with managing different loyalties is 
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further evidenced by the publication of two different editions: first, a South African 
edition (Country of My Skull) and second, an international edition (which, as previously 
noted, this chapter refers to as Country), published in the US with the subtitle "Guilt, 
Sorrow, and the Limits of Forgiveness in the New South Africa." Critics have remarked 
on the way that the second edition omits fictionalized details about the extramarital affair 
that the text's main character has in the first edition and on the additional introduction, 
textual notes, glossaries, character lists, and epilogue that appear in the internationally 
published book. Moss observes, "The second edition, with its extensive paratextual 
additions and editorial excisions, figures more as a documentary than the original 
edition" (89). The omitted fictionalized material further blurs the distinction between 
Krog and her narrativized, fictional persona, and the added historical and political 
explanations are presented as a comprehensive introduction to the struggle over 
apartheid. Country provides a new introduction by an American journalist; a lengthy 
epilogue; a section titled "Cast of Characters" that provides brief biographies; and an 
index (a textual element not usually included alongside a literary narrative). Through 
these elements it attempts to educate the international reader so that this reader may act as 
a witness to national trauma and recovery and, in doing so, facilitate the acceptance of the 
re-imagined South African nation-state into the international community. 
To some extent Country's portrayal of Winnie Mandela as a shape shifter who 
presents herself differently to national and international audiences illustrates how Krog 
attempts to narrate the TRC hearings differently for national and international 
readerships. Similar to Winnie Mandela, who "Media experts say [is] like a chameleon, 
moving across boundaries in quite an extraordinary way" (Krog 320), Country deploys 
71 
narrative to move across boundaries: between nonfiction and fiction, genres (poetry, 
prose, historiography, and memoir), and various identities (Antjie, Antjie Krog, Antjie 
Samuel, and Antjie Somers). Further discussing Winnie Mandela, Country emphasizes 
the words of an American journalist who says to Antjie, "she's not arriving for you, she's 
arriving for the Afro-American audience. She's already given more than ten hours of 
interview time to us. Her constituency is out there" (321). This speculation about Winnie 
Mandela' s constituency calls to mind questions about Country's own readership and 
whether this international edition reinforces the unquestioned agency of its international 
readership within the human rights movement. 
Krog both transgresses textual and identity categories and publishes different 
editions in an effort to appeal to various constituencies within and across national and 
international boundaries. More than simply exhibiting a postmodern inclination to 
destabilize truth as critics have suggested,64 the way that the text shuttles between various 
identities for its narrator and narratee and contextualizes trauma differently for national 
and international audiences exposes friction between the state, international networks of 
governance, those who influence the circulation of multinational capital, and competing 
ethical doctrines. Country imagines not only that a union between testifier and witness at 
the TRC hearings may establish a new national community but also that extending the 
community of witnesses to an international readership may validate the new South Africa 
as a secure state and viable partner within the international community. The alternation 
between national and international loyalties reveals the conflict between national and 
international sovereignty that defines the contemporary human rights discourse that 
Country engages. As the text attempts to express loyalty to conflicting national and 
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international sovereignties it focuses on articulating depoliticized, human suffering and 
archiving it via its reader-witnesses rather than disrupting power relations within the state 
and between the state and international community by accounting for and dealing with 
the politically situated sources of suffering. 
While Country attempts to appeal to competing national and international 
factions, which results in both personal and textual fragmentation and an inconsistent, 
perhaps even unethical, postmodern representation of truth, Animal's People -the final 
text I will analyze- challenges the way that national and international sovereignties 
interact. Animal's People takes issue with a transnational company that refuses to 
recognize national authority and a state that compromises the well being of its people in 
order to serve its own financial interests. Furthermore, it problematizes the discourse of 
human rights that both We Wish to Inform You and Country deploy to negotiate these 
contradictory sovereignties. 
The Fiction of Literary Humanitarianism: Beyond Metaphor "the Poor Remain" 
Whereas both We Wish to Inform You and Country are written by journalists from their 
relatively privileged positions, Animal's People is its narrator Animal's response to a 
journalist's request for his story, and his critical tone challenges the integrity of this 
journalist's interest in him. I invoke Animal's objections to the journalist in his own story 
to problematize both Gourevitch's and Krog's texts. For instance, the way in which 
Animal questions the likelihood that the tapes onto which he records his story will be 
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accurately transcribed and properly understood by a reader problematizes the way in 
which Country relates translated testimonies recorded at the TRC hearings. Though 
Animal's People is a work of fiction, its setting- a fabricated city called Khaufpur 
(Khauf meaning terror and pur a suffix meaning city in Urdu) - is modeled after Bhopal 
where the effects of a massive industrial disaster are still being felt and where Sinha's 
efforts as an activist are focused. The narrator is part of the underclass ofKhaufpur, and 
because of a spinal deformation that has resulted from the poisonous chemicals to which 
he is exposed, he walks on all fours and goes by the name Animal. Animal rejects the 
journalist's initial proposition for his story, refusing to provide a standard account of 
trauma and an appeal for human rights. But, he eventually decides to tell the story that 
makes up the novel in order to deliberate on his existence and decide whether or not to 
have an operation, made possible by humanitarian aid, to straighten his spine. As his 
narrative proceeds, he gradually cultivates a posthumanist perspective through which he 
denaturalizes many of the assumptions ofhuman rights discourse. 
Animal's People challenges textual engagements with political violence as 
trauma, and it exposes how such narratives employ the discourse of human rights as they 
sustain inequitable power dynamics. The novel has many layers: the frame narrative 
within which Animal speaks his story into a series of tapes is preceded by an editor's 
note, appended by a glossary, and expanded upon at the website www.khaufpur.com. The 
editor's note, itself part ofthe fictional frame narrative, refers to Animal not by his name 
but condescendingly as "a nineteen-year-old boy" as it guarantees the authenticity of his 
narrative, which it insists is provided in his words though they have admittedly been 
transcribed from tapes and translated from Hindi to English. The "Khaufpuri Glossary" 
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and the website that promises to provide further information on the fictional city offer to 
further contextualize a narrative that the tongue-in-cheek editor's note implies is supplied 
by a 'native informant.' Ironically, on the website, Animal voices his perturbation 
concerning the final publication of his story.65 The novel's many paratextuallayers 
comment on the way that narratives circulate within and across domestic and 
international spaces, reflecting struggles to manage conceptions of political conflicts and 
the way in which such conflicts are influenced by the movement oftransnational capital. 
In the opening pages of Animal's People, the narrator recalls the journalist who 
solicited his story for inclusion in a book. He greets him, "Salaam Jarnalis, it's me, 
Animal" (Sinha 3), and he speaks directly to the journalist for the space of a few pages 
before shifting his address to the journalist's readership. I read Animal's dialogue with 
this particular journalist as an intertextual address that puts him in conversation with the 
journalists in We Wish to Inform You and Country. Animal indicts the journalist he meets 
admonishing him: "You were like all the others, come to suck our stories from us, so 
strangers in far off countries can marvel there's so much pain in the world. Like vultures 
are you jarnaliss. Somewhere a bad thing happens, tears like rain in the wind, and look, 
here you come, drawn by the smell of blood. You have turned us Khaufpuris into 
storytellers, but always the same story" (5). Animal notices that journalists pursue a story 
that casts him and his fellow Khaufpuris as suffering, subaltern victims. His criticism of a 
publishing industry that surveys the carnage of political battlefields for narratives of 
suffering and reinforces an uneven power dynamic between a privileged reader and an 
unfortunate victim turned storyteller,66 puts Gourevitch's We Wish to Inform You and 
Krog's Country into question. Both by journalists, these two texts tell a story of mass 
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suffering that is focalized through the narrator's experience as a witness to trauma. Both 
narrators ultimately tell the story of their own and their reader's existential crisis (brought 
on by a confrontation with mass suffering) and how they deal with it by assuming the role 
of witness and therein supposedly relieving victims of an otherwise debilitating trauma. 
The structure of the story in these texts, and the structure of the story that Animal 
criticizes, allows a privileged readership to contemplate suffering as evidence of a 
universal ethical crisis, rather than a situated political crisis, and it casts the reader-
witness as a literary humanitarian. 
Animal expresses frustration with journalists who plot him as a suffering body in 
need within the normative human rights story. He challenges the journalist, arguing, 
"many books have been written about this place, not one has changed anything for the 
better, how will yours be different? You will bleat like all the rest. You'll talk of rights, 
law, justice. Those words sound the same in my mouth as in yours but they don't mean 
the same" (3). The implication is that the many books that have been written about 
Khaufpur all tell the same human rights story citing "rights, law, [and] justice" to support 
an ethical argument against suffering. Perhaps these words have not made a difference 
because they do not correspond to particular political action, policy, or legislation. 
Furthermore, such words do not mean the same when Animal says them because as a 
subaltern subject he cannot speak of his own accord and is without the right to have 
rights. Within the human rights framework he is only allowed to speak "the same story" 
(5); he is unable to access the 'universal' tenets of"rights, law, [and]justice" without 
assimilating to the idea the journalist has ofhim and applying to him for humanitarian 
intervention. There is, however, yet another, more compelling reason these words mean 
something different when Animal uses them: rather than endorsing them as solutions to 
politically situated violence, he attempts to articulate them from a posthumanist 
perspective. 
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The suggestion is that the book Animal narrates will tell a different kind of story; 
it will not provide the testimonial narrative that journalists offer when they discuss 
Khaufpur. Essentially, Animal is telling his story in an attempt to both express his 
outrage at a political situation and resolve a related personal, ethical quandary, but he 
insists that justice in Khaufpur should not be dependent on him narrating himself or other 
Khaufpuris as suffering victims. Having initially refused to tell the journalist a story 
within the parameters that it was sought, Animal has now decided he will tell his story in 
his own way, and he insists it will be a different sort of story. He acknowledges his first 
refusal, reflecting, "What's changed? Everything. As to what happened, well, there are 
many versions going round, every newspaper had a different story, not one knows the 
truth, but I'm not talking to this tape for truth or fifty rupees or Chunaram's fucking 
kebabs. I've a choice to make, let's say it's between heaven and hell, my problem is 
knowing which is which" (11). Animal specifically says he's not talking "for truth," 
meaning his goal is not to testify about the events that have occurred or the conditions in 
which he and his fellow Khaufpuris live. His intent is not to record a particular truth to 
prove his worth as a person and establish his right to have rights. Finding the ethical 
framework of human rights an ineffective way to navigate the situation within which he 
finds himself, he tells this story to explore other possibilities. At the end of the text, he 
reveals the dilemma that he faced when a letter arrived from the US informing him his 
surgery would be paid for. He remembers that he decided to tell his story in order to 
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determine if he should have the surgery or not, recalling, "I will tell this story, I thought 
and that way I'll find out what the end should be. I'll know what to do" (365). Unsure 
what an ethical code that is not constricted within a humanist framework might look like, 
he tells his story without knowing how it will end. Animal sets out to tell a story to which 
he does not know the ending in order to contemplate what should come next in a 
narrative that refuses a humanitarian rescue fantasy. 
Once he has decided to tell his story, Animal spends some time contemplating the 
prospect of addressing the readership the journalist had assured him would find him 
interesting. Recalling the journalist's assertion that thousands would be able to see 
Animal through him, Animal balks, "I think of this awful idea. Your eyes full of eyes. 
Thousands staring at me through the holes in your head. Their curiosity feels like acid on 
my skin" (7). Animal is sickened by the thought of being the object of the kind of 
spectatorship in which Gourevitch and Krog enable their readership to engage. He does 
not want to be the object of the reader's sensory experience in order that this reader might 
be able to witness the traumatic effects of the chemical disaster in Khaufpur. Even 
speaking directly to this readership without the journalist's mediation, Animal senses, 
"What I say becomes a picture and the eyes settle on it like flies" (13). Animal finds it 
objectionable to create such a sensory experience for the reader and suggests that telling a 
story that appeals for human rights renders him and the Khaufpuris about whom he writes 
objects of decay. Creating a picture that draws readers "like flies" (13) does not allow 
him and his fellow Khaufpuris to be dynamic, multifaceted individuals whose existence 
transcends the disaster (and its mishandling) that they have endured. 
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Identifying the reader of Animal's narrative as an outsider who inhabits a 
radically different socioeconomic position, the text problematizes this relationship and 
details Animal's struggle to redefine its parameters. Animal draws attention to the absurd 
gap between himself and his readership, raging, "'What am I to tell these eyes?[ ... ] What 
can I say that they will understand? Have these thousands of eyes slept even one night in 
a place like this? Do these eyes shit on railway tracks? When was the last time these eyes 
had nothing to eat? These cuntish eyes, what do they know of our lives?'' (7-8). Animal 
tells his story after playing a prominent role in extended political protests that result in 
violent rioting and a second night of terror that reproduces the initial industrial disaster in 
Khaufpur. He tells his story and that of his people in order to make sense ofthese events 
and decide if he should have an operation he feels may change life as he knows it. 
However, he finds that the normative humanist framework within which the 
contemporary publishing industry packages his story joins him in a dialectic with a 
readership that does not understand even the most fundamental elements of his life. 
He alludes to the chasm between the reader and himself, noting the difficulty of 
communicating his story across socioeconomic, linguistic, and spatial differences. At one 
point he muses, "You don't answer. I keep forgetting you do not hear me. The things I 
say, by the time they reach you they'll have been changed out of Hindi, made into Inglis 
et fran9ais pourquoi pas pareille quelques autres langues? For you they're just words 
written on a page. Never can you hear my voice, nor can I ever know what pictures you 
see" (21). More than just a disconnect between signifier and signified, Animal observes 
the instability of a narratee with whom he shares neither personal space, common 
experience, or language and whom he will most likely never meet or be able to 
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communicate with directly. Animal's anger at the socioeconomic gap between his 
readership and himself and his consideration of the possibility for miscommunication not 
only undermines the premise of literary humanitarianism, which supposes that the reader 
may act as a witness to resolve the conflict about which the narrator testifies. It also calls 
attention to the absurdity of structuring all stories involving political violence as appeals 
for human rights. 
One way in which Animal attempts to realign the power dynamic between himself 
and his readership is to identify and address his reader as an individual, rather than as 
thousands of eyes like flies devouring his story as decaying matter. He calls out to this 
reader: "In this crowd of eyes I am trying to recognize yours. I've been waiting for you to 
appear, to know you from all the others" (13). And then, he speaks frankly to this 
individual reader, stating, "You are reading my words, you are that person. I've no name 
for you so I will call you Eyes. My job is to talk, yours is to listen. So now listen" (14). 
Animal imagines the interaction between narrator and reader anew, attempting to 
circumvent preconceived ideas and hegemonic discursive structures that render the 
narrator-reader relationship unequal. He confronts and names the individual reader 
according to this person's basic relationship to the text as a set of eyes. Asserting himself 
as the narrator whose job it is to talk and assigning his reader the job of listening, he 
positions himself as the expert and instructs the individual, whose eyes register his words, 
to listen rather than devour. As this metaphor of eyes listening crisscrosses between the 
senses, the novel alerts the reader to the shallowness of his/her sensory experience as a 
reader-witness. By destabilizing the authenticity of sensory descriptions, the text reminds 
the reader that such simulations do not enable the reader to experience, and in turn 
overcome, the suffering described. 
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Animal continues to complicate the metaphor of witnessing through the senses as 
he indicates that his story requires the reader to actively listen because he tells it in a way 
that will disorient a reader who sees the world from a normative perspective and expects 
to hear a standard testimonial narrative. Remarking to the reader, "[t]he world of humans 
is meant to be viewed from eye level. Your eyes" (2), he acknowledges his reader's 
normative way of perceiving the world. Not only does Animal literally see things from a 
different level (as he says, "Lift my head I'm staring at someone's crotch. Whole nother 
world it's below the waist" [2]), but from his perspective as a human who is treated as 
inhuman and who defensively self-identifies as a non-human animal he undermines the 
discursive framework of human rights. He warns the reader, "If you want my story, 
you'll have to put up with how I tell it" (2). Because he does not fit within the rigid 
categories of a humanist framework, he attempts to tell his story and establish a 
relationship with the reader from the posthumanist vantage point that he develops over 
the course of the narrative. A closer analysis will detail how Animal cultivates this 
perspective as his narrative progresses. Broadly speaking though, it is important to note 
that rather than enabling him to exist outside of or beyond the humanist moment within 
which he lives, a posthumanist perspective allows Animal to denaturalize humanist 
assumptions and apply a critical lens to the human rights discourse that frames the 
corporate violence in Khaufpur. 
Animal demonstrates how the Kampani (which is the name the characters in the 
novel use to refer to the company responsible for the industrial disaster),67 and those 
81 
governments that enable and protect it, treat him and his people as less than human even 
as they prescribe humanitarian aid as a way to absolve themselves from accepting legal 
responsibility for the deaths and injuries of thousands ofKhaufpuris. After abandoning 
their factory and eluding a trial for nearly two decades, the Kampani sends a team of 
lawyers to Khaufpur to negotiate a deal to dismiss allegations against them. One of the 
Kampani' s lawyers, nicknamed "The buffalo," proclaims to a crowd that has gathered in 
protest: "We're here to offer generous humanitarian aid to the people ofKhaufpur" (306). 
In turn, Gargi, an old woman whose back is almost as bent as Animal's, responds, "Mr. 
Lawyer, we lived in the shadow of your factory, you told us you were making medicine 
for the fields. You were making poisons to kill insects, but you killed us instead. I would 
like to ask, was there ever much difference, to you?" (306). Gargi's question suggests 
that the Kampani has treated the people who live around their factory in the same manner 
as they do the insects that their chemicals were designed to exterminate. Ignorant of 
Gargi' s insight and under the impression that she is simply asking for money rather than 
calling for the Kampani to stand trial and compensate for its offenses, "The buffalo 
reaches in his red-lined coat, gets out his wallet. 'Buy yourself something nice,' he says. 
Old Gargi's standing there with five hundred rupees in her hand" (307), which is around 
ten US dollars. The lawyer's patronizing reply to Gargi's demand that the Kampani take 
legal and financial responsibility for the crimes it has committed against Khaufpuris 
illustrates how humanitarian aid is offered as a way to defuse legitimate anger and 
distract attention from the much costlier and often irreparable damage that victims of 
corporate violence sustain. 
82 
As one of these victims, Animal is offered humanitarian aid to have an operation 
in the US that will repair his severely bent spine so that he can walk upright. Elli, a doctor 
from the US who has opened a medical clinic in Khaufpur and sustained a tumultuous 
friendship with Animal has arranged for the operation, and he is telling this story to 
figure out if he should have it or not. As he tells the story he deliberates on where he fits 
on the spectrum between humans and other animals, and he increasingly challenges the 
humanist logic that constructs humanity as a distinct class. However, in the beginning of 
his narrative he still judges himself against a humanist standard. Animal's first words to 
the reader are, "I used to be human once. So I'm told" (1 ). Though he has no personal 
recollection of it, Animal was indeed born a regularly functioning human, but just days 
after the chemical disaster occurred at the factory in Khaufpur, its poison attacked his 
body, and, left untreated, he eventually could not walk upright. In the language of human 
rights, the Kampani' s negligence and refusal to treat the people they poisoned or properly 
clean up the contaminated area to prevent further devastation, have undermined his and 
his people's humanity. Animal, who has a particularly visible physical deformity and has 
known no other way of being, reacts by outwardly embracing the persona of an animal 
and shocking people into keeping their distance from him while he secretly wishes he 
were able to walk on two feet. Thus, he introduces himself growling, "My name is 
Animal[ ... ] I'm not a fucking human being, I've no wish to be one" (23). And, he 
explains to the reader, "This was my mantra, what I told everyone. Never did I mention 
my yearning to walk upright" (23). Animal at first expresses contempt for human beings 
and resists being associated with those who have treated him as a lesser form of life. Yet, 
at the same time he covets the human capabilities that elude him. 
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The important distinction is that Animal is human, but he struggles to figure out a 
posthumanist way of understanding his existence and his relationship to others. He at first 
accepts the normative understanding of what it means to be human and rationalizes, "if I 
agree to be a human being, I'll also have to agree that I'm wrong-shaped and abnormal. 
But let me be a quatre partes animal, four-footed and free, then I am whole, my own 
proper shape, just a different kind of animal from say Jara, or a cow, or a camel" (208). 
Being "wrong-shaped and abnormal" would define Animal's existence as defective and 
debilitating, and it would render him a body in perpetual need. Refusing to occupy the 
subject position of the victim who is compelled to parade his differences as marks of 
trauma to prove his humanity and appeal for the right to have rights, he initially portrays 
himself as an animal. He suggests that by classifying himself as an animal he frees 
himself from a state of inferiority. Yet, this actually reinforces the strict categorization of 
the human, upholding the idea of the normative human and supporting a distinction 
between humans and animals. 
As the narrative progresses and Animal tells his story his discussion of the human 
and the animal changes, becoming more nuanced. Whereas early in his story, Animal 
upholds a distinction between the human and the animal, toward the end he defies this 
false binary. Ultimately deciding against the operation that would straighten his spine, 
Animal imagines a different possibility for himself than the narrative trajectory of literary 
humanitarianism allows. Rather than seeing an operation made possible by generous 
humanitarian aid as the thing (and the only possible thing at that) that will rescue him 
from his suffering, he realizes this may not actually be a suitable solution for him at all. 
He explains, 
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See, Eyes, I reckon that if I have this operation, I will be upright, true, but to walk 
I will need the help of sticks. I might have a wheelchair, but how far will that get 
me in the gullis of Khaufpur? Right now I can run and hop and carry kids on my 
back, I can climb hard trees, I've gone up mountains, roamed in jungles. Is life so 
bad? If I'm an upright human, I would be one of millions, not even a healthy one 
at that. Stay four-foot, I'm the one and only Animal (366). 
Animal recognizes that the surgery may not provide the retribution it promises and that it 
may actually make his life more difficult. He instead embraces himself as a four-footed 
human animal with the understanding that his humanity does not elevate him above other 
animals, human or non-human. He thus embraces his moniker of"Animal" not as a 
metaphor for human deprivation but as a reminder of the animality of all humans, and 
acknowledging this animality enables him to think the human in another way. Using a 
modifier in the phrase "upright human" (366), he nuances traditional definitions, 
decoupling what it means to be human from its normative discursive framing. He implies 
that because there are many ways of being human, difference should not undermine an 
individual's humanity, and one should not have to prove this humanity. His name at once 
points to the fact that all humans are animals and identifies him as an individual as any 
other proper name would. He is a four-footed human animal who accepts himself as 
unique ("the one and only Animal" [366]), rather than attempting to become another 
iteration of 'universal' humanity. 
Even as he accepts himself, however, Animal does not pretend to solve the 
political problems that the text confronts. After telling his personal story, he concludes, 
"Eyes, I'm done. Khuda hafez. Go well. Remember me. All things pass, but the poor 
remain. We are the people of the Apokalis. Tomorrow there will be more of us" (366). 
With this brusque dismissal of his reader, Animal makes it known that by listening to this 
story the reader does not change the circumstances within which he lives. Telling this 
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story to the reader does not metaphorically release Animal's people from the toxic 
conditions within which they experience suffering. The stilted series of farewell sayings 
that Animal delivers replace the happily-ever-after resolution that the humanitarian reader 
seeks and give way to the fact that "the poor remain" (366). The text refuses to establish a 
relationship between a subaltern narrator and a comparatively socioeconomically 
privileged reader that enables the reader to engage in literary humanitarianism. It reminds 
the reader that "the people of the Apokalis" (366), the poor people the reader does not 
usually see who are impacted by politically situated, corporate violence, will not fade into 
oblivion beneath the chemical vapor from which they emerged in this narrative. 
With this conclusion Animal reminds the reader that he has told his story in order 
to figure out how he will live with the effects of the disaster at the factory in Khaufpur, 
but telling his story and determining this does not achieve justice for his people. By 
distinguishing between the personal resolution Animal arrives at as he tells his story and 
the larger political context within which he exists, the text acknowledges that storytelling 
does not inherently resolve the socioeconomic disparities and political problems that it 
describes. As Animal refuses to assimilate to normative human subjectivity, the text 
reminds the reader that justice is not dependent on Animal proving his personhood and 
thereby establishing his and his people's right to have rights. Indeed, the text defies a 
possible repetition of the humanist framework by refusing to project Animal as a hero 
who embodies a posthumanist ethical solution. In many ways Animal's behavior is 
highly unethical: he poisons a fellow activist named Zafar out of jealousy of Zafar' s 
relationship with Nisha, a friend that he secretly loves; he spies on and sexually 
objectifies Elli; and he may even have burned down the ruins of the factory causing the 
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second night of terror. Animal certainly does not model a perfect posthumanist ethics 
(such a model would after all only be a reincarnation of humanism by another name), and 
this is perhaps part of the point: justice should not be dependent on Animal exhibiting an 
attention-grabbing level of suffering and proving he is worthy of rights. Neither should 
justice be dependent on Animal accepting humanitarian aid to have an operation to 
remove visual evidence of a toxic past that remains perceptible in his crooked back. 
Animal asks the Eyes to whom he directs his story to listen to what he has to say 
about the Kampani rather than seeing him as the embodiment of a toxic past and 
consuming his suffering according to the delusion that this will somehow relieve him of 
it. He represents his people's suffering not to signify their worthiness of humanitarian aid 
but to demand accountability from the Kampani. The point Animal is trying to make to 
the Eyes - to his readership - is that justice should involve the Kampani facing trial. As 
Animal's People encourages the reader to question the power dynamic between the poor 
"people of the Apokalis" (366) and the privileged readers who devour their stories, it 
exposes systemic inequalities, calls for legal action, and challenges the logic of human 
rights and humanitarian aid from a posthumanist perspective. 
* * * 
This chapter has argued that by portraying conflicts involving political and corporate 
violence as human rights concerns and informing the reader about such situations by 
narrativizing the traumatic experiences of 'native informants,' literary humanitarianism 
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detracts attention from the people who are responsible for such violence and from the 
power structures within which they operate. While We Wish to Inform You and Country 
exemplify the way in which literary humanitarianism attempts to engage the reader as a 
witness in order to rescue the suffering bodies of those who have been victimized in 
national and international conflicts, Animal's People interrupts the dialectic between the 
narrator-testifier and the reader-witness. Animal tells his story from a posthumanist 
perspective, distinguishing between his own non-normative personhood and the 
Kampani's legal responsibility for contaminating Khau:fpur with toxic chemicals. 
Moreover, he emphasizes that his story does not resolve the transnational power struggle 
within which his people are victimized. The neoliberal economic policies and national-
international power dynamics that allowed for such corporate violence continue to 
produce systemic inequalities. 
In chapter three I comment further on the limitations and the (seemingly 
contradictory) infinite possibilities for storytelling, concentrating there on the way that 
literature maintains the openness of the historical archive. In preparation for that 
chapter's more in depth narratalogical and theoretical analysis of storytelling, and in 
concluding the current critique of the narrator-testifier and reader-witness dialectic, it is 
useful to recall Animal's storytelling technique. Animal's way of beginning to tell a story 
without knowing its end demonstrates that stories do not have to be oriented around an 
end result. Thus, literature may function as a space within which to rethink the 
testimonial narrative of human rights. Acknowledging that literature may transgress a 
humanist teleology and tell a story without knowing what comes next may be the first 
step in imagining ways of thinking that are not so limiting as current discursive 
frameworks. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Literature and the Archive: Narrating Uncertainty in Zoe Wicomb's David's Story 
As I argue in my first two chapters, literature is a space within which human rights 
discourse equates narrative voice with agency and denies the subaltern the right to have 
rights; and literary humanitarianism reinforces an imperialistic relationship between 
suffering victims and privileged readers. If this is the case - if portraying testimony as an 
aesthetic object or an aesthetic object as testimony in the name of literary 
humanitarianism fetishizes the suffering that results from political violence and inequality 
- then, I ask in this chapter, how can storytelling be useful to those who experience deep-
rooted, systemic inequality, pervasive economic instability, brutality, torture, or 
genocide? Acknowledging that efforts of literature to correct for inequitable or biased 
representation within the archive do not actually rectify systemic problems in the day-to-
day political realities within which people live, I suggest that perhaps literature might 
serve another function. What if literature is applied not as a way to write back to the 
archive or refine the archive by adding to it but as a meaningful way to confront the 
chaos of violent political upheaval? Instead of approaching literature as a way to achieve 
closure, it might instead be appreciated for the openness it allows. As this chapter studies 
the relationship literature has to the archive and political realities, it analyzes the way 
literature may occupy multiple temporalities not only to at once remember and forget but 
also to remain open to the unknown and narrate complications and ruptures that define 
uncertain political realities. 
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My argument is not simply that literature may provide a way of narrating 
uncertainties that a historical record is unable to represent; the key distinction I am 
making is that literature may do this by offering something other than testimonial 
narratives that archive political violence as trauma. Rather than attempting to deal with 
those things that remain unrepresented in the archive by identifying them as unspeakable 
or unverifiable trauma, literature might be applied as a way to narrate gaps and ruptures 
in the archive not for the sake of closure but as a way to come to terms with uncertainty. 
Instead of approaching literature as a way to endow subjects with agency, provoke a 
humanitarian response from the reader, or resolve systemic inequality within the archive, 
I call attention to the ability of literary narratives to connect representation within the 
archive (which is located in the past) to life in the present by allowing different 
temporalities to coexist. I problematize the notion that literature should act either 
mimetically or metaphorically to confer the right to have rights on those who cannot 
claim it for themselves. Rather than using literature to induct another subject to the 
society of those with the right to have rights or add another right to an already extensive 
and contradictory list, efforts that both reinforce a rights framework that is based on 
inclusion and exclusion, literature might offer a way to acknowledge the past and look 
toward the future without imposing a predetermined teleology. I argue for a consideration 
of literature as an exploration of lived reality that is not dictated by a rights-oriented 
testimonial structure in order to shift from a focus on suffering in terms of rights and 
wrongs to careful consideration of the power relations that produce violence. 
By way of reviewing some of the key issues that define the debate about 
contemporary literary and cultural representations of political violence, I first offer a 
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concise reading of Michael Ondaatje' s Ani! 's Ghost. I take up the questions Ani! 's Ghost 
raises about living in Sri Lanka in the 1980s and early 1990s in a state of political 
violence with no clear victim-persecutor binary; about the complications that arise when 
possibilities for representing political violence are governed by a war-torn state and 
policed by the international human rights community; and about the imperialism at work 
in the assumption that real world violence in former colonies ends with the conclusion of 
its Anglophone textual representation. Then, I show how Zoe Wicomb's David's Story 
manages the complexities that Ani! 's Ghost reveals about the relationship between the 
archive, literature, and political reality within the context of post-apartheid South Africa 
without subscribing to the human rights framework within which Ani!' s Ghost remains 
trapped. In my analysis of David's Story, I consider how literature might remain open to 
the future without relegating political violence to the past by archiving it as trauma. The 
psychic metaphor of consciousness renders traumatic political violence unrepresentable. I 
analyze the way David's Story instead confronts apartheid-era torture, sexual abuse, and 
systemic gender inequality within the African National Congress (ANC; the governing 
party of the new South Africa) through a gendered metaphor that frames its engagement 
with the archive and post-apartheid politics. 
After a brief discussion of Ani! 's Ghost, I take up David's Story as the primary 
object of analysis in this chapter and explore the politics of literary representation 
through a narratological analysis of this South African novel whose metanarrative puts 
the act and object of narration into focus in the context of racial stratification, 
militarization, and torture. The latter novel's exposition of the writing process along with 
its protagonist David's preoccupation with the archive and his concerns over the limits of 
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representation in terms of the variability of truth and the illusiveness of memory provide 
an opportunity to discuss the use of literature to narrate p~litical events. Not only is 
David's Story a politically engaged novel, but it also illustrates the complications of 
writing as a way of inscribing oneself within the archive, communicating within and 
across the archive, and narrativizing what is remembered and what is forgotten to 
construct and revise the archive. In short, the novel exhibits the relationship that the 
archive and literary representation have to lived reality. 
David's Story is commonly read for what remains unutterable within its narrative. 
Critics continually propose useful readings of its silences and omissions, 68 and as they 
comment on the way the unknown figures in the representation of the past and present, 
several critics notice that the novel is concerned with narrating that which exceeds 
current discourse.69 Whereas some rely on the language of trauma to discuss the novel's 
concern with the function of literature in post-apartheid South A:frica/0 I track the way 
the novel narrates uncertainties and complications in the moment of transition out of 
apartheid without reducing political violence to trauma. Drawing on Achille Mbembe's 
and Jacques Derrida' s theorizations of archival temporality and Derrida' s notion of an 
openness to the future that he terms the messianic, I analyze how David's Story narrates 
the gaps and ruptures within the archive. The novel not only demonstrates the messianic 
nature of the archive, it is also concerned with figuring out how to narrate what remains 
unknown without foreclosing possibilities. I track how David's Story manages the literary 
in relation to the historical archive by presenting a story populated by undecidable figures 
like those Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak theorizes in her discussion of the Derridian 
concept ofmessianicity. I first identify the way David's Story plots the relationship 
93 
literature has to the archive and lived reality in post-apartheid South Africa. Then I argue 
that the novel presents gender as a metaphor that illustrates differing approaches to 
literature and the archive and reveals the possibilities for a literary openness to the 
unknown. The novel not only decouples the feminine from testimony about suffering, but 
also, by gendering the messianic approach to storytelling as feminine and reinterpreting 
narrative uncertainties as an openness to unknown possibilities, it challenges the 
distinction that its main character David makes between what he sees as politically 
important, masculine historiography and ineffective, feminine literary narratives. 
To begin with Ondaatje' s Ani! 's Ghost then, in this novel Anil, a forensic 
pathologist for an international human rights organization, and Sarath, an archaeologist 
selected by the Sri Lankan government, translate the remains of an individual they name 
Sailor into testimony about political violence in Sri Lanka. Together, Anil, who "could 
read Sailor's last actions by knowing the wounds on bone" (Ondaatje 65) and Sarath, 
who, as "a good archaeologist[,] can read a bucket of soil as if it were a complex 
historical novel" ( 151 ), curate an archive of organic material in an attempt to tell the story 
of Sailor's political murder. The narrative they construct around the objects they find is 
shaped by the political circumstances of what Sarath calls "an unofficial war" in which 
"bodies turn up weekly," "[e]very side [is] killing and hiding evidence," and "no one 
wants to alienate the foreign powers" (17). Sarath suggests that the violence in Sri Lanka 
has remained unofficial, or invisible, in part because the world is watching, and it would 
alienate foreign powers to publicize a war that had "backers on the sidelines in safe 
countries, a war sponsored by gun- and drug-runners" ( 43). Caught up in this complex 
relationship between an internally splintered state, those who circulate international 
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capital on the black market, and the international human rights community, Anil and 
Sarath attempt to piece together the story of Sailor's disappearance and political murder. 
As the novel depicts the way in which Anil and Sarath formulate a narrative for 
Sailor, it opens out to a broader discussion about the way that international politics 
influence representation. At one point in their struggle to establish a story for Sailor, Anil 
lashes out at Sarath, insisting, "I came here as part of a human rights group[ ... ] I do not 
work for you[ ... ] I work for an international authority." To this Sarath responds, "This 
'international authority' has been invited here by the government" (274). Thus the 
question arises: in whose name will the representation of Sailor's death be conducted; 
what political body will sponsor it and/or inhibit it, and how will this shape the 
representation itself? And, as the novel draws attention to the politics of representation, it 
also challenges a history of Western cultural representation that depicts protagonists from 
England and the US as saviors in foreign lands. Thus Anil recalls Gamini, Sarath's 
brother, remarking, 
American movies, English books- remember how they all end?[ ... ] The 
American or the Englishman gets on a plane and leaves. That's it. The camera 
leaves with him[ ... ] The tired hero[ ... ] He's going home. So the war, to all 
purposes, is over. That's enough reality for the West. It's probably the history of 
the last two hundred years of Western political writing. Go home. Write a book. 
Hit the circuit (285-6). 
Though Anil was raised in Sri Lanka, she has spent her adult life in England and the US, 
and she has worked in places ravaged by war and political violence as a representative of 
an international human rights organization based in Geneva. The novel is not only 
focalized through Anil, it is also written in English by a Sri-Lankan born author who has 
lived most ofhis life in Canada. Gamini's comments thus demonstrate the novel's self-
consciousness and raise important questions about the role of Anglophone literature in 
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addressing political violence in places impacted by histories of colonialism and 
contemporary imperialism. The novel points out that perceiving a political crisis, war, or 
any type of socioeconomically situated violence as existing only within the bindings of a 
book or through the lens of a camera and then profiting from this representation is itself 
an exercise in imperialism. 
Even though A nil's Ghost is careful not to depict the violence in Sri Lanka as 
something that will end when its pages run out and it surveys the complications of 
literary humanitarianism, it still attempts to bridge the gap between political reality and 
literary representation by presenting itself as testimony. It depicts "a fearful nation" in 
which "public sorrow was stamped down by the climate of uncertainty" and "Death, loss, 
was 'unfinished,' so you could not walk through it" (56). Within these grim 
circumstances, the novel imagines Anil and Sarath using scientific data to provide 
certainty about Sailor's political murder and offer closure to it. The novel imagines a 
scenario in which these two scientists are able to access an organic archive (which is 
perhaps a perfect archive) and read it objectively to identify empirical evidence of a 
political murder. Yet, even with their scientific evidence the only option available to Anil 
and Sarath, whose goal it is to expose a crime and prevent further political murders, 
seems to be to submit a testimonial narrative of Soldier's death, which they have of 
course constructed, as evidence within a corrupt juridical system that is structured by a 
divided state and ineffectively policed by the international human rights regime. The 
human rights regime to which Anil and Sarath appeal on Soldier's behalf has not held up 
in the context of a civil war that is funded and armed by international powers. The novel 
tells the story of the failure of both the state and the international human rights 
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infrastructure, but it still attempts to engage in literary humanitarianism. Within the 
context of the national and international failure that the novel depicts, Anil identifies 
Sailor as a "representative of all those lost voices" and determines to tell his story 
according to the conviction that "[t]o give him a name would name the rest" (56). Like 
other works of literary humanitarianism, Anil's Ghost attempts to provide a space within 
which narrators and readers may together imagine themselves overcoming uncertainty 
and achieving closure by acknowledging the story of a victim of political violence. 
The novel identifies the influence that human rights discourse has on the narrative 
production of individual texts and reveals the complications involved in shaping cultural 
archives on a larger scale. However, it is important to emphasize that even though 
identifying the problematic ways that human rights discourse shapes the archive may be a 
key to reconceiving the archive, this alone will not improve political realities. There is 
discordance between representation within the archive and political reality that no 
revision to the archive can bridge. While A nil's Ghost demonstrates this complication, it 
remains invested in the archive as a space from which to claim rights for victims of 
political violence who cannot speak for themselves. The problem that surfaces with 
A nil's Ghost is that no matter how accurate the archive or how grounded representation is 
in objective facts, narrative accounts of physical and/or emotional trauma cannot deliver 
state protections by invoking 'universal' human rights. 
Although Ani! 's Ghost illustrates the complications involved in navigating 
national-international human rights networks, it attempts to overcome the failures of both 
the state and international community via literary humanitarianism. By portraying 
political violence as personal trauma and then endorsing itself as a form of testimony, 
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A nil's Ghost tries to supplement the historical record and extend the scope of the 
juridical. Part of the literary humanitarian project is to fill in gaps in the historical archive 
by writing back to narratives that fail to represent the subaltern and thereby claim rights 
for subjects who are unable to do so for themselves. However, as I began to argue in 
chapter two, treating a complex political history as trauma and working to archive it both 
suggests the structural apparatus that allowed for the trauma is beyond representation 
because the psychic metaphor of consciousness suggests trauma surfaces in the archive 
only as an unspeakable silence, and it acts as if a history of violence can be 
compartmentalized and dealt with as part of the past by way of testimonial narratives. 
This positions the political conflict in the past and assumes it will be resolved by 
archiving evidence of the suffering it generated. 
Like A nil's Ghost, David's Story also deals with political upheaval in a divided 
state, the complications of the victim-persecutor binary, and the paradoxical relationship 
between the historical archive, literature, and political reality. However, while Anil's 
Ghost seeks closure by using science to overcome uncertainty, David's Story reveals that 
closure is an impossible cure. David's Story is particularly useful not only in studying the 
way that literary narratives relate to the archive and to contemporary political reality, but 
also in identifying the productivity of literature that engages the archive as a medium that 
refuses the kind of closure literary humanitarianism seeks. Published in 2000 after the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) hearings, Wicomb's novel is set in 1991 
South Africa during the period of upheaval before the TRC was created, but after the 
ANC was unbanned and Nelson Mandela was released from prison, and as apartheid laws 
are being repealed and multi-party talks for a negotiated settlement are taking place. In 
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this moment of transition, David Dirkse, a guerilla freedom fighter for Umkhonto we 
Sizwe (MK; the armed wing of the ANC) is working with an amanuensis to tell his story. 
This amanuensis is both the narrator of the novel and an unnamed character who 
struggles with the task ofwriting about David's activity in the Movement, his time at the 
ANC's Quatro camps in Angola, and especially his unexplained relationship with Dulcie, 
a fellow high ranking guerilla. Dulcie has possibly been tortured and may also have 
tortured others, and she is the key figure representing uncertainty throughout the text. 
As David works with the amanuensis he is eager to delve into the archive and 
incorporate Griqua history into his story.71 However, determining that David's efforts to 
historicize his Griqua heritage are actually a way of burying his own secrets, the 
amanuensis decides to imagine the parts of his story that he refuses to reveal. She rejects 
David's attempts to engage in a kind of literary testimony that speaks on behalf of 
subaltern figures, like Saartje Baartman,72 whom he locates within Griqua history. 
Instead, she focalizes his story through a series of women whom she portrays both within 
the Griqua history David constructs and as a part of her frame narrative, which is also 
heavily appended by flashbacks to the more recent personal histories of David, his wife 
Sally, their female elders, and Dulcie. The amanuensis's "story of women" (Wicomb 
199) challenges David's conception ofthe historical archive- and the place of political 
militancy within it - as masculine and the literary as feminine and ineffective. 
Furthermore, as the novel refuses to present this "story of women" (199) as a form of 
testimony that conceptualizes political violence in terms of trauma, it undermines the 
notion that testimony of suffering is a feminine narrative mode.73 
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My examination of the way David's Story plots the archive in the world is 
informed by Achille Mbembe's and Jacques Derrida's theorizations of the archive. 
Mbembe points out, "the archive imposes a qualitative difference between co-ownership 
of dead time (the past) and living time, that is, the immediate present" ("The Power" 21). 
And, he explains in more depth, "the time woven together by the archive is the product of 
a composition. This time has a political dimension resulting from the alchemy of the 
archive: it is supposed to belong to everyone. The community of time, the feeling 
according to which we would all be heirs to a time over which we might exercise the 
rights of collective ownership: this is the imaginary that the archive seeks to disseminate" 
(21). The distinction between the "dead time (the past)'' of the archive, which "belong[s] 
to everyone" and "living time" experienced by individuals in "the immediate present" 
(21) plays out in Wicomb's novel as David tries to use storytelling both as a way to 
distance himself from what he has done in the name of the Movement and to honor the 
work of the Movement by inducting it into an archive over which there is "collective 
ownership" (21). Asthe amanuensis surmises, "[h]e wanted me to write it, not because he 
thought that his story could be written by someone else, but rather because it would no 
longer belong to him. In other words, he both wanted and did not want it to be written. 
His fragments betray the desire to distance himself from his own story; the many 
beginnings, invariable flights into history, although he is no historian, show uncertainty 
about whether to begin at all" (Wicomb 1). If his story no longer belongs to him, but to 
an amanuensis and a communal archive, David will, in a sense, be freed of it. 
Yet, David's training as an MK freedom fighter has taught him that secrecy is 
crucial to security, and in his continued allegiance to the ANC he is tasked with figuring 
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out "how to maintain an army whilst officially dismantling it" ( 1 08). In order to provide 
the impression of "dismantling" this "army" he historicizes it, but to avoid the details of 
contemporary politics he retreats into historiographic metafiction. 74 He invokes an 
inaccurate communal history that he insists exists in the archive in order to plot himself, 
and the Movement to which he has dedicated his life, within this archive without 
disclosing his own secrets or those of the Movement. 
David is intent on archiving his story of the Movement at this particular moment 
of transition out of apartheid-era rule in order to render violent events part of the past; to 
make what happened belong to the public not just the individual; and to honor the ideals 
for which the Movement has stood. And, to a certain extent, forgetting is a necessary part 
of the transition that he seeks to implement with the help of the amanuensis. Derrida 
details how the archive enables forgetting, explaining, 
the archive - the good one - produces memory, but produces forgetting at the 
same time. And when we write, when we archive, when we trace, when we leave 
a trace behind us- and that's what we do each time we trace something, even 
each time we speak, that is we leave a trace wh~ch becomes independent of its 
origin, of the movement of its utterance - the trace is at the same time the 
memory, the archive, and the erasure, the repression, the forgetting of what it is 
supposed to keep safe. That's why, for all these reasons, the work of the archivist 
is not simply a work of memory. It's a work of mourning. And a work of 
mourning, as everyone knows, is a work of memory but also the best way just to 
forget the other, to keep the other in oneself, to keep it safe, in a safe- but when 
you put something in a safe it's just in order to be able to forget it, okay? When I 
handwrite something on a piece of paper, I put it in my pocket or in the safe, it's 
just in order to forget it, to know that I can find it again while in the meantime 
having forgotten it ("Archive Fever" 54). 
David's Story narrativizes the paradox of at once remembering and forgetting by way of 
the archive. Though David does imagine a revisionist history, he engages the archive not 
simply to remember certain things and forgets others, but also in the sense that Derrida 
describes. He wants his story written to allow it to become "independent of its origin" 
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(Derrida, "Archive Fever" 54), meaning independent of him. He also hopes writing it will 
place it "in a safe" where it will be protected but where he will also "be able to forget it" 
(54) and move on. In the post-apartheid South African context in which Wicomb writes 
this novel, the paradox of at once remembering and forgetting is especially relevant. 
Following the TRC hearings and Nelson Mandela's landmark presidency, which both 
endeavored to define a new South Africa, this novel explores the difficulties involved in 
addressing the effects of pervasive apartheid-era inequality and violence while building a 
new South African government through a negotiated settlement between oppressor and 
oppressed and the various factions responsible for widespread violence. 
David's Story illustrates how the archive operates in South Africa as "a work of 
mourning" (Derrida, "Archive Fever" 54). Not only for apartheid-era inequality and 
violence, but also for David himself, who dedicated his and his family's lives to the 
Movement and who, it is revealed at the end of the novel, has died partway through his 
project with the amanuensis. For the amanuensis, the text is a work of mourning that 
attempts to make sense of the fragments of information David has provided and to come 
to terms with the knowledge that the ANC engaged in political murders and torture in the 
name of the Movement. 
Throughout the novel the amanuensis emphasizes the practical and ethical 
difficulties she has writing David's story, and following an episode in which a gunman 
destroys her computer, she ends her narrative (which she has backed up externally), 
writing: "My screen is in shards. I The words escape me. I I do not acknowledge this 
scrambled thing is mine. I I will have nothing more to do with it. I I wash my hands of 
this story" (Wicomb 213). With the gunshot in the narrator's computer screen, the world 
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of the archive - which catalogues the past in writing - collides with the real world of her 
lived reality in the present. The fragmented nature of David's story is reflected in the 
"shards" of her computer screen as she ends the narrative in the form of what may be 
seen as the breakdown of narrative structure or as a poem. Each line that follows evokes a 
double meaning. She at once has no words to adequately tell David's story and as she 
formulates them the "words escape" her control; she does not see "this scrambled thing" 
as hers, which suggests it not only does not belong to her but that it belongs to something 
greater than her; and she will have "nothing more to do with it," which also suggests it 
will take on a life of its own with each new reading. And, finally, in the last line she 
absolves herself of responsibility by cleansing the hands that write words that at once 
remember and forget. The amanuensis's washing of her hands calls to mind Dulcie's 
incessant hand washing (her "hands are raw with washing" [181]), and as a trope hand 
washing evokes Pontius Pilate washing his hands before sending Jesus to his death. The 
insinuation is that, like Pilate, Dulcie and the amanuensis both participate in violence 
reluctantly - Dulcie as a possible agent of torture and the amanuensis by exposing 
dangerous secrets that both undermine the authority of the ANC and put Dulcie at risk. 
Dulcie's need to continually wash her hands is also a reminder that absolution is a 
process of remembering and forgetting that is ongoing and never finished. Rather than 
reading this text at the end of the novel as broken lines signaling the decline of narrative, 
I see them as a poem whose multiple meanings demonstrate how literature adapts and 
changes with new readings. It is through this risky sort of openness that literature allows 
a space for the continual process of remembering and forgetting as it connects the 
historical archive to lived reality. 
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If writing is a space within which to remember and forget, the novel plots the 
complications of doing so when writing is restricted or even forbidden. David not only 
employs the amanuensis as an archivist, bestowing on her the responsibility of recording 
his story, and acts as an archivist himself in his evaluation of Griqua history. He also 
depends on writing to archive his own thoughts, even though this violates the security 
policy that governs him as a freedom fighter. In fact, 
He cannot think without writing things down, a longstanding defiance of rules, 
but he has developed his own set of rules for the transgression that renders it safe 
as houses: he uses the smallest possible slip of paper, which he always removes 
from its pad to ensure that there is no imprint; it is never left unattended; he 
shoves it into his mouth at the slightest interruption; improvised and inconsistent 
codes and abbreviations make it, in any case, difficult to read; and the note exists 
only as long as he is busy writing - he destroys it as soon as he arrives at 
conclusions (1 07). 
Personally, David engages in the act of writing in order to think things through, not to 
produce a readable text or leave an "imprint" within a public archive. Indeed, when he is 
not chronicling Griqua history, he takes great care to ensure his writing remains illegible. 
He does not simply defy the rules of the Movement, but also establishes his own variation 
on its guidelines to ensure the transgressive act of writing is "safe as houses" (1 07). 
Derrida' s discussion of writing ("When I handwrite something on a piece of paper, I put 
it in my pocket or in the safe, it's just in order to forget it, to know that I can find it again 
while in the meantime having forgotten it [Derrida, "Archive Fever" 54]) is particularly 
relevant here. David's allusion to his attempts to secure his writing within a safe house 
may reflect his own struggle as a high-ranking leader within the Movement to at once 
remember and forget in the interest of security, for the sake of maintaining the public 
image of the ANC, and in order to assuage his own conscience. After all, he is writing in 
this instance in order to consider "how to maintain an army whilst officially dismantling 
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it" (Wicomb 108). Maintaining the militancy ofthe ANC while appearing to dismantle it 
involves installing it within an archival past and projecting a peaceful future. As David 
faces this paradox and tries to reconcile a militant past with the prospect of a nonviolent 
future, he not only accesses the archive to perform a revisionist history of his Griqua 
heritage so as to use this as a model for moving forward after apartheid, as Dorothy 
Driver suggests.75 At the same time, he also seeks temporary asylum in a present that he 
identifies with the act of writing - for him writing offers a way to confront his own 
uncertainty, but for the sake of security he clings to the belief that "the note exists only as 
long as he is busy writing" (Wicomb 1 07). He relies on writing to process his thoughts 
and formulate new possibilities, but he attempts to suspend his writing in a present 
temporality so that it does not become part of the historical record. 
David's relationship to writing is perplexing not simply because it is 
contradictory, but also because in featuring David's own writing (both his personal 
musings and his narrative ofGriquahistory) and the amanuensis's writing about him, the 
novel explores the possibilities for a methodology of writing that has not yet fully 
materialized. Though David is extremely cynical about the role of literature in the 
Movement and the narrator's frustration at the writing process is palpable (sometimes 
even overshadowing David's story); David insists the amanuensis must write his story 
and she takes great risks to do so. The conflicting ideas about writing that the novel 
displays and its characters' struggles to engage in the writing process suggest that 
literature is being asked to function differently in this novel - perhaps in a way that has 
not yet been entirely realized. David at once relies on writing to figure things out but also 
tries to prevent his writing from being read. He also maintains that literature does not 
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make a revolution ("No point, David says scornfully, in reading about freedom when we 
should be playing active roles towards attaining it" [140]), but he enlists an amanuensis 
to write his story. So, the narrator wonders, 
Why, then, does David want his story written- which is to say, have it read? Yes, 
he does feel ambivalent about this project, which invites a reader to perform a 
task he does not value. But he cannot explain: he is in a sense ashamed of 
appearing to be vain, of thinking of himself as special. It is not that he wants to be 
remembered; rather, it is about putting things down on paper so that you can see 
what there is, shuffle the pages around, if necessary, until they make sense (140). 
Though he becomes sidetracked with reconstructing and recording Griqua history, David 
is not interested in documenting his story so as to be remembered, and he certainly does 
not accept the interface between text and reader as a way to engage in political activity. 
What is ultimately at stake in this novel is not how literature might shape or revise the 
archive or how it might achieve the "freedom" (140) for which David has fought; literary 
narrative is not being proposed as a means to accomplish a political project. Instead, the 
novel presents literature as a way to "see what there is" and "make sense" of it (140). 
Rather than submitting testimony to its reader as part of a political appeal, David's Story 
uses the narrative freedom available to literature to "shuffle the pages" of the recent 
history of South Africa around. At a time when literature is increasingly proposed as a 
way to do the work of human rights, David's Story seeks a different methodological 
approach to storytelling, and it is therefore useful in considering possibilities for 
conceptions of justice that are not restricted within a rights-based framework that depends 
on the acceptance of testimonial narratives into the archival record. 
While the text acknowledges that writing constructs an archive that defines how 
histories are understood and indicates where power is located, the purpose of the novel is 
not to infiltrate this archive and induct David into the official historical record. Resolving 
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not to make David's story about writing back to the official archive, an activity into 
which David initially diverges with his attempts to write an account that reinscribes 
Saartje Baartman within a celebratory narrative of Andrew Le Fleur and Griqua origins/6 
the amanuensis says to David: "There are quite enough of these stories" (135). In this 
moment, the novel acknowledges the project of writing back, and it takes a stand against 
using literature to recover the oppressed figure of Baartman. Plotting Baartman within a 
revisionist history would further subjugate her in the name of David's contemporary 
political agenda. Rather the novel showcases the multiple ways that writing operates in 
relation to David- both in his life and in the way the amanuensis narrativizes it -to 
explore how writing might otherwise be deployed. 77 
Because the frame narrative about the amanuensis's experience writing David's 
story draws attention to all other instances of writing in the novel, there is a slippage 
between different forms of writing that is useful in considering the limitations and 
possibilities of literary texts. For example, when David comes across a hit list with his 
and Dulcie's names on it, it becomes clear that writing may be used as a weapon, but his 
attempts to counteract the hit list through his own scribbling andre-inscription 
demonstrate the limit point of engaging writing as a performative act. The narrator 
describes how the hit list operates explaining, "The hit list is a cultural variation on 
sticking pins into a doll or sending a tokolos - a demon - to undermine the intended 
victim" (112). Marking a name down in the ledger of a hit list enacts a death sentence 
through writing. As David scans the list its neatly printed script pierces into his 
consciousness - he cannot un-read his name or disassociate from it. The narrator 
describes his desperate reaction, continuing, 
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Inviolable like the tokolos, a hit list cannot be amended in any way. To pluck the 
pins out of the wax doll is not a possibility, for there is no longer a subject to 
perform such a task. What David does is therefore something of a miracle, 
something performed in the trance of his freedom mantra. He can, of course, not 
touch his own, but he scores her name out with a pen, repeatedly, so that it can no 
longer be recognised. The terror mounts with each stroke of the blue ballpoint. 
When the name is completely obliterated, he shudders at what he has done. Has 
he, the intended, been directed into acting, into becoming the agent for others? 
(116-17). 
Once the hit list is written, it exists in the world as a text that functions separately from its 
author; there is no subject who can un-write it. In the "trance of his freedom mantra" 
(116), as if under a rhetorical spell, David attempts to achieve a "miracle" (116) and 
assume the position of the author-figure so as to remove Dulcie's name. But, by 
scratching out her name "so it can no longer be recognised" ( 11 7) and is "completely 
obliterated" (117), David obscures Dulcie completely, leaving no recorded trace ofher. 
In a sense he fulfills the action for which the hit list calls, and all that remains is the 
scribbled evidence of a power struggle over her presence on the list. Dulcie herself is 
gone; her individual existence is beyond recognition. 
When David realizes he may have become "the agent of others" (117) by striking 
out Dulcie's name on the hit list, he endeavors to rectify the situation by writing her name 
anew as if by creating a text that writes back to the original he might set things right. The 
narrator recounts, "By way of making amends to Dulcie he writes her name on another 
clean sheet of paper. Below it he writes: It is they who obliterate her name" (117). 
Counteracting the hit list with his own textual assertion and casting blame on an 
unidentified "they" does not un-write Dulcie's obliteration. David's frustration with the 
hit list illustrates the paradox of writing back- this dialectic reinforces the framework 
within which power operates. Rather than asking literature to constitute a performative 
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act (to write back to an oppressive power structure on behalf ofBaartman or Dulcie), the 
novel observes the limitations of such a project. It proceeds from this point not in order to 
enact a particular politics but to engage in a reflective exercise that explores the latent 
possibilities that might emerge out of the literary process. 
To put it in a Derridian sense, David's Story struggles to figure out how to engage 
in a kind of storytelling that is "future-oriented" (Derrida, "Archive Fever" 46) but not 
teleological - a kind of storytelling that has "no horizon of expectation" ( 46). Derrida' s 
discussion of messianicity is useful in defining the challenges that the novel confronts in 
its engagement with the archive and its metanarrative about storytelling. He defmes his 
terms explaining, "What I call the messianic is simply the relationship to the future, the 
expectation of what comes, with no horizon of expectation. Anyone, anything might 
happen or arrive" (46). In the moment oftransition out of apartheid that David's Story 
inhabits, the archive is of particular importance because it is a site for negotiating the 
process of remembering and forgetting. As I have shown, the novel comments on the 
relationship that archival representation has to political reality in South Africa as 
apartheid is being dismantled. If, as Derrida contends, "there is a messianic, a 
messianicity, implied in the very experience of the archive. And that's also why it is 
impossible to close the archive" ( 46), the novel questions what this means for its militant 
MK freedom fighters in the midst of a negotiated settlement between the ANC (itself 
internally fractured) and the apartheid government led by the National Party. How will 
the ANC- the governing party of the new South Africa- retain authority if knowledge of 
torture within its ranks is made available within an archive that is impossible to close and 
always open to reinterpretation? 
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The novel exhibits the complexity of a negotiated settlement as it calls attention to 
the torture that has occurred within the ANC against its own members as well as the 
persistent racial stratification of the black, coloured, and white populations within and 
across the various political parties in South Africa.78 Since, as Derrida observes, "[i]t's 
always possible to re-interpret an archive. And this future-oriented structure of the 
archive is precisely what confronts us with a responsibility, an ethical and political 
responsibility" ("Archive Fever" 46), David's Story tries to negotiate the ethical and 
political complications of this responsibility in the context of the transition out of 
apartheid. The novel's efforts to narrate the ethical and political challenges at this 
particular moment in South Africa circle around its fleeting visions of Dulcie, who, the 
amanuensis admits, has "always hovered somewhere between fact and fiction" (Wicomb 
198). Imagining Dulcie harboring a secret, the narrator writes, "In these times of 
negotiation, the small, secret world of the guerilla has grown cracks; her own little secret 
has come to stand for something else, something to do with a world blown up, enlarged, 
so that comrades huddle like startled animals in unfamiliar groups" (198). The transition 
out of apartheid exposes not only the violence of the apartheid government but also the 
atrocities committed by anti-apartheid guerillas against each other. The "secret world of 
the guerilla" is now being exposed, and Dulcie's personal secret is a sign of the ruptures 
within the Movement. 
The vague representation of Dulcie's secret, to which the novel continually 
alludes but never fully discloses, demonstrates the challenges of narrativizing "a world 
blown up" (198). The reader is left to speculate: Is Dulcie's secret a desire for David who 
is not only married but also off-limits as a fellow leader within the Movement? (Dulcie 
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refers to David and her "private teenage obsession" [198].) Or, perhaps her secret is that 
she has been (and still is) tortured? (She has scars on her back, describes the "delirium of 
pain" (82), and refers to "visits by night" [184].) Could it also be that David has tortured 
her? ("His fingertips pressed precisely into the wounds under her shirt, plunged 
intimately into her flesh, caressed every cavity, every organ, her lungs, liver, kidneys, her 
broken heart, with a lick of fire" [199].) Or maybe even, she has tortured others? ("Dulcie 
washes the sticky red from her hands" [18] and "her hands are raw with washing" [181].) 
If Dulcie and her elusive secret reflects the chaos of "a world blown up" ( 198), the image 
of "comrades huddle[ d] like startled animals in unfamiliar groups" (198) signals the 
resulting collapse of humanist classifications. No longer confined within their familiar 
groups, the comrades are suddenly out in the open, stripped of the humanist codes that 
once camouflaged their animality. 
Perhaps embracing animality - freed from the humanist construction of it as Other 
-is a way to open up to the messianic. David's Story shows how being open to 
messianicity challenges a testimonial narrative structure. Instead of reinforcing a juridical 
notion of storytelling as a way of delivering testimony, David's Story portrays writing as 
an exercise that is all about "see[ing] what there is" and "shuffl[ing] the pages around, if 
necessary, until they make sense" (140). Not only can writing be a way to dwell in the 
unknown and think things through, but also, in literature anything is possible. Yet, as 
literary humanitarianism applies humanist ideals of subject development, it imposes a 
teleology on the literary that forecloses the messianic. Spivak acknowledges this tension, 
observing, "Literature contains the element of surprising the historical. But it is also true 
that a literary text produces the effect of being inevitable - indeed, one might argue that 
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the effect is what provokes reading, as transgression of the text" (Death of a Discipline 
55). If literature is able to imagine possibilities outside of the historical record, the textual 
form also seems to enable the reader to skip ahead and read the last page to find out what 
will happen. David's Story does not allow the reader to satisfy this urge because it not 
only interrupts a linear chronology, but also manages temporality differently. 
The novel includes frequent vignettes or episodic flashes of Dulcie that are not in 
sync with either the chronology of the frame narrative or David's actual story. Dulcie is 
always portrayed in the present tense, suspended in time as David and the narrator try to 
figure out how to account for her- how to narrate her. Thus, the amanuensis comments, 
There is no progression in time, no beginning and no end. Only a middle that is 
infinitely repeated, that remains in an eternal, inescapable present. This is why 
David wants her simply outlined, wants her traced into his story as a recurring 
imprint in order to outwit her fixedness in time, in order for her to go on, to 
proceed, as in the stories he sometimes finds time to tell his children: and then and 
then and then" (Wicomb 150-1 ). 
Dulcie only surfaces in fragmented presents that flicker throughout the narrative. If 
literature allows for a space to try to figure out how to narrate Dulcie and her secret 
(which "has come to stand for something else, something to do with a world blown up" 
[198]), David's inclination is to string together isolated "imprint[s]" (150) of her so as to 
camouflage her (and the complication she represents) and plot her within a historical 
narrative that follows a linear chronology. The novel, however, confronts Dulcie's 
"fixedness in time" ( 151) as the amanuensis struggles to narrate the rupture that Dulcie 
signifies without knowing what its effects will be in the future. Thus, in the hands of the 
amanuensis the story proceeds without knowledge of what is to come.79 Much like Indra 
Sinha's Animal who tells his story in Animal's People in order to "find out what the end 
should be" (Sinha 365; see my analysis of Sinha's novel in chapter two), Wicomb's 
narrator tells David's story in order to actually figure out what the story is. 80 
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Like Animal's People, David's Story explores a posthumanist method of 
storytelling that occurs without a narratological blueprint of what is to come. Building on 
Derrida's discussion ofmessianicity as well as his concept ofteleopoiesis, Spivak 
identifies the value of approaching the literary without preconceived expectations. She 
promotes teleopoiesis as a way "to affect the distant in a poiesis - an imaginative making 
-without guarantees, and thus, by definitive predication, reverse its value" (Death of a 
Discipline 31 ). Engaging literature not as a means to an end but as a way to welcome the 
unknown may open up a space for the messianic to emerge. One way literary works 
might encourage such openness is by interrupting the developmental trajectory of the 
normative humanist narrative. In this vein, Spivak identifies a-chrony (as defined by 
Mieke Bal) as a literary device that can keep an "event's status narratalogically 
undecidable" (64).81 A-chrony occurs in David's Story in the glimpses of Dulcie that 
occur outside of the diagetic time of the narrative. As a representation of the 
"narratalogically undecidable" (64), the elusive Dulcie is a continual reminder of the 
uncertainty not only in the amanuensis's narrative but also in the transitional moment in 
which the novel is set. 
Self-conscious about the ambiguity in the narrative she provides, the amanuensis 
is careful to point out that the gaps in the story she tells are not a reflection of her 
subjectivity. She separates her personal identity from the story she relays, forewarning, "I 
would hate a reader to think that my failure to provide facts, to bridge the gaps in the 
narrative, has something to do with the nature of our relationship. Or with my gender. 
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David was simply unable/unwilling to disclose all" (Wicomb 2). Though the amanuensis 
may be making this point out of pride, this distinction between the identity of the narrator 
and the story itself is worth pursuing. This work is about analyzing the process of 
storytelling itself not about defining a subject through storytelling. Even at the level of 
dialogue, which occurs through free indirect discourse throughout the novel, speech is 
detached from any one person so that the sources of the story's elements remain vague. 82 
Furthermore, the amanuensis's mention of gender here, in the preface that frames the 
novel, raises a valuable set of questions: Is the messianic approach to storytelling 
gendered? How does David's Story showcase and/or challenge the literary as feminine 
and historiography as masculine? How does the novel's treatment of gender shape its 
attempt to think through the political moment with which it is concerned? 
The novel exposes several gendered assumptions about the literary and its 
relationship to militancy and the historical archive. The amanuensis's concern that the 
gaps in the story will be read as an effect of her gender become more significant as David 
expresses the idea that writing is a mode of impotent intellectualism compared to 
militarism, which is portrayed as a masculine form of action throughout the novel. David 
regards reading as an activity in which women "take refuge" (25), and he argues that "the 
mad poets and painters in bandanas bandying about their stuff on the suburban 
battlefields of Observatory" ( 140) are politically ineffectual. 83 He is also upset with the 
amanuensis for presenting the history he wants to tell as "a story of women" (199). He 
reprimands her, grumbling, "You have turned it into a story of women; it's full of old 
women, for God's sake[ ... ] Who would want to read a story like that? It's not a proper 
history at all" (199). David contrasts this "story ofwomen" with a "proper history" (199), 
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suggesting that history is gendered male. His insinuation that no one of any consequence 
will want to read about women reveals the logic by which a masculinist "proper history" 
may omit considerations of women. The novel upends the notion that the amanuensis's 
gender may explain the gaps in the story by showing the exclusions that make up David's 
gendered understanding of history. 
Rather than interpreting the tension between David and the amanuensis as a 
simple power struggle between a masculinist historiography and a feminist mode of 
storytelling, it is useful to consider the novel's treatment of gender as a metaphor through 
which the gaps and uncertainties of the literary may be understood as spaces from which 
the messianic might emerge. If the feminine is associated with emptiness - with narrative 
gaps and a lack of substance worthy of "proper history" (199) - gendering the messianic 
approach to storytelling as feminine is a way of reinterpreting narrative gaps and 
uncertainties as openness to the unknown. The "story of women" ( 199) that the female 
amanuensis tells is an accumulation of uncertainties, and the novel attempts to narrate the 
unknown by way of these women. However, the novel's study of the way each of these 
individual women experiences the literary disqualifies any accusations of biological 
essentialism that might be made against it. To be clear, there is a distinction in the novel 
between feminine storytelling as a metaphor for the messianic approach to the literary 
and the individual gendered bodies that make up the story. 84 
David's wife Sally exemplifies the way that conceptions of literature may be 
shaped independent of one's biology. In addition to David's view of reading as an 
activity within which women retreat and his low opinion of literary intellectuals, the 
novel explores the relationship gender has to the literary and political in its depiction of 
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Sally. In the opinion of Sally's mother, "Reading, lying across a bed casting her eyes over 
print, was a decent way for a girl to spend her time and could only keep her out of 
mischief' (118). When Sally was a child reading was cast for her as a leisure activity 
meant to occupy the empty time of girlhood, and she resents its confinement. As an adult, 
Sally feels further restricted by recurrent textual images of "the bodies of black women" 
and the "tragedy of being coloured" ( 117), 85 which discipline the female body by 
dictating what it means to be a strong black woman or a "tragic" coloured woman. For 
Sally, 
It was the movement that offered freedom in the form of loose khaki trousers and 
a break from reading about the sad coloured condition. And marriage to David, 
she sighed, that lost her place in MK - and took her back to the overrated business 
of reading novels. How could such things possibly be called weapons of the 
struggle? Perhaps the stuff and nonsense that is said nowadays about culture is 
meant to placate women like herself, and she rises stiffly onto her own good solid 
legs to cook sausages for the children, whose voices rollick down the length of the 
street as they chant: You won't make it to heaven I Without the AK-47 (119). 
Sally views the literary and political as two distinct sites because the novels she reads 
narrate the political by fetishizing the bodies of black and coloured women. She is happy 
to escape novels that represent her "sad coloured condition" (119) for a position in MK, 
because it promises her an opportunity to combat that condition that her novels only seem 
to reinforce. Becoming a wife and mother excludes her once again from the masculine 
space of MK and relegates her to the world of her novels. Thus, after Sally recalls this 
history, "she rises stiffly onto her own good solid legs" (119), like one of the characters 
with "good thick legs" ( 117) in her novels. Yet, the text subtly undermines Sally's 
generalizations about the literary; the militant chant Sally hears the children singing is 
formatted in the text as a poem, and such a mantra has the effect of reproducing freedom 
fighters for the Movement. 
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The text exposes the false promises of MK, suggesting it has set up an erroneous 
dichotomy between the intellectual as passive and feminine and the militant as active and 
masculine. Despite Sally's insistence that the movement offered her "freedom in the form 
of loose khaki trousers" ( 119), which camouflage femininity, she is still subordinated as a 
woman within the Movement. Rather than calling it rape, Sally forces herself to consent 
when a male comrade tells her: "A fuck, that's what you need" (123). Sally's body does 
not belong to herself but to the Movement, and at various moments the Movement 
defines her body differently. As a guerilla in "loose khaki trousers" (119) she is freed 
from the confines of her girlhood, but in the moment of the sexual encounter her body is 
sexualized and her needs are dictated for her. Then, after she has "forced herself' to 
fulfill this "unspoken part of a girl's training" (123), "she los[es] her fear, f[inds] her 
body dissolving" (123). Not only is fear associated with her feminine body, but also after 
she undergoes her training as a girl, she does not become a woman, but rather her body 
disappears. Sally's body reemerges when she loses her place in MK to become a wife and 
mother (notice marriage and fatherhood do not supplant David's position in MK), and she 
returns to reading novels that reflect back cliched images of her female body in their 
attempts to narrate the political. 
It is the type of novels that Sally reads - those that fetishize female bodies and the 
subordination of women- that David's Story problematizes. The amanuensis not only 
features Sally's derision of such novels, but also, as I have already discussed, she refuses 
to allow David to turn this story into a revisionist tale of Saartje Baartman. Instead, 
David's Story considers how literature might shift from fetishizing the bodies of women 
like Sally, Baartman, and Dulcie to allowing bodies to be something more than the 
117 
conditions they currently represent. This means being open to what might emerge but 
cannot yet be fully named; it means allowing literature to narrate the political in a way 
that is open to uncertainty and the unknown. The novel gestures toward such a mode of 
storytelling by attempting to narrate Dulcie as one who remains unknown. Unlike Sally 
who loses her place in MK to be David's wife and a mother to their children, Dulcie is a 
powerful woman within the movement. Not only does her androgyny interrupt the false 
dichotomy between the masculine as politically active and the feminine as passive, but 
also, unlike Sally who finds herself restricted within the cliches of her novels, Dulcie 
eludes straightforward representation. 
Dulcie, who represents the unknown in the novel's gendered metaphor, further 
complicates the divide between literary intellectualism and political militancy in her 
desire for writing. Whereas reading novels is an empty, feminine exercise for Sally, with 
Dulcie writing retains the productive possibility of making something tangible. From 
Dulcie's perspective, "If speech is not allowed, she would like to have something written 
up, or written down. Dulcie once thought that she knew the difference. She would like to 
think that somewhere there are suitable words with which to say, to ask what she needs to 
know, to record what she thinks she knows. Then there would be something tangible, 
something to write, something to read" (198). Dulcie's confusion over whether 
something should be written "up" or "down" (198) puts the act of writing under pressure 
and shows that its function is in flux. She wants words to exist "to say," "to ask," and/or 
"to record" (198) so that writing will make things intelligible. But, making things 
"tangible" (198) in the standard way in which Dulcie describes ("to record what she 
thinks she knows" [198]) is also dangerous. Dulcie "fears for any such writing. Although 
118 
they come in the early hours she has to be vigilant at all times. Worse than any instrument 
of torture is the thought of such hard-found words being fingered by them- jabbed, 
clubbed, defaced into a gibberish that would turn the thing between David and herself 
into nothing" (198). The threat of the comrades, who the novel suggests come in the night 
to torture Dulcie, prevent her from putting her secret into words, "[a]nd so she does not 
write, neither up nor down; and so she is drawn into silence, becomes his mirror image, 
silent like him." (198). With Dulcie, who represents the unknown, the novel both invokes 
the potential of writing and acknowledges that what one writes may be manipulated 
("jabbed, clubbed, defaced into gibberish" [198]) and incorporated to reinforce existing 
power structures. While not advocating silence, this depiction of Dulcie's anxiety about 
her words being "defaced" (198) demonstrates the dangers of writing. It provides a 
reminder that the amanuensis is taking a risk by writing this narrative; the descriptions 
that the amanuensis provides of Dulcie may be misread or manipulated so that they do 
violence to Dulcie. Yet, if the amanuensis does not take the risk of narrating Dulcie as an 
undecidable figure, Dulcie will remain David's "mirror image" (198), and as a reflection 
of his crisis, Dulcie will be silent when he is silent. 
The way in which Dulcie is and is not represented in the novel expresses the 
controversies that complicate literary representation. The narrator suggests Dulcie is 
silent because she wants to defend her secret against her torturers who she fears will 
mutilate her words. The text, in turn, attempts to narrate Dulcie's silence, and it 
problematizes David's abstraction of Dulcie into an expression of his crisis as an MK. 
leader trying to maintain his militancy (which empowered him against the violence of the 
apartheid system) amidst talks for a negotiated peace. When David describes Dulcie to 
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the amanuensis as "a kind of a scream somehow echoing through my story" (134), the 
amanuensis reacts: "A scream, I laugh, a scream? You won't get away now with 
abstracting her. Besides, Dulcie herself would never scream. Dulcie is the very mistress 
of endurance and control. Dulcie knows that there is only a point to screaming if you can 
imagine someone coming to your rescue; that a scream is an appeal to a world of order 
and justice - and that there is no such order to which she can appeal" ( 134 ). A scream is a 
universal signal of distress that communicates a refusal to accept something; it is a call 
for help that is immediately comprehensible on a global scale in a world that is governed 
by order and justice. For Dulcie though, representation is not about being rescued, and 
her torture by her comrades suggests there is no order or justice in the world she inhabits. 
Dulcie wishes to find "suitable words"(198) to identify what she knows and does not 
know and perhaps articulate her secret in a way that may not be co-opted and distorted by 
a larger power syndicate. But, all around Dulcie are those like her torturers who would 
disfigure her and her secret or those like David who, wishing "to protect her" (199) turns 
her into an abstraction to either appeal in vain to order and justice or justify a reactionary 
militancy. 
At stake in the novel is the way in which Dulcie - the uncertain complication - is 
narrated and how she will be read. Bringing Spivak's discussion of the subject in literary 
representation to bear on my reading of David's Story underscores Dulcie's significance 
as a figure who defies normative narrative conventions. Spivak notices, "All around us is 
the clamor for the rational destruction of the figure, the demand not for clarity but 
immediate comprehensibility by the ideological average. This destroys the force of 
literature as a cultural good" (Death of a Discipline 71 ). Representing Dulcie as "a 
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scream" (Wicomb 134)- as a symbol of a type of distress that cannot be represented in 
words - would invoke the rational destruction of the figure, because it would portray her 
solely as an anonymous body in need calling out to be rescued. Figuring Dulcie as a 
scream would make her immediately comprehensible as a victim (or depending on one's 
reading, as a perpetrator or witness), and even though David does not intend to, he 
effaces her with this description. The novel as a whole, however, pointedly resists the 
presentation of Dulcie as a normative humanist subject who is calling out for help and 
appealing for her rightful place in the archival record. Instead, the novel narrates Dulcie 
in a way that encourages a different kind of reading. Describing the type of reading that I 
am suggesting David's Story promotes, Spivak contends, "to learn to read is to learn to 
dis-figure the undecidable figure into a responsible literality, again and again" (Death of 
a Discipline 72). To learn to read Dulcie, the woman who defies the gendered power 
structure that disciplines the female body and institutes a binary between the literary as 
feminine and the political as masculine, is to learn to read the uncertain, messianic figure. 
David's Story exhibits the process by which its narrator attempts to tell a story in 
which Dulcie, a messianic figure who complicates archival representation, interrupts the 
project of its protagonist, David, to plot the transition out of apartheid in South Africa. As 
the narrator struggles to demonstrate the role of literature in accounting for and 
overcoming political violence, the novel makes the moment of writing the focus rather 
than asking the trace in the archive to do the work of securing justice. The novel refuses 
to depict its characters screaming out from the archive in "an appeal to a world of order 
and justice" (Wicomb 134); it confronts the uncertain truth that "there is no such order" 
(134). After years of institutionalized racial violence and terror, in the context of political 
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upheaval in which each side attempting to negotiate a settlement is responsible for rape, 
torture and murder the novel confronts the disorder of the moment oftransition out of 
' ' 
apartheid. It presents storytelling as a way to think through the unknown, to move fluidly 
amongst past, present, and future temporalities, and to allow for both remembering and 
forgetting without resorting to a linear construction of history. By identifying gender as a 
site of contradiction and narrating its resulting gaps and ruptures as openings, the novel 
appeals for justice from a future that it cannot yet imagine but to which it remains open. 
Demonstrating how the archive is open to the messianic, the novel suggests 
literature might be useful in narrating uncertainty in a way that historiography does not. It 
depicts the difficulty of this project, and offers no easy resolution. Even in the last scene 
of the novel, the narrator writes: 
I shriek as a bullet explodes into the back of the computer. Its memory leaks a 
silver puddle onto the desk, and the shrapnel of sorry words scuttle out, leaving 
behind whole syllables that tangle promiscuously with strange stems, strange 
prefixes, producing impossible hybrids that scramble my story. I look out, across 
at the full fig tree, where a figure leisurely takes his leave, climbing over the wall 
and crushing my black-eyed Suzies. Is this no longer my house, bought from the 
red-faced man with the lackluster sales talk? Will I never know what's going on? 
Does no one care what I think? Will I ever be heard above the rude buzz of 
bluebottles? (212-13). 
The narrator's house is invaded; it is not safe and her writing is not protected within it. 
Even if writing is made "safe as houses" (107) as David insists he makes his own writing, 
this passage shows the safe house being ransacked. The archive is not safe; it is not a 
safe; it is in chaos, continually changing. The safe house (the narrator's house) has been 
infiltrated; "memory leaks" (212), "words scuttle" (212) and "tangle" (212), and 
"hybrids[ ... ] scramble" (213) the story. The historical record is a mess and stories that one 
might hope would set things straight get shuffled around and do not seem to be producing 
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easy answers. Rather than offering a concise resolution, narrative closure is exposed as a 
false promise. But, without even the pretense of control that closure offers, the ability of 
literature to both survive the violence that threatens it (here in the form of the bullet) and 
withstand readers, who like "bluebottles" (213; flies that breed on decaying organic 
matter) devour its subjects, is contestable. The novel thus poses a series of questions to 
literature: to whom does literature belong once it is written; does anyone care what it 
says; will it ever be heard against violence and through consumption? 
In considering these questions about the function of literature and its relationship 
to the political and historical record, Spivak is again useful. She writes "I must keep 
imagining and presuming a challenge to history[ ... ] I must keep telling myself that history 
tells us what happened and fiction what may have happened and indeed may happen" 
("The New Subaltern" 337). Literature offers a space in which to think through 
possibilities that are available but have perhaps not been activated; it allows a mode 
within which to practice new ways of thinking and imagine phenomena for which 
preconditions are still coalescing. Literature may thus function as a way to narrate 
uncertainty, and as such it requires a particular kind of reading. According to Spivak the 
"reading of fiction" involves "learning from the singular and unverifiable" (338). Rather 
than cataloging literary narrative as historical evidence that plots political violence as 
trauma within the archive, it is useful to read fiction in a way that acknowledges the 
particularities of individual stories and allows for uncertainty. 
In this chapter I set out to learn what function literature might have in relation to 
the archive and political reality in post-apartheid South Africa. My analysis of the way 
that Dulcie, the singular and unverifiable, figures in David's Story, has demonstrated both 
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the challenges and the potential of literature that endeavors to narrate uncertain political 
realities without foreclosing unknown possibilities. In the next chapter I analyze the way 
that selected works from the Caribbean address the paradox of challenging an imperial 
power network by using a language and literary form that has been integral to its 
historical formation. I show not only how these texts narrate economic and cultural 
imperialism, but also how they resist a literary humanitarian reading that reduces 
individuals from the Caribbean to symbols of imperial oppression. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Narrating Transnational Identity and Remapping the Postcolonial in Three Caribbean 
Texts 
In the previous chapters I have shown that treating armed conflict and physical 
endangerment in the postcolony as a human rights concern depoliticizes violence and 
suffering and detracts attention from its underlying causes. This chapter focuses on the 
economic and cultural imperialism that characterize the postcolonial condition. It asks 
how the problematics of narrating postcoloniality intersect with a human rights discourse 
that has come to govern articulations of injustice. Literary humanitarianism interprets the 
inequalities that result from economic and cultural imperialism as a human rights concern 
and attempts to join the exploited masses of the postcolony with international 
humanitarian readers. One of the fundamental problems with interpreting the postcolonial 
condition as a human rights concern is that the 'universal' subject of human rights is 
always already a national subject, and the socioeconomic crises that need to be addressed 
in the postcolony are transnational. 
In addition to histories of colonialism, inequitable global development policies 
and the growth of transnational capital have resulted in the exploitation of the national 
subject in many post-independence states. The contemporary human rights movement 
attempts to rescue the national subject by imagining the 'universal' human in its place 
and asserting a moral code. Because the political possibilities for this 'universal' subject 
continue to be structured by the state, the globalization of a moral code is really a way to 
fortify the national subject while attempting to remain neutral about the global 
socioeconomic inequalities that undermine the well-being of this subject. 
Rather than recognize how colonialism and postcoloniality have produced 
subjects who are neither defined nor protected by the nation, literary humanitarianism 
supports the globalization of ethical ideals that promise to rehabilitate the national 
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subject. In an effort to achieve rights for those around the world who face injustices, it 
deploys a testimonial narrative structure. The assumption is that testimony not only offers 
catharsis to resolve the traumatic effects of slavery and colonialism, but also that it 
provides evidence that those who suffer from injustices in the post-independence state 
deserve what Hannah Arendt terms "the right to have rights" (294).86 Because the right to 
have rights is tied to the state, literary humanitarianism requires individuals to narrate 
themselves in a way that is legible to the state in order to prove their eligibility for rights. 
As literary humanitarianism attempts to defend the 'universal' human against the 
'inhuman' evils that threaten the national subject, it commits epistemic violence by 
imposing a rigid narrative framework that does not allow for transnational articulations of 
the postcolonial condition. Literary humanitarianism's focus on saving the national 
subject from post-independence states obscures global inequalities, and it suppresses 
complex identities that have formed through dia~poras and displacements related to 
slavery, colonialism, and postcoloniality. 
I read Jamaica Kincaid's A Small Place (1988), Michelle Cliffs No Telephone to 
Heaven ( 1987), and Derek Walcott's Omeros ( 1990) in order to ask how contemporary 
literature might interrupt the dominant discourse of human rights and unhinge appeals for 
international justice from the 'proper' development of national citizen-subjects. As these 
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texts negotiate the paradox of challenging an imperial regime by using a language and 
literary form that was integral to its historical formation, they exhibit the complications of 
counteracting normative, developmental narratives that sustain global inequalities. 
Kincaid addresses this paradox as she comments on the way that "millions of people," 
through the slave trade and British colonization, were "made orphans: no motherland, no 
fatherland, no gods, no mounds of earth for holy ground[ ... ] and worst and most painful 
of all, no tongue" (31 ). She remarks; "isn't it odd that the only language I have in which 
to speak of this crime is the language ofthe criminal who committed this crime?" (31). 
Through its particular lexicon, grammatical logic, and canonical narratives, language 
provides a rubric for ontological understanding, and it structures forms of expression. 
Kincaid, Walcott, and Cliff are part of a legacy of Caribbean writers who self-
consciously reappropriate the English language and its literary forms to challenge 
epistemic violence as they move in and across the Caribbean, England, Africa, and the 
Americas. 87 As human rights discourse increasingly regiments the way that injustice is 
represented and addressed, I look to this tradition to identify alternative narrative 
strategies through which literature may represent the inequalities of the postcolonial 
condition. 
As transnational writers whose work is claimed within multiple literary fields 
from Caribbean to American to Commonwealth and Anglophone literature, Kincaid, 
Walcott, and Cliff complicate the neat categorization of national identity. They have each 
been scrutinized for their privileged positions as immigrant writers in part because their 
work often self-consciously comments on the ethical complications of representing their 
respective island homes from within the US academy and the international publishing 
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industry that supports them. Rather than pursuing the overdue promises of postcolonial 
nationalist projects or rights-based identity politics, Kincaid, Walcott, and Cliff reveal 
that neither national citizenship (in Antigua, Jamaica, and St. Lucia, respectively), nor 
universal humanism offer protection from exploitation on the global market. A Small 
Place, No Telephone to Heaven, and Omeros remap postcoloniality according to the 
networks of transnational capital that structure it and the racial, gender, and sexual 
hierarchies that discipline its subjects. As these works show how colonial history, 
inequitable postcolonial 'development,' and contemporary economic and cultural 
imperialism produce transnational subjects, they undermine imposed binaries like native 
and tourist, male and female, and Old and New World. Such binaries constitute the split 
subject of the 'universal' human.88 I consider not only how these texts challenge the 
transnational power networks that human rights discourse masks, but also what happens 
to 'the human' in these narratives as it becomes transnational. 
I first show how A Small Place illustrates a significant aspect of the postcolonial 
condition that literary humanitarianism overlooks. Kincaid's text shows that being human 
and being a national citizen in the postcolony does not deliver equal rights because 
economic and cultural imperialism put the postcolonial subject into the service of 
transnational capital. The narrative calls attention to the inequitable power structure that 
extends from the historical relationship between master and slave to the contemporary 
dynamic between tourist and native. As the text critiques the divide between native 
Antiguans who experience various forms of oppression and tourists who consume 
fantasies of Antigua that elide structural inequalities, it refuses literary humanitarian 
readers accommodations similar to those that tourists enjoy. After analyzing Kincaid's 
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critique of the postcolonial condition, I examine how No Telephone to Heaven exposes 
the limits of rights-based movements that attempt to empower national subjects through 
identity politics. Featuring characters that do not fit within racial and gender categories, 
this novel explores what happens when postcolonial subjects come up against the limits 
of both personal and national sovereignty. While the novel acknowledges that revolution 
becomes an imperative at such junctures, it also compels its reader to question what 
revolution will look like in the contemporary postcolony where, despite independence 
and resignification, imperial structures persist. Through my reading of Walcott's Omeros, 
I identify possibilities for rethinking a human-centered, rights-based representation of 
postcoloniality. The landscape that this epic poem depicts cannot be contained within 
national borders, explained in terms of a rift between divided worlds, or expressed from 
the perspective of the 'universal human' subject. I propose a posthumanist reading of 
Omeros in order to show how the text ultimately frees its characters from the identity 
politics that No Telephone to Heaven problematizes. Together these texts demonstrate not 
only how transnational identities are transforming the contemporary literary field,89 but 
also how such identities exceed the limiting categories that contemporary human rights 
discourse imposes. 
Kincaid's A Small Place surveys the sociopolitical and economic landscape of 
late nineteen eighties Antigua, a nine by twelve mile island that was a British colony until 
1967 (it then became an associated state of the UK) and gained independence from 
Britain in 1981. Tinged with irony, the text is a long essay written in short, simple clauses 
that together read like a fable. Its sarcastic tone is at once humorous and assertive in its 
honesty. The storybook-like nonfiction narrative is told in four parts- a tourist's view, a 
129 
recollection of colonial Antigua, a depiction of postcolonial Antigua, and a reflection on 
what it is like to be Antiguan. It thus provides a useful introduction to the political and 
economic reality of postcoloniality in the Caribbean. 
The text is provocative because, rather than allowing its imagined reader to 
interpret its representation of the postcolony as a literary humanitarian, it identifies its 
reader by way of his or her socioeconomic relationship to Antigua as a potential tourist. It 
opens by describing the perspective typical of the reader that it addresses, beginning, "If 
you go to Antigua as a tourist, this is what you will see" (Kincaid 3). As the text directs 
itself to "you," the tourist, it immediately implicates the reader in the critique that will 
follow. A Small Place exposes the disparity between the tourist's view and the lived 
reality of Antiguans, and it refuses to allow "you," the tourist and reader, the luxury of an 
illusion that permits structural inequalities to go unquestioned. By calling the reader out 
as a potential tourist, the text prevents the literary humanitarian from invoking a fantasy 
of universal humanism to reconcile his or her own privilege with the exploitation of the 
natives in this narrative. Instead the text details how the tourist's view of Antigua is 
obstructed by his or her own desires and advantages (the latter of which are often 
unbeknownst to him or her). 
Moving step-by-step through the tourist's experience of Antigua (all the while 
maintaining the direct address of "you" to the reader), A Small Place describes the 
impression tourists have of a place like Antigua versus the reality of this place and of the 
postcolonial condition itself. The narrative shows how limited the tourist's perspective is 
noting, "You may be the sort of tourist who would wonder why a Prime Minister would 
want an airport named after him - why not a school, why not a hospital, why not some 
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great public monument? You are a tourist and you have not yet seen a school in Antigua, 
you have not yet seen the hospital in Antigua, you have not yet seen a public monument 
in Antigua" (3). As is immediately implied here and elaborated on throughout the 
narrative, the priority in Antigua is placed on international tourism at the expense of the 
country's own social infrastructure. The tourist's interest coupled with this lack of 
awareness about such structural inequality bears similarity to the literary humanitarian's 
superficial concern and inattention to structural problems. A Small Place suggests that the 
way in which the tourist is valued at the expense of Antigua's inhabitants encourages the 
tourist's delight in things such as the "deliciously hot and dry" climate and his or her 
ignorance of the fact that this place "suffers constantly from drought" (4). It also 
facilitates the tourist's mobility: "Since you are a tourist, a North American or European 
- to be frank, white - and not an Antiguan black returning to Antigua from Europe or 
North America with cardboard boxes of much needed cheap clothes and food for 
relatives, you move through customs swiftly, you move through customs with ease. Your 
bags are not searched" ( 4-5). The international tourist is allowed to move with ease in 
and out of spaces within which the national subject is restricted and policed. The state 
privileges the free movement of capital in the form of tourists' dollars, and it restricts its 
own national citizens' ability to freely participate in the exchange of"much needed" (4) 
goods. While the tourist is liberated by the global economy, the native is more severely 
taxed by it. 
The text clarifies that one is not inherently either a tourist or a native, calling 
attention to the fact that 
every native of every place is a potential tourist, and every tourist is a native of 
somewhere. Every native everywhere lives a life of overwhelming and crushing 
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banality and boredom and desperation and depression, and every deed, good and 
bad, is an attempt to forget this. Every native would like to find a way out, every 
native would like a rest, every native would like a tour. But some natives- most 
natives in the world- cannot go anywhere (18). 
There is no essentialist difference between a tourist and a native - their difference is in 
the inequitable social, political, and economic structures to which they are subject within 
the web of global power networks. The mobility that the tourist enjoys allows this person 
to escape the limited purview of day-to-day life and redefine a banal existence against the 
difference of an Other. In contrast to those natives who are "too poor to escape the reality 
of their lives[ ... and] too poor to live properly in the place where they live" (19), the 
tourist is encouraged to feel uninhibited, especially in a place like Antigua that caters to 
tourists at the expense of its inhabitants. As the tourist's right to mobility as well as rest 
and leisure comes up against the native's right to an adequate standard of living, the 
limitations of a rights-based system are exposed.90 Of the native who is never able to be a 
tourist, the text explains, "they envy your ability to turn their banality and boredom into a 
source of pleasure for yourself' (19). By addressing its critique to the reader as tourist, A 
Small Place challenges the reader to acknowledge his or her own socioeconomic 
relationship to Antiguans. Furthermore, as the text clarifies that the native and the tourist 
are not essentialist categories, it ensures that the reader does not translate its statement 
that "every native of every place is a potential tourist, and every tourist is a native of 
somewhere" (18) into a universal humanist resolution. It reminds the reader that although 
particular experiences or aspirations may be universal, the lives of individual humans are 
structured by inequitable socioeconomic and political realities. 
Through its analysis of the tourist, A Small Place also exposes the inclination to 
justify one's own privilege. The text acknowledges, "A tourist is an ugly human being. 
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You are not an ugly person all the time" (14), but "since you are being an ugly person 
this ugly but joyful thought will swell inside you: their ancestors were not clever in the 
way yours were and not ruthless in the way yours were, for then would it not be you who 
would be in harmony with nature and backwards in that charming way" (17). A humanist 
conception of the world naturalizes the ascendancy of humans over other forms of life 
and it allows for Social Darwinist thinking, which suggests there is a ladder of 
civilization on which some humans distinguish themselves from others by distancing 
themselves from "nature." A Small Place suggests that privileging tourists and marketing 
Antiguans as a "charming" ( 1 7) attraction allows tourists to imagine Antiguans on the 
low end of a developmental ladder that they see themselves as having already ascended. 
By pointing this out to a reader who has already been identified as a potential tourist, the 
text challenges the reader to acknowledge the socioeconomic sources of his or her 
privilege rather than fall back on the faulty (and shameful) logic of the developmental 
narrative that it has just undermined. 
This developmental narrative also suggests that Antigua should mature as a nation 
according to the model of wealthier nations. In response, A Small Place challenges the 
assumption that the accumulation of capital is an appropriate measure of a nation's 
welfare. It suggests that features such as Antigua's standing army, Minister of Culture, 
and postage stamps are duplicitous performances of a nation that serves multinational 
capital at the expense of its citizens. Kincaid questions the role of the standing army in 
Antigua as she remarks, "And though this army cannot really fight a war, is not trained to 
really fight a war- Antigua, after all, has no enemies - the men in this army can shoot at 
people, and if they cannot fight a war but can shoot at people, what people will they shoot 
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at?" (72-3).91 According to the text, this army does not exist to protect the people of the 
nation from outside threats. Instead, it polices the people of the nation in order to guard 
its international financial interests. These interests are in part reliant on an international 
tourist industry that profits from Antiguan people's labor and their marketability as 
"charming" (17) attractions. 
Rather than investing in domestic infrastructure to ensure the well being of the 
Antiguan people, the tourist industry cultivates a fa9ade that appeals to visitors seeking 
escape from their own lives. Kincaid implies that the purpose of Antigua's Minister of 
Culture is to project a desirable image of Antigua. She suggests, "In countries that have 
no culture or are afraid they may have no culture there is a Minister of Culture" (49). The 
text insinuates that this minister constructs and regulates the people's culture in order to 
display it for tourists eager to consume a particular idea of Antiguan 'culture.' The 
hollow representation of this 'culture' is evident in the country's postage stamps. Kincaid 
considers how these stamps reveal the state's loyalties, and she wonders, "who decides to 
print stamps celebrating the Queen of England's birthday? Who decides to celebrate 
Mickey Mouse's birthday? Who decides that stamps from this part of the world should be 
colourful and bright and not sedate and subdued, like, say, a stamp from Canada?" (51-
2). Kincaid not only asks who controls the representation of Antigua but also reveals how 
superficial the image of the nation is. The two honorees she mentions are representative 
of the British Empire that once ruled Antigua and the US-controlled foreign powers that 
continue to challenge its sovereignty. The first is a member of the English monarchy that 
dominated the country through colonialism and the other is a cartoon icon of cultural 
imperialism. Antigua itself is only referenced by the "colourful and bright" (52) tones of 
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the stamps, which evoke superficial images of the island scenery that would be of interest 
to a visitor seeking escape from his or her own "sedate and subdued" life as a native of 
some other place. 
Ultimately A Small Place reveals that neither anti-colonial nationalism nor 
universal humanism addresses the inequality of a global hierarchy structured by 
transnational capital. The narrative shows that citizenship does not guarantee rights in a 
state that puts the people of the nation in a position of subservience to global financial 
interests. What is more, by highlighting the reader's complicity in economic and cultural 
imperialism, the text refuses a humanitarian response to the inequalities it illustrates. In 
its conclusion it exposes the 'universal' human as a construct that masks the 
socioeconomic disparities between the tourist and native. Kincaid suggests that the 
relationship between tourist and native has its historical antecedent in the master-slave 
dialectic, in which the authority ofthe master is defined by the subjugation of the slave 
and vice versa. Noting that "all masters of every stripe are rubbish, and all slaves of every 
stripe are noble and exalted" (80), she ends her narrative by remarking, "Of course, the 
whole thing is, once you cease to be a master, once you throw off your master's yoke, 
you are no longer human rubbish, you are just a human being, and all the things that adds 
up to. So, too, with the slaves. Once they are no longer slaves, once they are free, they are 
no longer noble and exalted; they are just human beings" (81 ). The "descendants" (80) of 
the masters and the slaves are just human beings, and as such they continue to relate to 
each other through a relationship of imperialism. As human beings, the people of Antigua 
- "the descendants of those noble and exalted people, the slaves" (80-1) - are exploited 
by their own state and by the global financial interests that they are made to serve. Thus, 
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neither being human nor being a national citizen put an end to global inequality.92 
Responding to injustices by invoking universal humanism or calling for postcolonial 
'development' are empty gestures that ignore the economic and cultural imperialism that 
persists in the postcolony. 
While Kincaid's A Small Place illuminates the way that contemporary 
imperialism operates, Cliff's No Telephone to Heaven exhibits the challenges that 
postcolonial subjects face not only in negotiating the various narratives that define their 
seemingly fragmented identities but also as they come up against the limits of identity 
politics in their attempts to counteract imperialism. No Telephone to Heaven hints at the 
complexity of identity and representation in the postcolony by beginning with a brief 
glossing of the Jamaican term "ruinate." Used to describe second growth forests in which 
bush has reoccupied previously cleared land, ruinate is also an appropriate term to apply 
to this postcolonial narrative, which is itself a tangled and disorderly palimpsest. Cliff 
precedes nearly every chapter in No Telephone to Heaven with epigraphs that span 
Y oruba hymns, Jamaican proverbs, and the works of writers as different as Elizabeth 
Barrett Browning and Aime Cesaire. She also embeds references to texts ranging from 
Charlotte Bronte's Jane Eyre to the New York Times travel section. The novel not only 
overlays its numerous intertextual references with its own narrative, but it also rejects a 
linear timeline and arranges its fragmented narrative strands in a sporadic and 
overlapping configuration. The text's disorienting narrative structure interrupts the 
normative conventions of the postcolonial development novel. It refuses to contain its 
character's identities within rights-based categories and allows the controversy it depicts 
to spill out beyond the book's covers. Rather than symbolically resolving the problems of 
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the postcolonial condition by book's end through a linear story about its main character 
Clare Savage's journey toward revolution, it offers an unruly narrative that twists around 
on itself and leaves the reader feeling entirely unsettled about the possibilities for either a 
literary or a political revolution in the postcolony. 
In the first scene of the frame narrative a group of people, including Clare (though 
not named at this point) and her friend Harriet (called "Harry/Harriet" throughout the 
text) are in the back of a truck ascending the mountainous Jamaican terrain on a winding 
road edged by ruinate forest. The identities of the people in the truck remain unknown, 
but they wear uniform-like clothes that they have sourced through channels that evoke 
their colonial history and current economic dependency. The text describes them "dressed 
in similar clothes, which became them as uniforms, signifying some agreement, some 
purpose- that they were in something together" (Cliff 4). Though their objective remains 
vague, it can be gleaned from this opening sketch that this group is putting their second-
and third-hand uniforms to use for a new purpose. Many of them wear khaki, a material 
that was once "spun to outfit the empire" ( 6) and which some have been enshrouded in 
before as school children, gardeners, laborers, distillery workers, and cane-cutters. Others 
"wore discarded American army fatigues, stolen from white kids high on dope, plugged 
into machines sending our music into their heads, sleepyheads, on the beach" (6). Worn 
by American "sleepyheads" in Jamaica for music festivals like "Sunsplash" and 
"Jamfest" (6), these fatigues signal the apathetic rebellion of privileged American youths 
armed with nothing but "one of Papa's credit cards" (6). The repeated resignification of 
this clothing hints at the various channels of political, economic, and cultural imperialism 
through which such uniforms make it onto the backs of the people in the truck. 
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In addition to the repurposed khakis and the pilfered fatigues, the group shares a 
small collection of camouflage jackets, each with a "soldier's name still taped to the 
breast pocket" (7). Despite the impracticality of such jackets in the Jamaican heat, there is 
an insistence that the jackets signal the authenticity of the group. The text illustrates the 
complexities of this assumption as it describes, 
The camouflage jackets, names and all, added a further awareness, a touch of 
realism, cinematic verite, that anyone who eyed them would believe they were 
faced with real soldiers. True soldiers -though no government had ordered them 
into battle - far from it. But this is how the camouflage made them feel. As the 
gold and green and black knitted caps some wore - a danger because the bright 
gold would sing out in the bush -made them feel like real freedom fighters, like 
their comrades in the ANC - a cliche, almost screenplayed to death, Viva Zapata! 
And all that - but that is what they were, what they felt they were, what they were 
in fact (7). 
Though some wear the colors of the Jamaican flag, these are not "real soldiers" (7), for 
they have the authority of "no government" (7). Donning these camouflage jackets with 
others names on them, they project an image for an outside viewer that may or may not 
correspond to who they really are. They "feel like real freedom fighters" (7), like those in 
the African National Congress (ANC) that fought against apartheid in South Africa. Yet, 
there is an element of pastiche here as the text acknowledges how they act out cliched 
images that have been "screenplayed to death" (7). It becomes unclear whether they are 
comrades in a revolutionary movement that extends across the African diaspora or if they 
are mere imitations of revolutionaries like those in the 1952 Hollywood film Viva 
Zapata! starring Marlon Brando as Mexican revolutionary Emiliano Zapata. The 
confirmation that the text provides when it states "but that is what they were, what they 
felt they were, what they were in fact" only makes their identities more ambiguous as the 
text fluctuates between vague, cliched descriptions. 
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Though the novel explains that the people on this truck are "making something 
new" (5), and they certainly seem to be on a critical mission, the particularities of their 
undertaking are not immediately clear. Perhaps this is because revolutionary agendas 
have so often been tied to a rights-based idea of identity, and both individually and as a 
group these people on the truck are indefinable within any consistent identity category. 
The text describes the differences among them, observing, 
the shades of their skin, places traveled to and from, events experienced, things 
understood, food taken into their bodies, acts of violence committed, books read, 
music heard, languages recognized, ones they loved, living family, varied widely, 
came between them. That was all to be expected of course-that on this island, as 
part of this small nation, many of them would have been separated at birth. 
Automatically. Slipped into places where to escape would mean taking your life 
into your own hands. Not more, not less. Where to get out would mean crashing 
through barriers positioned by people not so unlike yourself ( 4-5). 
The people in the truck do not appear to share a singular ethnicity, culture, or body of 
experience. Though they are "part ofthis small nation" (4), they are not united by way of 
the nation.93 In fact, as part of this nation they have been "separated" (4) from each other 
as if this stratification is part of what defines the nation. Perhaps they have come together 
now in an effort to "escape" (4) the oppressive conditions to which they have been 
subjected by "crashing through barriers" (5). In one way or another each of these people 
do not fit into prescribed identities. The story that follows this opening scene studies how 
Clare struggles against the oppressive identity categories that define the postcolonial 
condition. It undermines the binary logic that suggests light-skinned Clare must be either 
white or black and her transgendered friend Harry/Harriet must be either male or female. 
But, Clare and Harry/Harriet are not simply in a fight for their identities; as a part of the 
group in the truck they are also searching for a way of"reaching out or up" (16) to break 
out ofthe oppressive system that sustains inequality and injustice in the postcolony. The 
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novel is so provocative, because rather than representing the activism of the group in the 
truck as a way to embrace universal humanism and redeem the Jamaican underclass, it 
considers how two of the truck's passengers, Clare and Harriet, come up against the 
limits of both personal and national sovereignty in their struggle against the postcolonial 
condition. 
Picking up where Cliffs first novel Abeng left off with Clare's story, No 
Telephone to Heaven details what life is like for Clare after she moves in 1960 at age 
fourteen with her family from her childhood home in Jamaica to New York. Clare's 
mother Kitty returns to Jamaica shortly after this, taking Clare's younger sister Jennie and 
leaving Clare with her father Boy who is determined to pass as white. The story follows 
Clare as she struggles with her sense of self throughout high school and college in the 
US, and it remarks on Kitty's death in Jamaica when Clare is twenty. It then accompanies 
Clare, who "with the logic of a creole" ( 1 09) transplants herself to "the mother-country" 
( 1 09). She eventually attends graduate school in London until she meets Bobby, a 
wounded African-American deserter from the army, with whom she travels around 
Europe. After Clare has a miscarriage, probably due to the Agent Orange Bobby was 
exposed to in the Vietnam War, they separate and she moves back to Jamaica. The story 
progresses (though not in chronological order) until it catches up with the frame narrative 
at which point Clare is thirty-six. With the encouragement of her friend Harry/Harriet, 
she has moved back to Jamaica, reclaimed her grandmother's farm, and now lives on the 
land with the group in the truck that people call "NO TELEPHONE TO HEAVEN" 
(106). 
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As Clare moves between Jamaica, the US, and England, the novel highlights the 
effect that a history of colonialism and continued postcolonial subjugation have on her 
sense of self. In the US Clare learns that her mixed racial identity is an unwelcome 
complication. Boy deals with the racism that he encounters in the US by attempting to 
pass as white. He denies Clare's and his mixed racial identities and "counsels his 
daughter on invisibility and secrets. Self-effacement. Blending in. The uses of 
camouflage" (100). Clare's ability to blend in is tested when Boy enrolls her in a New 
York City high school. The school principal takes issue with Clare's racial makeup and 
reinforces the color line as she admonishes, "we have no room for lies in our system. No 
place for in-betweens" (99). Thus Clare is taught by both her father- who contends that 
she is white - and this representative of the US educational system - who classifies her as 
black - that she must efface part of herself in order to be recognized. This strict 
categorization denies her very existence and requires that she either be white or black, for 
these demarcations are perceived as distinguishing fundamentally opposite types of 
people. What is more, the principal's concern over Clare's race is part of a larger 
conversation in which she maintains that even though Clare has had extensive training in 
multiple languages, advanced math, and classical literature, she should be enrolled in a 
lower grade because her education up to this point has taken place in Jamaica. The 
principal claims, "We are professional educators here. We are talking about degrees of 
emotional development. Children develop differently. Children from underdeveloped 
countries develop at a different rate than American children" (98). The principal 
reinforces a hierarchy that renders "underdeveloped" countries, namely the former 
colonies, inferior. She also insinuates that Clare's uncertain racial identity is a symptom 
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of Jamaica's "underdevelopment" and suggests that Clare would be more properly 
developed within a "system" that allows for no "in-betweens" (99). 
The novel critiques this logic of development and essentialist classification by 
including passages that parody the anthropological narrative style through which the 
(post)colonial subject is dehumanized. Clare is described as 
The albino gorilla moving through the underbrush. Hiding from the poachers who 
would claim her and crush her in a packing crate against the darker ones offended 
by her pelt[ ... ] She cowers in the bush fearing capture[ ... ] Not speaking for years. 
Not feeling much of anything, except a vague dread that she belongs nowhere[ ... ] 
She does not gather branches to braid into a nest. She moves. Emigrated, lone 
travel, the zoologist would have recorded (91). 
Assuming the tone of scientific field notes, this passage satirizes the way that Clare is 
marked as abnormal- even "offens[ive]" (91)- for not fitting into the standard system of 
racial classification. Having been taught to camouflage parts of herself, she avoids 
exposure by moving. This continual evasion consumes all of her energy, and hiding parts 
of herself becomes the defining part ofher identity. 
Perhaps this is why Clare feels a special kinship with Harry/Harriet who is born 
"[n]otjust sun, but sun and moon" (128). Early on the novel explains, "everyone tolerates 
him, as if measuring their normalness against his strangeness" (21 ). But Clare, in her 
difference, identifies with Harry/Harriet. In one of their conversations she reflects, "No, I 
don't find you strange. No stranger ... no stranger than I find myself. For we are neither 
one thing nor the other" (131). Drawing strength from Harry/Harriet, Clare stops 
camouflaging herself. And yet, even as she is beginning to embrace her difference, it 
seems that these two will ultimately be forced to conform to one or the other side of their 
split identities. For, even Harry/Harriet remarks, "I mean the time will come for both of 
us to choose. For we will have to make the choice. Cast our lot. Cyaan live split. Not in 
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this world" ( 131 ). The rigid boundaries of racial and gender categories in this world 
demand conformity, and Clare and Harry/Harriet fmd that rather than empowering them, 
identity politics limit their subjectivity. Furthermore, when Harriet makes a choice and 
announces to Clare, "Harriet live and Harry be no more" (168), it becomes clear that she 
has been shunned for transgressing gender norms. She comes up against the limit of 
sexual rights, and perhaps as a result finds herself on the truck in the frame narrative with 
a group of people who have "[ s ]lipped into places where to escape would mean taking 
your life into your own hands" (4). Together, this group in the truck has decided to take 
life in Jamaica into their own hands. 
For Harriet the first part of such a process to take her life into her own hands is to 
establish authority over her own identity, even if others are not willing to accept the 
identity she inhabits. Her struggle to do this is tied up with the violation that she 
experienced as a young boy. She shares with Clare, 
I have been tempted all of my life to think symbol - that what he did to me is but a 
symbol for what they did to us, always bearing in mind that some of us, many of 
us, also do it to each other. But that's not right. I only suffered what my mother 
suffered- no more, no less. Not symbol, not allegory, not something in a story or 
a dialogue by Plato. No, man, I am merely a person who felt the overgrown cock 
of a big whiteman pierce the asshole of a lickle Black bwai - there it is. That is all 
there is to it (130). 
This refusal to exist only as a representation of a history of violent oppression is 
indicative of the novel's self-consciousness as a literary form and its refusal to frame 
Harry/Harriet's identity in terms of trauma. This is, after all, not a testimonial narrative. 
The novel directly confronts the reader's inclination to think "symbol" or "allegory," and 
reminds the reader that addressing historical violence is more complex than simply 
representing Harry/Harriet's traumatic personal violation and celebrating the way that 
he/she might overcome it by sharing this story. 
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However, establishing ownership over one's identity is only one aspect of taking 
one's life into one's own hands. While political movements based on identity have been 
important for establishing rights for individuals and groups who have been discriminated 
against on the basis of their racial, gender, or sexual identities, these rights-based 
movements have their limits. In No Telephone to Heaven Clare and Harriet find not only 
that they do not fit into the identity categories within which people have fought for rights, 
but also widespread inequality and injustice still persist in Jamaica despite the agendas 
set out by nationalist politicians and international black power and feminist activists. 
There is a whole substratum of people who are asked to endure their poverty and have 
faith that the promises of such movements will materialize. No Telephone to Heaven 
takes a closer look at those people who cannot escape a life of continued servitude, 
hunger, illness, and destitution. It explains that these people are "tired of praying for 
those that persecute them" (17), and it confronts the possibility that there is "NO 
TELEPHONE TO HEAVEN. No voice to God. A waste to try. Cut off. No way of 
reaching out or up. Maybe only one way. Not God's way. No matter if him is Jesus or 
him is Jah. Him not gwan like dis one lickle bit. NO TELEPHONE TO HEAVEN" (16). 
The novel not only explores the complexities of Clare and Harriet's identities but also 
illustrates the hopelessness, anger, and violence that the postcolonial condition produces. 
Though the novel focuses in large part on how Clare, "A light-skinned woman, 
daughter of landowners" ( 5), ends up "on this truck, alongside people who easily could 
have hated her" ( 5), structurally the text foregrounds what it is like for those people, 
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unlike Clare, who have "no way of reaching out or up" (16). Clare's story is scattered 
throughout the text, revealing how tangential her development actually is to the novel's 
central concern. In fact, a full explanation of her life is delayed in order to detail how a 
poor young boy named Christopher becomes a disgruntled "yardbwai" ( 46) who goes 
mad and murders his employer's family and a fellow servant. Compared to Christopher 
who grows up with bones bent from hunger in a shantytown called "the Dungle[ ... ] the 
dung-heap jungle" (32), Clare is a privileged dreamer who has the luxury of fretting over 
an identity crisis. The novel spends a good deal of time depicting the hardship and 
frustration that Christopher experiences as well as the brutality of the murders that he 
commits and the mad haze within which he wanders for the remainder of his life. It then 
depicts how Clare, who has for most of her life remained disconnected from 
underprivileged Jamaicans, becomes involved in a revolutionary movement that takes up 
the issues of Jamaica's poor. While the novel shows how Clare grows to embrace the 
Jamaican ancestry that she was once denied, it does not portray Clare as a savior for her 
people. 
Christopher's story epitomizes the tragedy of so many inequitable (post)colonial 
policies and failed promises to uplift the people of the postcolony. By the end of the 
novel- in the time ofthe frame narrative- Christopher is known as "de watchman of 
downtown" (179). He is a "legend" (179), mythologized by a reggae singer whose lyrics 
intone, "Him call fe bu'n. Bu'n de damn t'ing down. Bu'n all Jamaica downtown. People 
say him mad, dem say him clown, but de truth will come when we bu'n de fockin' place 
down" (179). Thus, the violence to which he resorts when he feels utterly trapped by his 
unending poverty and dependence is romanticized and invoked as a rally cry. To others 
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he has become something so destructive and unstable that he is seemingly inhuman. In 
the last pages of the novel, he is hired on a movie set by Hollywood filmmakers who cast 
him as Sasabonsam - a fabled West African forest creature that hides in trees and attacks 
hunters. The filmmakers interpret his dreadlocked "hair, the look in [his] eyes" (205) as 
animalistic and instruct him to change nothing about his appearance. While "edg[ing] 
back as far" as possible from his "stench" (205), they request that he howl for them to 
demonstrate just how inhuman he can be. And, when coaching him in his scene, the 
director advises, "Remember, you're not human" (207). Whether mythologized in a 
reggae song "played in Brixton" (179)- a Caribbean enclave of London- or captured 
howling in a Hollywood movie, Christopher becomes an object of consumption. He 
becomes a canned image of either rebellion or degeneration, and in both cases the 
realities of his life in the Dungle and his brutal killing spree are completely eclipsed. 
As the novel problematizes such simplistic perceptions of Christopher as either a 
revolutionary icon or an inhuman monster, it reveals the complexity not only of the 
postcolonial condition but also of attempts to combat it. Throughout the narrative there is 
a troubling association between the brutal murders that Christopher commits in a mad 
rage and the militancy of those in the truck. The moment before Christopher slaughters 
an entire family along with his fellow servant the novel reveals, "A force passed through 
him. He had no past. He had no future. He was phosphorus. Light-bearing. He was light 
igniting the air around him. The source of all danger. He was the carrier offire. He was 
the black light that rises from bone ash" ( 4 7). This fiery imagery bears a disturbing 
similarity to the rhetoric of the group in the truck who have determined that "[t]hey must 
turn the damn thing upside down. Fight fire with frre. Burn. Yes, burn it down" (50). 
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There is a recognition within this group that revolution means not simply fighting for 
rights for one identity group or another in order to reorganize the global hierarchy but 
rather fundamentally changing the inequitable system that supports such a hierarchy. Yet, 
by showing the similarities between this group's potential actions and Christopher's 
gruesome acts, the novel refuses to idealize the revolution for which they are calling. 
The link between the violence that Christopher inflicts and the violence that the 
group on the truck sets out to cause, as well as the vague descriptions of the group on the 
truck, raise important questions about what this group's revolution will look like. Aside 
from destruction, what is the logic of this revolution? Furthermore, by what channels will 
this revolution be possible? Organizing around a particular identity group - whether 
based on race, gender, sex, or nationality -leads to the reshuffling of power within the 
same inequitable system. Clare and Harriet know all too well the exclusions that identity 
politics reinforce. They have come up against the limits of personal sovereignty in a 
world that doesn't allow for them to live split between the binaries that it imposes. 
Furthermore, as part of a militant group that has the authority of "no government" (7), 
they are not invoking the nation as a revolutionary structure. The authority of the nation 
has been undermined to the point that their country's army is deployed not on behalf of 
the nation but for the protection of the foreign movie crew that has hired Christopher to 
howl in a tree ("[r]emember, you're not human" (207), they tell him). As it turns out the 
group in the truck is on a mission to overtake this movie set, but someone has given them 
up. The group, including Clare and Harriet, is attacked by the army while the Hollywood 
movie crew waits in their trailers for this disruption to be neutralized. Clearly the 
sovereignty of the nation has been compromised by its investment in international capital, 
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but does this also mean that Clare and Harriet have risked their lives -possibly lost their 
lives- in an attempt to interrupt the filming of a movie? The absurdity of this scenario 
reflects the senseless inequalities that define the postcolonial condition. 
No Telephone to Heaven explores the difficulty of"crashing through barriers" (5) 
that have been set out by the dominant power when only the tools conceived of by this 
power are available. It suggests that such a scenario requires revolution, but it questions 
what might occur in the moment of revolution as well as what might come after. In the 
instant when Christopher revolts, becoming "the carrier of fire" ( 4 7), he feels as if he has 
stepped outside of a linear temporality - as if "[h ]e had no past. He had no future" ( 4 7). 
Thus, the novel suggests that in the moment of "fight[ing] fire with fire" (50), there is a 
certain timelessness. But, what comes out of this isolated moment? Does it bring about 
pure destruction as it seems to do with Christopher, or might it produce something else? 
Though the group in the truck fails to enact revolution and is actually shot down by its 
own country's army, the novel itself invokes its own revolutionary moment. The novel 
has been using the language and literary form of its (post)colonial masters, and it has 
been attempting to interrupt the narrative conventions of the postcolonial development 
novel. On its last page though it seems to follow through on the call for revolution by 
turning language itself"upside down" (50) and invoking an epistemological breakdown. 
Words collapse into themselves on this page so that the meaning and authority of the 
linguistic sign disintegrates. This linguistic explosion encourages the isolation of the 
signifier- the sound-image- in order to imagine the emancipatory quality of time out of 
time. In the moment when the sign is obliterated, when words degenerate into pure 
sound, there is an opportunity for originality. Thus, the seemingly tragic ending of the 
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novel may be read either as a moment of destruction or possibility. In the conclusion the 
reader is suspended in a space of anxiety, unsure if this is an ending or a beginning, if this 
is a literary apocalypse or ifwhen "[d]ay broke" (208) there occurred a sort of rupture 
that perhaps allowed for the emergence of a form of justice that is yet unimaginable. 
No Telephone to Heaven questions the ways in which revolution in the postcolony 
has devolved into stealing army fatigues from tourists, attacking movie crews, calling for 
an absolute breakdown of language, and other various forms of "fight[ing] fire with fire" 
(50). As the novel's characters defy various social and legal boundaries, they are 
continually dehumanized (Clare as an albino gorilla and Christopher as Sasabonsam, for 
instance). The novel not only features dehumanized characters whose fragmented 
identities expose the limitations of rights-based movements, but it also illustrates the 
desperation that compels them to "fight fire with frre" (50). Like Cliff's No Telephone to 
Heaven, Walcott's Omeros also confronts the limitations of identity politics. Walcott's 
poetry has long contended with the fragmented identity that afflicts the postcolonial 
subject. Cliff even opens No Telephone to Heaven with an excerpt from Walcott's 1965 
poem "Laventille," which depicts a people who are divided between conflicting African 
and English cultures. In Omeros Walcott ultimately recognizes that it is necessary to 
move past representations of the postcolonial condition as a crisis of identity. The text 
stages the process by which its narrator realizes that plotting human subjects in a 
narrative according to pre-given identity categories reduces people to symbols and 
extends their exploitation. While No Telephone to Heaven exhibits how the postcolonial 
subject is dehumanized and how revolution in the postcolony can devolve into self-
destruction, Omeros reframes the postcolonial condition through a complex network of 
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imagery and metaphors that allow for a posthumanist reading. Both of these texts 
illustrate the struggle to break out of imperial structures, but the posthumanist outlook 
that I identify in Omeros reveals possibilities for overcoming the postcolonial condition 
that remain unavailable in Cliffs novel. 
Playing with the idea of inaugurating the St. Lucian version of a Homeric epic, 
Omeros is about the writing process and the writer at first getting stuck in the trap of 
incorporating characters into a master narrative. The text's narrator is a writer who, like 
Walcott, shuttles between the northeast of the US and his native St. Lucia. In verse-form 
he narrates a quasi-epic about two Helens- one, a contemporary St. Lucian woman over 
whom Achille and Hector fight and the second, the island of St. Lucia itself (known as 
the "Helen of the West Indies" because it changed hands between British and French 
colonizers so many times). The narrator's literary project (which comprises the text itself) 
is matched in the story he tells by the efforts of Major Dennis Plunkett (a retired, 
Regimental Sergeant in the British army) to excavate a history of St. Lucia. By 
documenting this history, Plunkett wishes to honor Helen, who is also his and his wife 
Maude's former housemaid. Plunkett is however, plagued throughout the narrative by a 
head injury. 
Several of the characters in Omeros are wounded, and the story initially revolves 
around the healing of its characters' many wounds. The narrative opens with Philoctete, a 
fellow fisherman to Achille and sometimes pigpen cleaner on Plunkett's farm, pointing 
out a scar that is "puckered like the corolla I of a sea-urchin" (Walcott 14).94 Throughout 
the narrative, this scar and the other characters' injuries stand in for the wounds of the 
middle passage, which marks the rift between the Old World and the New World. The 
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text defies the binary that this presents between Old and New World, and suggests that it 
is out of the middle passage that contemporary Caribbean identities have been formed. At 
first, it seems that the text presents the development of these identities in the shadow of 
their Homeric counterparts in order to validate them and stage a healing process. 
However, instead of presuming to heal its characters' physical and emotional wounds by 
way of a testimonial narrative, Omeros ultimately takes a cue from the Catholic Church-
going, Obeah woman Ma Kilman who intuits a cure for Philoctete's wound. Ma Kilman 
runs a bar called No Pain Cafe, but she finds a cure for Philoctete by following a line of 
ants (also described as "the vine I of the generations of silent black workers" [244]). 
These ants "lend her I their language" (245), and over the course of the narrative they 
reveal that each wound "carries its cure" (323). As Ma Kilman opens up her mind to the 
language of the ants, she breaks out of a human-centered episteme. She is able to locate 
the cure for Philoctete's wound when she finally sees the world outside of the human 
constructs (figured here as language) that have previously restricted her sight. The poem 
challenges the supremacy of a humanist episteme (which divides its characters between 
Old and New World identities and leaves them wounded) by recognizing that the 
imperial structures that define their existence are constructs. As Omeros breaks down the 
false boundaries between the natural world and the human world, it undermines the 
authority of the humanist paradigm through which historical and contemporary 
imperialism has devalued St. Lucian people.95 
By showing how the text itself grows out of an accumulation of influences that 
include not only Western classics and African oral traditions but also the arrangement of 
natural elements, Omeros reveals that writing - along with all other human endeavors - is 
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part of the natural world rather than distinct from it. Even the rhythm and rhyme of this 
epic poem are derived from the movement and sound of the sea. Though the author figure 
is at first preoccupied with Homeric allusions and initially chases after a literary ideal in 
the form of the epic poem, the answers that seem to elude him become clear once he 
acknowledges that his writing - and moreover, identity in St. Lucia- is formed out of a 
complex web of life that includes humans but is not defined by them. In the end the 
narrator acknowledges that Omeros is more than an homage to a shadowy Homeric 
figure. Certainly, this figure surfaces in the text as a plaster bust and finds a double in the 
blind "Old St. Omere, "who is known throughout the narrative as Seven Seas for his 
claims of sailing around the world. Seven Seas even offers sage advice and ushers the 
narrator through the circles of hell in the manner of Dante. Yet, even after all of these 
allusions, Omeros is not a mere echo of earlier epic poems. It is what its author-figure 
pronounces it as from the beginning: "I said, 'Omeros,' I and 0 was the conch-shell's 
invocation, mer was I both mother and sea in our Antillean patois, I os, a grey bone, and 
the white surf as it crashes I and spreads its sibilant collar on a lace shore" (14). The text 
is an invocation ofthe sea in which all life is figured as it writes and unwrites existence. 
As such it offers a posthumanist way of narrating the wounds of slavery, colonialism, and 
contemporary imperialism that reinvents the epic poem and challenges a human-centered, 
rights-based episteme. 
Omeros is significant not only for the way that it ultimately problematizes the 
incorporation of the subaltern into master narratives, but also for the imagery through 
which it illustrates postcoloniality. The text overlays several seemingly separate histories 
through an intricate use of nature-based metaphors. In doing so it synchronizes elements 
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that are usually designated binary opposites within an architecture that distinguishes 
between Old World and New World. Rather than reading Omeros in terms of writing 
back within a binary between the rights and wrongs of colonizer and colonized; civilized 
and uncivilized; or Western cultural history evidenced in classical texts and indigeneity 
recovered through Negritude, I suggest that applying a posthumanist lens brings the text's 
dynamic perspective into focus. Omeros demonstrates that existence is more complex 
than artificial binaries allow and more adaptable than a static historical record and the 
Western literary canon indicate. The ontology through which it identifies the self is not 
centered around the human; it sees the human as part of an entire landscape of living 
things. These life forms interrelate and adapt according to rhythms that are beyond the 
scope of the 'universal human' and the literary humanitarian narrative structure. 
Omeros disallows literary humanitarianism through its critique of the exploitation 
that tourism extends; its illustration of the complexities through which existence in St. 
Lucia is defined; and its ultimate recognition that its St. Lucian characters do not require 
this text to save them. It immediately censures the tourist by opening with Philoctete 
"smil[ing] for the tourists, who try taking I his soul with their cameras" (3) as he tells 
them the story of "how, one sunrise, we cut down them canoes" (3). What follows in the 
next several pages is a description of Philoctete and Achille, amongst other fishermen, 
"working with the same I concentration as an army of fire-ants" (7) to cut down laurier-
cannelles trees. The intensity of the fishermen at work reflects the gravity of cutting 
down the "dead god" (6) figured in each tree. After listening to "the ferns nod[ ... ] 'Yes, I 
the trees have to die" (3), the fishermen "pass the rum" (3) and "pray for strength" (3). 
The elegy that follows recalls: "The bearded elders endured the decimation I of their tribe 
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without uttering a syllable[ ... ] while the Aruacs' patois crackled in the smell I of a 
resinous bonfire that turned the leaves brown I with curling tongues, then ash, and their 
language was lost[ ... ] The gods were down at last" (6). Though the death of these trees 
marks the devastating loss of a language, their death is not the end. Next, the verse 
observes a hopeful reincarnation: as the fishermen, "like ants, trundled them to a cliffl ... 
t ]he logs gathered that thirst I for the sea which their own vined bodies were born with. I 
Now the trunks in eagerness to become canoes I ploughed into breakers of bushes, 
making raw holes I of boulders, feeling not death inside them, but use - I to roof the sea, 
to be hulls" (7). Beginning with these scenes of worker ants "cut[ting] down them 
canoes" (3) and converting "death" into "use" (7), the text deals with irrecoverable loss 
and shows how life can possibly go on after profound tragedy. 
This account of the trees becoming canoes is told in part by Philoctete and then 
more fully by the narrator. Partway through, before elaborating on the account Philoctete 
sketches, the narrator describes an exchange that takes place between Philoctete and the 
group of tourists whom he attracts with his tale. With this interjection, it is as if the text 
itself, like Philoctete drawing the tourists in, pauses and leans into the reader to offer 
something worth special attention. In this interlude the narrator first describes the 
interaction Philoctete has with the tourists, explaining, "For some extra silver, under a 
sea-almond, I he shows them a scar made by a rusted anchor, I rolling one trouser-leg up 
with the rising moan I of a conch. It has puckered like the corolla I of a sea-urchin. He 
does not explain its cure. I 'It have some things'- he smiles- 'worth more than a dollar' 
(4). Then the narrator explains that rather than selling the cure to "tourists, who try taking 
I his soul with their cameras" (3), Philoctete 
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has left it to a garrulous waterfall I to pour out his secret down La Sorciere, since I 
the tall laurels fell, for the ground-dove's mating call I to pass on its note to the 
blue, tacit mountains I whose talkative brooks, carrying it to the sea, I turn into 
idle pools where the clear minnows shoot I and an egret stalks the reeds with one 
rusted cry I as it stabs and stabs the mud with one lifting foot. I Then silence is 
sawn in half by a dragonfly I as eels sign their names along the clear bottom-sand, 
I when the sunrise brightens the river's memory I and waves of huge ferns are 
nodding to the sea's sound (4). 
Philoctete's decision to "le[ave] it to a garrulous waterfall I to pour out his secret" (4) 
punctuates the story about the canoes' history as trees and their current life in the ocean 
waves. By articulating the way that nature adapts and carries with it everything there is to 
know, this passage emphasizes the point of the story about the trees-become-canoes. It 
indicates that the reader should pay particular attention to the animal and plant life, 
earthly elements, and the larger natural environment within which existence is defined for 
those human characters in the text. Following the waterfall, which runs down the 
mountain from which the trees have been cut, out to the sea where "waves of huge ferns 
are nodding to the sea's sound" (4), reveals the unforeseen interconnections through 
which life occurs, changes, and adapts. After all, these ferns carry the secret poured down 
by the waterfall, and as they nod to the rhythm of the sea they echo those ferns in the 
mountains that Philoctete has said "sound like the sea that feed us I fishermen all our life" 
(3) as they "nod[ ... ] 'Yes, I the trees have to die"' (3). The trees have died to become 
canoes, and once "their nodding prows I agreed with the waves to forget their lives as 
trees; I one would serve Hector and another, Achilles" (8).96 Like so many of the other 
traumatic injuries that Omeros features, the wound of the massacred trees "carries its own 
cure" (323); the canoes that enable the fisherman to feed their people would not exist 
without the death of the trees. Perhaps providing such a dense thicket of imagery is a 
circuitous way to communicate its insights, but like Philoctete, the text will not simply 
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exchange its secrets with a reader who engages its characters and the island of St. Lucia 
with the cursory, self-interested glance of a tourist. 
The reader will have to move slowly through complex verse, layers of allusion, 
and a network of seeming contradictions to understand a narrative guided by ocean 
rhythms. Ultimately this reader will be asked to accept that "the sea had never known I 
any of them, nor had the illiterate rocks[ ... ] the ocean had I no memory of the wanderings 
of Gilgamesh, I or whose sword severed whose head in the Iliad. I It was an epic where 
every line was erased I yet freshly written in sheets of exploding surf I in that blind 
violence with which one crest replaced I another with a trench" (295-6). More than 
simply denaturalizing the reign of Western civilization, Omeros suggests that humans as 
a species are not the center of all life, which is easily "erased" and "freshly written in 
sheets of exploding surf' (296). Though literary epics may narrate many facets of life and 
even define how a great number of humans throughout history have experienced the 
world, it is not possible to control existence through human conceptions of it. What is 
more, realizing this does not uncover a natural key according to which one may decode 
the unknowable. The crests and trenches of life follow a pattern that occurs with a "blind 
violence" (296) that cannot be controlled. 
To a reader seeking a way to heal the wounds of history and contemporary 
globalization by taking a literary tour that encapsulates St. Lucian identity, Omeros 
demonstrates that understanding identity in the Caribbean postcolony is neither so 
straightforward as inserting its St. Lucian characters into a classic Western narrative nor 
so simple as returning to African origins. Rather than signifying a multicultural synthesis 
of these supposed opposites through a celebration of globalization and glorification of St. 
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Lucian characters, the text's complex web of imagery allows for a posthumanist 
understanding of a history of colonial violence, enslavement, and contemporary 
economic and cultural imperialism. The narrative questions essentialist identities by 
locating the self within a natural world that is continually changing. Its fore grounding of 
the ocean and attention to plants, insects, and birds along with many other animals and 
environmental elements is not merely pathetic fallacy or anthropomorphism. The 
usefulness of the text is not in understanding all of life through a metaphor of humanity 
or reading the world through a human experience of it. More than just metaphor, the 
text's nature-based descriptions unhinge representation from individual subjectivity and 
narrate lived reality through a posthumanist approach. 
Rather than structuring the text according to the subject formation of its characters 
or by drawing a universal humanist connection between the suffering of disparate people, 
Omeros's multiple storylines and settings are intertwined through the epic simile of the 
sea-swift. Moving with the ocean currents that flow through the middle passage, the sea-
swift surfaces in various spaces in the African Diaspora. As Philoctete and Achille cut 
down the trees in the first few pages of the text, the sea-swift appears "far from its home, 
I confused by the waves of blue hills" as it "cross[ es] the cloud-surf' that fills "the hole 
the laurel had left" (6) in the St. Lucian sky. Likewise, when Achille "question[s] his 
name and its origin" (130), it is "this mite of the sky-touching sea I towing a pirogue a 
thousand times her own weight I with a hummingbird's electric wings, this engine I that 
sho[ ots] ahead of each question like an answer" ( 130) that transports him to the Africa of 
his father Afolabe. The sea-swift also emerges in the US, where the author-figure spies 
"slave shacks" (177); the "gibbet branches of a silk-cotton tree I from which Afolabes 
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hung like bats" (178); and "the Trail of Tears" (177). And, like Maud, whose hands 
"diving like a swift" (89) embroider the migrating birds of St. Lucia on a quilt, the 
author-figure traces the path of the sea-swift throughout the verse itself. Thus, toward the 
end of the text, the narrator reflects, 
I followed a sea-swift to both sides of this text; I her hyphen stitched its seam, like 
the interlocking I basins of a globe in which one half fits the next I into an 
equator, both shores neatly clicking I into a globe; except that its meridian I was 
not North and South but East and West. One, the New I World, made exactly like 
the Old, halves of one brain, I or the beat of both hands rowing that bear the two I 
vessels of the heart with balance, weight, and design. I Her wing-beat carries these 
islands to Africa, I she sewed the Atlantic rift with a needle's line, I the rift in the 
soul (319). 
Swooping across epochs and moving within and between seemingly separate realities, the 
sea-swift sutures together the perceived opposites into which humans have bifurcated the 
world. The sea-swift reveals that "the New World, made exactly like the Old" (319), is 
not a replica or revision of an earlier model of existence. Rather, it is but one part of a 
body of physical matter that forms a globe whose orbit, like the inner workings ofthe 
"two I vessels of the heart" (319), has a "balance, weight, and design" (319) that enables 
life. As the sea-swift "sew[ s] the Atlantic rift with a needle's line (319), it heals ''the rift 
in the soul" (319) that has caused the author-figure an agony that he also "stitches into" 
(28) his characters. 
As the author-figure follows the sea-swift in his narrative "craft" (291), he 
gradually recognizes the implications of portraying characters by way of their wounds. 
Partway through the text, he acknowledges he has been "searching for characters" 
through which his "sorrow [might] ha[ve] been replaced," because "[w]hen one grief 
afflicts us we choose a sharper grief I in hope that enormity will ease affliction" (181). 
Portraying characters as symbols of suffering serves only to distract him from his own 
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disillusionment. As the text proceeds the author-figure struggles to engage in writing that 
narrates the challenges that postcolonial subjects face, without exploiting others' poverty 
for the sake of his own art. 
Gradually the author-figure learns what it means to heed the advice that his 
phantom father Warwick gives him about writing. Warwick recommends that the author-
figure be mindful that his poetic voice emanates from his childhood island home and the 
laboring women he watched there from his grandmother's house. These women worked 
"like ants" (75) carrying hundredweight baskets of coal, "the same colour I as their skins 
and shadows" (74), onto ships for "one copper penny" (74) per load. Warwick counsels, 
Kneel to your load, then balance your staggering feet I and walk up that coal 
ladder as they do in time, I one bare foot after the next in ancestral rhyme[ ... ] 
They walk, you write; I keep to that narrow causeway without looking down, I 
climbing in their footsteps, that slow, ancestral beat I of those used to climbing 
roads; your own work owes them I because the couplet of those multiplying feet I 
made your first rhymes. Look, they climb, and no one knows them; I they take 
their copper pittances, and your duty I from the time you watched them from your 
grandmother's house I as a child wounded by their power and beauty I is the 
chance you now have, to give those feet a voice' (75--6). 
Instead of depicting these women as suffering victims, Warwick recommends 
recognizing their strength. The author-figure initially feels "wounded by their power and 
beauty" (76), and he internalizes their struggle as a burden. Warwick prompts him to take 
a second look in order to recognize the cure for his affliction. As a writer he is charged 
with "giv[ing] those feet a voice" (76). Within a rights framework, endowing them with 
"a voice" would bestow agency upon these "Helens from an earlier time" (73). A work of 
literary humanitarianism would join these women in a testimonial dialectic with a reader-
witness in order to establish their personhood and appeal for rights. It would, in actuality, 
speakfor these women. However, an alternate possibility for a posthumanist 
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understanding of voice emerges in this passage. Warwick emphasizes that "giv[ing] those 
feet a voice" (76) means appreciating that they have given the author-figure his voice. It 
is their rhythmic persistence and the movement of their laboring bodies that shapes the 
author-figure's poetic voice, and he must serve them by following the rhythm they have 
taught him. His task is to articulate their collective existence as dynamic parts of an 
intricate network of life. The poetic voice that takes shape in Omeros is not simply the 
expression of human suffering or individual artistry. It keeps time according to the 
multiplying feet of these women who labor like ants; it moves through space along the 
flight paths of a sea-swift; and it finds its rhythm in the ocean currents. 
Rather than representing St. Lucians as tragic heroes (a trap the text nearly falls 
into), Omeros tells a story that decenters the human. By showing that poetry and, more 
broadly, language itself does not originate in human intellect or signify human mastery 
over all life forms, the text reframes the trauma of the middle passage, slavery, 
colonialism, and economic and cultural imperialism. Moreover, the text provides a 
different way of understanding memory, trauma, and identity in relation to these 
phenomena by recognizing that language does not derive from an autonomous human. 
For instance, Ma Kilman's communion with the ants imagines how language exceeds the 
human. The speaker illustrates this scene: 
Her hair sprung free as the moss. Ants scurried I through the wiry curls, barring, 
then passing each other I the same message with scribbling fingers and forehead 
touching forehead. Ma Kilman bent hers forward, I and as her lips moved with the 
ants, her mossed skull heard the ants talking the language of her great-
grandmother, I the gossip of a distant market, and she understood, I the way we 
follow our thoughts without any language (243--4). 
The language in which the ants communicate is thought to be dead and is certainly 
beyond Ma Kilman's memory. Yet, her encounter with the ants is not about the recovery 
160 
of a lost language; it is about changing her conception of language. The language Ma 
Kilman encounters in this scene does not operate according to conventional logic. She 
hears it not through her ears but rather through her "mossed skull" (243), and she comes 
to understand it "the way we follow our thoughts without any language" (244). She is 
able to comprehend this language by engaging her senses differently and tuning into the 
nonhuman world around her. 
The text emphasizes the potential benefits of thinking of language in a 
posthumanist way by showing how Ma Kilman's communication with the ants leads her 
to the plant that she will grind into a poultice to mend Philoctete's wounded leg. There is 
an important distinction to be made about this posthumanist perspective though. Ma 
Kilman is able to treat the gash in Philoctete's shin not by reverting to an earlier more 
'natural' state that is thought to be part of a lost past, but because in the ever-changing 
nature of life, a migrating sea-swift transported the seed of this plant to St. Lucia. Indeed, 
"A swift had carried the strong seed in its stomach I centuries ago from its antipodal 
shore[ ... ] She aimed to carry the cure I that precedes every wound" (238-9). There is no 
resolution to be found in a static past that cannot be recuperated. The cure is in the 
constant transformations that occur as life goes on; it is in recognizing how all life moves 
through time, registers change, adapts, and carries on with processes of living. 
More specifically, the text reveals the problems with thinking of identity in terms 
of a bifurcation between the Old World and New World that fixes each in time and space. 
When the characters in Omeros are understood within this framework, they are tom 
between these two worlds. Within this binary, their identities take shape out of a series of 
debilitating traumas that render them perpetual victims. Though the author-figure initially 
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fixates on the wounds that such a division causes and thus reinforces a problematic 
binary, he gradually realizes that "Like Philoctete's wound, this language carries its cure" 
(323). Late in the narrative he determines to alter his approach to identity, but the 
language of the text has allowed for a different understanding of identity from the start. 
As the author-figure admits, "affliction is one theme I of this work, this fiction, since 
every 'I' is a I fiction finally" (28) an astute reader may notice how every representation 
of human identity is a fiction. Each proclamation of the self as an "I" is part of a narrative 
- each "I" is the central figure in a story of itself. A static representation of this "I" can 
never entirely communicate identity since it is always in the process of changing. Omeros 
attempts to portray identity - the "I" and the fiction of every "I" - in a way that embraces 
this perpetual change. It defies the Western tradition according to which, as Achille 
Mbembe points out, "the human being can say 'I' only if capable of positing 
himself/herself as a conscious subject, essentially different from nature through thinking 
and doing" (On the Postcolony 190). Walcott's text shows that the human is inseparable 
from nature, which continually eclipses human "thinking and doing" (190). Rather than 
distinguishing the human from nature, Omeros focuses the story it has to tell about 
identity in St. Lucia through imagery of the Atlantic Ocean. As it tracks how people have 
been dispersed and brought together across this ocean, which precedes and outlasts them, 
the text shows how the divide between an Old World and New World is a human 
construct rather than an innate determinant of identity. 
Of course, the binary construct of Old World and New World manifests in real 
ways. This bifurcation of the world has supported systems of slavery, colonialism, and 
contemporary imperialism. Omeros is concerned with how each of these hegemonic 
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systems affects the people of St. Lucia. However, rather than continuing to define them 
through a binary framework of Old World and New World that manifests in the unequal 
power dynamics between master and slave, colonizer and colonized, and oppressor and 
oppressed, the text reframes identity. Calling to mind the dead bodies from the slave trade 
that extend across the middle passage, the text imagines, "strong as self-healing coral, a 
quiet culture I is branching from the white ribs of each ancestor" (296). The suggestion is 
that life persists by adapting, and the past that seems to have been lost plays a crucial part 
in shaping the future. Thus the verses continue, "where coral died I it feeds on its death, 
the bones branch into more coral, I and contradiction begins" (297). This contradiction 
defies binary logic. Moreover, as the metaphor mixes the imagery of human bones and 
coral, it challenges the hierarchy between the human and nonhuman. The text imagines a 
"patient, hybrid organism" (297) emerging from beneath "the mirror ofhistory" (297), 
and suggests that it "will change us with the fluent sculpture of Time" (296). In Omeros 
identity transgresses the boundaries of a binary logic and is reconceptualized through the 
mixture of contradictory metaphors. 
The characters that populate the narrative exhibit an openness to the sort of hybrid 
existence that defines St. Lucia in this epic. As the text recounts a typical ride in Hector's 
sixteen-seater passenger-van, it suggests that the future demands that people in St. Lucia 
embrace such hybridity. It describes: 
Passengers I crammed next to each other on its animal hide I were sliding into two 
worlds without switching gears. I One, atavistic, with its African emblem I that 
slid on the plastic seats, wrinkling in a roll I when the cloth bunched, and the other 
world that shot them to an Icarian future they could not control. I Many accepted 
their future. Most were prepared I for the Comet's horizontal launching I of its 
purring engine, part rocket, part leopard (117). 
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As these passengers "slide into two worlds without switching gears" ( 11 7) they break 
through the assumed boundaries between these worlds. They are transported across these 
barriers in a machine akin to a "rocket" that "purr[ s ]" like a "leopard" and is named "the 
Comet" for the celestial form of energy that seems to power it (117). This imagery 
invokes a cyborg-like, posthumanist idea of the kind of existence that Omeros suggests is 
taking shape in St. Lucia. But, this hybrid existence is not simply a result of new 
technologies that "launch" people into "their future" (117). Transgressing boundaries is a 
longstanding part of the culture in St. Lucia. Philoctete and Achille exemplify this when 
they dress up as women "every Boxing Day, and not because of Christmas, I but for 
something older; something that he [Achille] had seen I in Africa" (275). Achille wears 
Helen's signature yellow dress and with "a scarf round his head" (273), he is "not the 
usual kingfish-fighter I but a muscular woman" (273). This upending of gender categories 
signals the crossing of a boundary between African origins and Western conventions. As 
Achille whirls around in his skirts, he becomes "his own epitaph, I his own resurrection" 
(273), and in these festivities "people would laugh I at what they had lost" (273). Though 
the wounds of the middle passage, slavery, and colonialism are remembered on this day, 
the pain of these wounds does not define the St. Lucian identity that Achille and 
Philoctete honor. 
Yet, even as Omeros celebrates the way that its St. Lucian characters traverse the 
divide between Old World and New, it also acknowledges the way this culture is 
commodified through contemporary economic and cultural imperialism. The poem self-
consciously criticizes the poets that it depicts in one of the seven circles of hell for their 
"love of poverty" (294 ). It also laments that Achille's village has "become a souvenir I of 
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itself' (31 0). Admitting that the village's "life adjusted to the lenses I of cameras that, 
perniciously elegiac, I took shots of passing things" (311 ), the verse describes how "[t]he 
village imitated the hotel brochure I with photogenic poverty, with atmosphere" (311 ). 
However, as it notes the tourist attractions that "those who were 'people' lovers" (311) 
are sure to capture, it also remarks that, of these tourists, [n]one saw a swift dart I over 
the cactus on the cliff or heard it cry once" (312). This is particularly significant because 
it is this swift that carries the cure for Philoctete's wound (a cure he will not sell to the 
tourists), and it is by paying attention to this swift and following its path that the narrative 
is able to reframe the postcolonial condition. This epic will not allow the reader to engage 
the story it offers as "'people' lovers" (311) who are only interested in its characters as 
wounded victims. Rather than defining postcolonial identity in terms of the trauma that 
results from slavery, colonialism, and economic and cultural imperialism, Omeros 
introduces a posthumanist view that undermines the logic of such forms of domination. 
Whereas literary humanitarianism allows readers to act as tourists within stories 
that ennoble the suffering Other, A Small Place, No Telephone to Heaven, and Omeros 
confront the difficulty of narrating histories of slavery, colonialism and contemporary 
structural inequalities without reducing people to symbols of oppression. I interpret their 
portrayals of postcoloniality as a challenge to the way that contemporary human rights 
discourse invokes a 'universal' human in its attempts to develop postcolonial subjects 
into 'proper' national citizens. In the final chapter I will consider the demands that human 
rights discourse puts on stateless persons - specifically the contemporary refugee. I will 
examine two novels that challenge cultural narratives about the refugee by destabilizing 
the boundaries of victimhood and exposing the hypocrisy of a global hierarchy that 
extends from slavery and colonialism to contemporary imperialism. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Refugee Stories: Contemporary Imperialism and the New Diaspora 
I have already shown in the opening chapters that treating political violence as trauma 
reinforces an inequitable relationship between a narrator-testifier and reader-witness, 
dislocates suffering from its source, and forecloses narrative possibilities. Building on 
this critique, the previous chapter analyzed the possibilities for alternative representations 
of economic and cultural imperialism in the Caribbean where the post-independence state 
is often ruled by transnational capital. This concluding chapter elaborates on my 
discussion of the nation-state system, focusing in particular on the figure of the refugee. 
The refugee and the reader meet at the nexus of a complex interface between nation, 
state, and international collectivities. Presumably the refugee seeks safe harbor in a host 
nation because his or her rights have been violated by the state in his or her nation of 
origin. The standard refugee narrative thus portrays the refugee as a victim of a 'failed' 
state and invokes the authority of the international human rights regime in its attempts to 
justify the acceptance of the refugee into the host nation. 
The figure of the refugee first gained widespread attention and became integral to 
discussions of human rights in the mid-twentieth century when Hannah Arendt noticed 
that displaced persons reveal a breakdown in the nation-state system, which does not 
protect the supposedly inherent rights of stateless human persons. 97 While the 
international human rights law instituted in the latter half of the twentieth century 
attempts to uphold the rights of all individuals, the refugee continues to expose the limits 
of both human rights and the nation-state system. Yet, in the late twentieth century and 
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into the twenty-first as the language of human rights began to be commonly deployed to 
represent political violence in the postcolony, the figure of the refugee has been 
resignified not as an indication of a systemic problem but as a symbol of the perceived 
failure of anti-colonial nationalism.98 
Rather than addressing the root causes of political, economic, and social injustices 
in the postcolony, the language of human rights emerged as a way to discuss inequality 
without disrupting structures of global capitalism or interrupting narratives of US 
exceptionalism. In the aftermath of decolonization, in their attempts to compete in global 
markets, and under the added pressure of inequitable development policies, newly 
independent states increasingly sacrificed the well being of the nation in order to serve 
multinational capital.99 While the citizens of more dominant states are sustained and even 
allowed to profit from the exploitation to which less powerful states subject their people, 
the resulting crises in the postcolony are repeatedly deemed exceptions within an 
otherwise functional nation-state system. As the subjects of the postcolony absorb the 
inequalities of the global market economy, the injustices of development are depoliticized 
and cast as human rights issues. 100 According to the accompanying cultural narrative the 
refugee is the ultimate victim of a human rights violation (and must properly perform this 
subjectivity), and the perpetrator ofthis violation is representative of the corruption ofthe 
rogue state. 101 In turn, the host country that receives the refugee becomes the savior by 
offering incorporation into a 'healthy' state. 
This chapter reveals how Abdulrazak Gurnah' s By the Sea and Edwidge 
Danticat' s The Dew Breaker challenge conventional narratives about the refugee and 
facilitate complex dialogue about asylum. 102 Rather than rigidly defining people as 
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victims, perpetrators, or saviors, these novels destabilize the boundaries of victimhood 
and unhinge the representation of political violence from individual subjectivity. Both 
depict refugees who cannot be defined through the subjectivity of the victim, and they 
show that refugees from 'developing' nations are part of a new diaspora that cannot 
simply be collapsed into the nation-state system. As they demonstrate how characters slip 
between the categories of victim, persecutor, and savior, these novels deal with the 
prospect that it is not possible to truly know the person speaking a story or who it is that 
might be listening. Instead of forcing their characters into the juridical categories required 
of literary testimony, these texts explore the implications of no longer restricting the 
subjectivity of the storyteller or the reader within preconceived identities. As a result, 
both By the Sea and The Dew Breaker change the conversation about international 
political violence from a testimonial dialectic between the narrator and reader to a 
dynamic and open discussion that tests the possibilities of world literature as "a mode of 
circulation and of reading" (David Damrosch 5). 103 
Gurnah's and Danticat's characters- from Zanzibar in By the Sea and Haiti in 
The Dew Breaker - are a part of a new diaspora that has different dimensions from the 
old diaspora because it occurs after decolonization and in the context of transnational 
capital. 104 In the old diaspora Europeans were transplanted and peoples from Africa, the 
Americas, and the Indian subcontinent were displaced in order to establish the authority 
of the nation-state and expand its influence through nation-based empires. The new 
diaspora moves in and across the space of the nation-state, but it disrupts conceptions of 
nation as it exceeds its boundaries. It is not made up of conquerors and dehumanized 
victims as in the slave trade and colonization. Those in the new diaspora are leaving 
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'developing' nations in an attempt to escape various economic, political, and social 
injustices, but such problems are not resolved in the supposedly properly functioning 
nation-states that receive them. While the international human rights infrastructure 
assumes that transferring rightless persons into the space of a 'functional' nation will 
endow them with rights, this does not actually address the fundamental inequalities of a 
nation-state system that is governed by transnational capital. The unresolved wrongs that 
occur in the 'developing' nation (as well as the hauntings of the old diaspora) do not 
disappear in the nation of 'refuge.' 
Read together, By the Sea and the Dew Breaker reveal the transnational 
intersections of postcoloniality and human rights. As the stories in both texts crisscross 
different temporalities and exceed national borders, they show how human rights 
discourse is connected to historical and contemporary imperialism. By the Sea not only 
parodies current cultural narratives about the refugee, but it also demonstrates how such 
caricatures of refugees in England are extensions of the master narrative that supported 
European colonialism. After I track the connection between the old and new diaspora 
through my analysis of By the Sea, I turn to The Dew Breaker to show how attempts to 
simply reincorporate the new diaspora into the nation-state system not only allow 
fundamental injustices to persist but also perpetuate claims of US exceptionalism. The 
Dew Breaker contradicts the mythology of US exceptionalism according to which US 
benevolence and democracy triumph over foreign tyranny and traumatic political 
histories to restore human rights. Examining these two novels together foregrounds the 
systemic problems of a global hierarchy that is based in a history of colonialism and 
diversified by inequitable postcolonial development under cover of the language of 
human rights. 
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By the Sea accounts for lives complicated by imperialism and postcoloniality by 
offering shifting truths, memory fragments, and conjecture from two different narrators 
who have each immigrated to England to escape their lives in the East African island of 
Zanzibar. Saleh, the text's first narrator, has arrived in England in the late 1990s as a 
sixty-five-year-old refugee. In Zanzibar he once owned a furniture store that catered to 
European transplants and travelers until an inter-family property feud led to his unlawful 
imprisonment. Roughly a quarter of the way through the novel the reader learns that in 
order to obtain a passport, Saleh has used the name and birth certificate of Rajah Shaaban 
Mahmud, the man whose family he dispossessed. The text alternates between narration 
by Saleh and LatifMahmud, Rajah Shaaban Mahmud's youngest son who changed his 
name from Ismael and clandestinely immigrated to London via the German Democratic 
Republic as a young man. 
Through the intertwining narratives, the reader learns that Saleh's father's second 
wife Bi Maryam was Rajah Shaaban Mahmud's aunt, and when she died she left her 
house to Saleh rather than Rajah Shaaban Mahmud, causing suspicion and resentment in 
her nephew's family. Additionally, in the early 1960s when Saleh gives a loan to a 
Persian trader from Bahrain named Hussein, he acquires the deed to Rajah Shaaban 
Mahmud's current home as security (Hussein has the deed because he previously gave a 
loan to Rajah Shaaban Mahmud). As it turns out, at the time of this agreement, Hussein 
has been attempting to seduce Rajah Shaaban Mahmud's oldest son, Hassan who is just 
fifteen. Hussein soon leaves town with Hassan, and becomes delinquent in repaying his 
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debt. Facing financial pressures because of the nationalization of the banks, Saleh collects 
on the security Rajah Shaaban Mahmud provided, and he ends up repossessing the home 
and its contents (thus taking a second home from Rajah Shaaban Mahmud and hastening 
the further disintegration of his family). In reaction, Rajah Shaaban Mahmud's wife 
Asha, who is also the mistress of a government Minister, conspires to have Saleh 
imprisoned. His eleven-year detainment ends under amnesty in 1979, but during this time 
his wife and daughter have died. Then, in the late 1990s Saleh feels threatened when 
Hassan returns seeking retribution for his family's losses. Wary of a corrupt legal system 
and exhausted by this feud, Saleh uses the now deceased Rajah Shaaban Mahmud's birth 
certificate, which had been amongst the possessions he repossessed three decades earlier, 
to obtain a passport and apply for asylum in England. 
By revealing the complicated set of occurrences and long personal and political 
history that have led Saleh to seek asylum in England, the novel undermines the 
superficial categories into which standard refugee narratives flatten individuals. At the 
beginning of his account Saleh declares, "I am a refugee, an asylum-seeker. These are not 
simple words, even if habit of hearing them makes them so" ( 4). Such words have 
become commonplace as part of the increased circulation of human rights discourse. This 
text reveals the complexity behind the human rights language used to identify stateless 
persons. A former colonial subject, Saleh's identity as a refugee is deeply intertwined 
with colonial history, corrupt postcolonial governance, and continued economic and 
cultural imperialism. As Saleh tells his story, the novel shows that there is a significant 
difference between the narratives that are often imposed upon the refugee and the 
collection of divergent yet interconnected stories that define a life. The novel begins to 
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indicate this as Saleh- newly arrived at Gatwick airport -recalls looking upon the 
objects that he has removed from his luggage for inspection. 105 He muses, "It was not my 
life that lay spread there, just what I had selected as signals of a story I hoped to convey" 
(8). The novel exhibits the oversimplifications and indignities to which Saleh subjects 
himself in order to achieve a mobility that he hopes will free him from the anxiety and 
exhaustion of his life in the postcolony. 
As the novel parodies the compulsory refugee narrative through which Saleh 
presents himself to the British authorities, it also provides an intricate set of narratives 
that acknowledge the ambiguities of personal lives and the political complexities of the 
postcolonial condition. He has brought with him very few items "from a life departed" 
and refers to this luggage as "the provisions of my after-life" (31). He has carefully 
curated these items to exhibit a refugee status that will gain him entry into an "after-life" 
(31 ). As I will discuss further in my reading of The Dew Breaker, the refugee experience 
is conceptualized in terms of a "life departed" in one's country of origin and an "after-
life" (31) in a new host country. Ultimately though, the unresolved problems of the "life 
departed" persist in the "after-life" (31)- the seemingly simple words "refugee" and 
"asylum-seeker" only mask the systemic problems that stateless persons reveal. Thus, 
Saleh comments, "It is so different here that it seems as if one life has ended and I am 
now living another one. So perhaps I should say of myself that I once lived another life 
elsewhere, but now it is over. Yet I know that the earlier one teems and pulses in rude 
good health behind me and before me" (2). The unresolved issues of the earlier life 
unsettle the possibility for a new beginning; they rupture the linear progression that the 
typical refugee narrative promises. 
173 
By the Sea refuses a developmental plot and instead offers an unruly assembly of 
recollections that upend a simplistic understanding of asylum. As Saleh begins to tell his 
story he admits, "It is difficult to know with precision how things became as they have, to 
be able to say with some assurance that first it was this and it then led to that and the 
other, and now here we are. The moments slip through my fingers. Even as I recount 
them to myself, I can hear echoes of what I am suppressing, of something I've forgotten 
to remember" (2). Saleh is essentially announcing himself as an unreliable narrator, yet 
this admission is actually more honest than if he were to present the kind of testimonial 
narrative that would secure him asylum. In explaining why he is telling this story, he 
acknowledges, "I have an urge to give this account, to give an accounting of the minor 
dramas I have witnessed and played a part in, and whose endings and beginnings stretch 
away from me. I don't think it's a noble urge. What I mean is, I don't know a great truth 
which I ache to impart, nor have I lived an exemplary experience which will illuminate 
our conditions and our times" (2). Saleh is a reluctant narrator who undercuts 
assumptions about the nobility of storytelling and the supposedly universal qualities that 
it taps into. He will not offer a "great truth" (2) about 'universal' man or endeavor to 
unite his readers as witnesses to "an exemplary experience" (2) of the subaltern 
condition. 
Instead of a testimonial narrative packaged for a select panel of witnesses, Saleh 
provides a complicated, unwieldy story to an undefined readership. He announces, "I will 
tell the story this way, for all the blemishes in the telling, because I no longer know who 
may be listening" (30). Rather than pretending that the text's readership is part of an 
international community of witnesses united by the ideals of universal humanism, the 
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novel acknowledges the anonymity of a global readership. While Saleh performs the role 
of the proper refugee to the authorities in Britain in order to enter the country, he will not 
grant his unknown listeners the authority of judging his subjectivity as a refugee. To this 
audience, he will tell a messier version of his refugee experience and the history behind 
it. As Saleh repeatedly acknowledges that he "no longer know[ s] who may be listening" 
(16, 30), the text questions what it means to circulate a story addressed to an anonymous 
global reader. Rather than projecting a singular identity and authorizing function onto this 
readership, the text confronts the reader with a tangled saga of imperialism and inter-
family drama in which people do not fit into the categories that human rights discourse 
prescribes. 
By the Sea connects the rigid classification of people to colonialism and 
challenges the continuation of such taxonomies in the postcolony. The text acknowledges 
that colonialism depended on the adoption of a particular set of cultural narratives that 
naturalized a global hierarchy and the dominance of the colonizer over the colonized. 
Saleh recalls that under colonialism, "New maps were made, complete maps, so that 
every inch was accounted for, and everyone now knew who they were, or at least who 
they belonged to. Those maps, how they transformed everything" (15). Colonialism 
carved the globe into territories, cataloguing people as the possessions of one or another 
of the European empires. Under colonial rule people were assigned a value according to 
the identity that the colonizer projected onto them. Saleh remembers, "In their books I 
read unflattering accounts of my history[ ... ] I read about the diseases that tormented us, 
about the future that lay before us, about the world we lived in and our place in it. It was 
as if they had remade us, and in ways that we no longer had any recourse but to accept, so 
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complete and well-fitting was the story they told about us" (18). The 'knowledge' that the 
British colonizer produces about the world and the place of its colonized subjects in it 
dictates their history and their future. It relegates entire peoples to a particular identity 
that seems "so complete and well-fitting" (18) within the master narrative that it becomes 
internalized. 
Over time the master narrative has been challenged, yet it continues to evolve in 
ways that reinforce the supposed superiority ofthe West and justify the dominance of 
some over others. Commenting on the way cultural narratives have changed, Saleh 
recounts, 
But they left too many spaces unattended to, could not in the nature of things do 
anything about them, so in time gaping holes began to appear in their story. It 
began to fray and ravel under assault, and a grumbling retreat was unavoidable. 
Though that was not the end of stories. There was still Suez to come, and the 
inhumanities of the Congo and Uganda, and other bitter bloodlettings in small 
places. Then it would seem that the British had been doing us nothing but good 
compared to the brutalities we could visit on ourselves. Their good, though was 
steeped in irony. They told us about the nobility of resisting tyranny in the 
classroom and then applied a curfew after sunset, or sent pamphleteers for 
independence to prison for sedition. Never mind, they did drain the creeks, and 
improve the sewage system and bring vaccines and the radio (18-19). 
Saleh explains colonialism, anti-colonial resistance, and postcolonial violence in terms of 
storytelling. Independence movements challenged the narratives that sustained 
colonialism, exposing their "gaping holes" until they "began to fray and ravel under 
assault" (18). Yet independence does not free the postcolony from stories that reinforce 
the supposed cultural, economic, and moral superiority of the West. The master narrative 
is revised so that it becomes a failure within the postcolony that causes "bitter 
bloodlettings in small places" (18), and colonialism is recast as having "do[ne] us nothing 
but good" ( 18) despite its hypocritical tyranny. This new set of stories implies that 
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colonialism improved life in its territories through the modernization (read 
Westernization) of agriculture, sanitation, medicine, and communications. It presents the 
"bloodlettings in small places" ( 18) as evidence of the supposedly inherent brutality of 
the African. 
Accompanying this narrative about the failure of the postcolonial state, is the 
story of the new diaspora, which portrays the oppressed escaping inhuman conditions in 
the postcolony. According to this narrative, the refugee is rescued by the West through 
acceptance into a properly functioning nation-state. Saleh illustrates how this narrative 
operates in relation to Zanzibar as he discusses the British government's reason for 
granting asylum to refugees from Zanzibar. He explains, 
The British wanted to make the point to an international audience that it regarded 
our government as dangerous to its own citizens, something they and everyone 
else had known for a long time. But times had changed, and now every puffed-up 
member of the international community had to show that it was taking no more 
nonsense from the unruly and eternally bickering rabble that teem in those 
parched savannahs. Enough was enough. What did our government do that was 
worse than the evils it had done before? It rigged an election, falsifying figures in 
front of international observers, whereas before it had only gaoled, raped, killed 
or otherwise degraded its citizens. For this delinquent behaviour, the British 
government granted asylum to anyone who claimed their lives were in danger. It 
was a cheap way of showing stern disapproval ( 1 0). 
Saleh illustrates the way in which human rights rhetoric is deployed to reinforce a global 
hierarchy that enables "every puffed-up member of the international community" (10) to 
retain a sense of superiority over the "eternally bickering rabble that teem in those 
parched savannahs" (10) of Africa. Zanzibar, his home country, is deemed a pariah 
within the international community for its apparent disregard for the democratic process. 
By accepting refugees at this particular moment, the British government makes a show of 
its respect for democracy and marks Zanzibar as a failed state. Rather than 
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acknowledging how the inequalities of a long-standing global hierarchy have contributed 
to the conflicts in Zanzibar, it is figured as a dysfunctional state and a threat to the 
authority of the democratic process that the international community supposedly upholds. 
The lives of those the government has "gaoled, raped, killed or otherwise degraded" (10) 
continue to be disregarded by a fickle audience of"international observers" whose focus 
on a rigged election allows them to celebrate the apparent superiority of their own states. 
Via Saleh the novel suggests that the British use the breakdown of the state in Zanzibar to 
emphasize their own civilized nature and reinforce their unquestioned authority at both 
the national and international levels. 
The text continues its critique of international politics as Saleh becomes part of 
the refugee system and comes into contact with various (official and unofficial) 
representatives of the state who each project a refugee narrative onto him. His first 
encounter in England is with Kevin Edelman, the immigration officer who searches his 
luggage. Upon arrival, Saleh pretends that he does not speak English because he is under 
the impression that this is essential to his performance as a refugee. Reading Saleh's 
silence as a fundamental inability to comprehend the situation in which he is in, Edelman 
seizes an opportunity to pontificate about "this asylum business" (11 ). As he takes issue 
with Saleh's age and with the fact that he is not European, the text parodies the way in 
which the refugee is made to absorb the blame for the inequalities that he or she is 
attempting to escape. Edelman charges, "Why didn't you stay in your own country, 
where you could grow old in peace? This is a young man's game, this asylum business, 
because it is really just looking for jobs and prosperity in Europe and all that, isn't it? 
There is nothing moral in it, just greed. No fear oflife and safety, just greed" (11 ). 
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Assuming that old age would grant peace, Edelman disregards any danger that Saleh may 
or not have faced in his own country. He depicts the pursuit of a better life as a mark of 
"greed" (11) and insinuates that there is a proper (more productive) age for asylum. 
Meanwhile Saleh is of course merely playing the part of the helpless refugee, and 
the reader is privy to the internal dialogue through which he delivers incisive rebuttals to 
each of Edelman's absurd postulations. Thus as Saleh delivers his critique of Edelman, 
the text is really posing a series of questions to the reader. Saleh begins by asking, "At 
what age are you supposed not to be afraid for your life? Or not want to live without fear? 
How did he know that my life was in any less danger than those young men they let in? 
And why was it immoral to want to live better and in safety? Why was that greed or a 
game?'' (11 ). His questions reveal the arbitrary restrictions that are put on the refugee, 
who is attempting to claim rights that have been conceived of in international human 
rights law as inherent. The host country determines whether or not a person qualifies for 
asylum, and Edelman demonstrates how bias and ulterior motives condition such 
decisions. Details such as age are a factor, because the expenses of old age cause an 
imbalance in the cost-benefit ratio according to which the refugee is valued. Saleh 
describes the logic of this measurement in several places throughout his narrative. He 
notices there is an assumption that a young man from one of those "other place where the 
oppressed manage to survive" (11) could possibly "work in a hospital" or "produce a 
future English cricketer" ( 49). But, someone like him is "too old for anything much 
except Social Security, assisted housing and subsidized cremation" ( 49). This, Saleh 
derides, outweighs the benefit of making the "superior moral gesture of allowing people 
from my country asylum" ( 49). 
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As Edelman continues to speak at Saleh, he moves from a disdain for his age to 
disapproval of his alleged imposition as a non-European. The immigration officer 
declares, 
My parents were refugees, from Romania[ ... ] I know about the hardships ofbeing 
alien and poor, because that is what they went through when they came here, and 
I know about the rewards. But my parents are European, they have a right, they're 
part of the family[ ... ] People like you come pouring in here without any thought 
of the damage they cause. You don't belong here, you don't value any of the 
things we value, you haven't paid for them through generations (12). 
The rights-bearing person that served as a model for the drafters of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) was European as were the first wave of refugees 
after World War II. Since decolonization the identity of the refugee has changed to more 
often include individuals from 'developing' countries. Edelman objects to the new 
diaspora, alleging that they are not "part of the family" (12) and "don't value any of the 
things we value" (12). In Edelman's estimation the 'universal' values of the UDHR do 
not extend to people who are not of European descent. He justifies this by suggesting that 
Europeans have "paid for" these values "through generations" (12). Furthermore, he 
alleges that African refugees like Saleh are a detriment to European societies, as if the 
refugee infects an otherwise perfectly healthy state with social and economic ills that 
originate in his or her home country. 
This suggestion that the crisis of the refugee is a product of an isolated state's 
failure to live up to European values ignores the injustices of slavery, colonialism, and 
inequitable postcolonial development policies. Speaking to the reader, Saleh counters 
Edelman's claims by objecting, "But the whole world had paid for Europe's values 
already, even if a lot of the time it just paid and paid and didn't get to enjoy them" (12). 
Saleh reminds that Europe has defined its values -its standards and ideals - by 
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subordinating others' beliefs and principles, and it has established its own value- its 
worth and its wealth - by exploiting resources and labor in the rest of the world. Further 
elaborating on the hypocrisy of Edelman's assertions Saleh scoffs, "Kevin Edelman, the 
bawab of Europe, and the gatekeeper to the orchards in the family courtyard, the same 
gate which had released the hordes that went out to consume the world and to which we 
have come sliming to beg admittance. Refugee. Asylum-seeker. Mercy" (31). In his 
judgment of the new diaspora, Edelman does not acknowledge its connections to the old 
diaspora - that of Europeans as well as displaced Africans and others throughout the 
world who were put into the service of Europeans. When Europe "released the hordes 
that went out to consume the world" (31 ), it did so at the expense of pre-colonial peoples, 
cultures, and societal structures. Now having finally gained independence from Europe, 
many new nations are still reeling from the effects of such ruptures and are further 
disadvantaged by inequitable development policies and the overpowering influence of 
transnational capital. Caught up in the corruption of a hierarchical nation-state system 
that is increasingly ruled by transnational capital, the people in 'developing' nations now 
seek "Mercy" from those who continue to benefit from their subordination (albeit now at 
the hands of their own governments). In turn, the powerful nations from whom they seek 
asylum too often react as Edelman does by recasting the refugee as the source of any 
domestic problems that the all-too 'benevolent' host country faces as a 'responsible' 
member of an international community blighted by states that threaten 'Western' values, 
such as democracy. 
Edelman's speech represents but one story in an intricate set of cultural narratives 
circulating about refugees. In addition to critiquing the logic to which Edelman 
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subscribes, By the Sea parodies multiple other stories in this canon. After making it past 
the immigration officer, Saleh is moved to a detention center and assigned a caseworker 
named Rachel Howard. Rachel is able to get him released and moves him into a bed and 
breakfast operated by a woman named Celia whose guests are all refugees. Saleh 
describes one of them as "a picture of abjection and humbled dignity, a tragic body 
whose life depended on sustaining the enthusiasm of people who were debating its 
outcome" (51). Celia is one of these people who happen to have been born into British 
citizenship and therefore enjoy the privilege of debating the outcome of others' lives. 
Like Edelman, she talks at Saleh and the other refugees under her watch with little regard 
as to their points of view, and their silence seems to encourage her incessant chatter. 
Taking no notice to whom she is speaking, she comments to them, "Now foreigners are 
everywhere, with all these terrible things happening in their countries. It didn't used to be 
like this. I don't know the rights and wrongs of it, but we can't just tum them away, can 
we? We can't just say go back to your horrible country and get hurt, we're too busy with 
our own lives. If we can help them, I think we should. Be tolerant" (55). Similar to 
Edelman, Celia considers the source of the refugee's troubles to be solely the result of 
some other, inherently "horrible country" (55). She separates her own life from the lives 
of those whose subordination grants her relative privilege, but unlike Edelman she 
regards charity as the appropriate response. Though she is by her own admission 
uninformed about the political crises that cause people to seek asylum, she feels it is her 
duty to contribute to political debates on their behalf. She promotes tolerance, which in 
actuality upholds her own humanity and marks others' differences as signs of an inherent 
inferiority that requires protection. 106 
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Saleh's caseworker Rachel projects yet another story onto him. After scooping 
him up as part of her case load, she gets him transferred from the detention center to the 
bed and breakfast that Celia operates and then finally to a small flat of his own. As Saleh 
remembers meeting Rachel at the detention center he notes, "I saw then that she had not 
really seen me, that the crafty look was turned inwards on the ways and means at her 
disposal" ( 46). At the start, Rachel views Saleh as a case to be solved and is preoccupied 
with ushering him through the system. This job offers her a sense of pride, and Saleh 
recognizes that in the beginning he is for her "the prized refugee" that she has "rescued 
from the jaws of the state" (63). Once he is at Celia's, he worries that Rachel may leave 
him stranded there. He thinks of her and one of her colleagues, sneering, "Those two 
young champions of justice and human rights had delivered me to a zoo and then gone to 
see their friends and colleagues to boast about how many ministers they had outwitted to 
get an old man out of the nasty detention centre and the fascist clutches of the state" (59). 
At first it seems that it does not matter to Rachel who Saleh really is aside from whatever 
details may help her to rescue him and prove herself a "champion of justice and human 
rights" (59). Through Saleh's cynical view of her, the novel critiques the way in which a 
bureaucratic system effaces individuals in its attempts to make a case for them as 
refugees. It suggests that this process sustains inequitable power relations by positioning 
those like Saleh as perpetual victims and others like Rachel as triumphant saviors. 
Yet, as the novel further develops Rachel's character it becomes clear not only 
that she is more complex than Saleh first perceives but also that the refugee system is 
more futile than he understands. Saleh has not yet realized that Rachel cares a great deal 
about securing him asylum, not simply for her own sense of achievement but because she 
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actually cares about his well-being. When he exposes his secret knowledge of English 
with a fair amount of "glee" (64), he does not understand that her initial anger stems from 
a grave concern for him. He points out, 
She did not have to listen in silence while stories were told about her, only ring a 
couple of organizations to see if they had an interpreter for a client who spoke a 
language she could not name and was too ignorant of the cultural geography of 
the world to make a guess. It was not even ignorance, but an assurance that in the 
scheme of things it did not matter very much what language I spoke, since my 
needs and desires could be predicted, and sooner or later I would learn to make 
myself intelligible. Or sooner or later she would fmd an expert who would make 
me intelligible ( 66). 
From Saleh's point of view, Rachel was after all merely inconvenienced by his silence 
while he was subjected to person after person casting him in one demeaning story after 
another. As the helpless refugee, his "needs and desires could be predicted" (66), because 
others simply dictated what they were, and he was not "intelligible" ( 66) due to his own 
apparent deficiency rather than a lack of understanding on the part of anyone else. 
Certainly these critiques are valid, and in fact Rachel has sought an "expert in [his] area" 
(66) to act as an interpreter- presumably to make some sense of him as if he is a relic to 
be explained. Over time though, Rachel does make a continued effort to get to know him 
as a person. Perhaps it does make her feel good about herself that she is able to overcome 
bureaucratic obstacles in order to locate resources and find a safe space for him to live, 
but she really is doing something worth feeling good about. She turns out to be his most 
practical ally, and she actually delivers what the refugee system promises. Yet, it is in 
offering the most perfect model of what asylum can provide, that Rachel reveals the limit 
point of the refugee system. 
Granting the refugee asylum only offers temporary relief on a case-by-case basis; 
it does not resolve the systemic crises that prompt the new diaspora. Furthermore, 
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achieving asylum requires the refugee to fit him or herself into a master narrative that 
disconnects personal suffering from historical and contemporary imperialism. Saleh does 
not provide his history to the authorities because it does not fit the story required of the 
refugee, and telling them this story will not resolve his problems or provide him 
absolution. He allows others to fit him into the stories they want to tell of him so that he 
is able to escape a personal feud that has been exacerbated by discrimination from 
European banks and corruption within colonial and postcolonial governments. 
While By the Sea parodies the refugee stories within which Saleh is cast, it also 
demonstrates that beneath all of the cultural narratives about the refugee, there are unique 
individuals whose lives are marked by convoluted dramas and connected to long political 
histories. In-between the chatter of those figures the text presents to satirize and critique 
the stories that circulate about the refugee, By the Sea reveals the complicated, sometimes 
distasteful, history that led Saleh to seek asylum. This history festers beneath many layers 
of narrative until it erupts when Saleh meets the man who Rachel calls an "expert in your 
area" (66). The scholar ofliterature that she has located at the University of London is 
LatifMahmud, who is really Ismael, Rajah Shaaban Mahmud's younger son. It is ironic 
that Rachel means for Latif to be an interpreter so that she can access a story about Saleh 
as a victim and secure him asylum, because for years Latif has considered Saleh to be the 
man who destroyed his family. Saleh complicates the boundaries of victimhood, and 
Latif, as it turns out, is no expert in what happened to Saleh. 
Saleh and Latif share an unfortunate past, but they have contradictory ideas about 
the events in it. Latif knows only bits and pieces about what happened between Saleh and 
his family, and he is troubled by "tyrant events" (86) from a past that he does not 
185 
understand. Any expertise he may have as an intellectual fails to produce a reliable 
explanation, and he is haunted by the gaps and inconsistencies in his own story. When 
Saleh seeks Latif out to be his "shriver" (145), he suggests that he is not necessarily the 
"assassin" ( 101) that Latif thinks he has been. What is more, the details that Latif shares 
in return cause Saleh to question the reliability of his own memory. The exchange 
between these characters allows for a dialogue that undermines assumptions about the 
refugee and reveals the complexities of the new diaspora. The resulting accumulation of 
memories and conjecture offer the reader an unwieldy account of a troubling family 
drama, political conspiracy, and desperate immigration. Within this framework, the one-
dimensional categories of victim, persecutor, and savior become irrelevant. Furthermore, 
the reader is prompted to question how the language of human rights has been 
incorporated into a master narrative that scapegoats the new diaspora for the crises of a 
contemporary global hierarchy. 
Like Gurnah' s By the Sea, Danticat' s The Dew Breaker also presents intersecting 
narrative voices that undermine both themselves and one another. To an even greater 
extent than Gurnah' s novel, The Dew Breaker problematizes the human-inhuman binary 
between victim and perpetrator. Such a binary treats characters as foils by casting one as 
an inhuman architect of pure evil in order to celebrate the other as a fully developed 
human subject deserving of rights. Danticat' s novel undermines this binary by requiring 
the reader to negotiate the perspectives of a myriad of characters affected by state-
sponsored torture in Haiti. The text includes nine vignettes that portray various 
perspectives of political killings and torture under the Duvalier regimes in Haiti. 107 It tells 
loosely intertwined stories about people who have fled from Haiti to the US, but it does 
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not characterize these individuals as victims or suggest that the US offers them escape 
from the violence of their persecutors. On the contrary, the narratives that make up the 
novel depict capable individuals who have attempted to extricate themselves from 
dangerous conditions. In the US however, they find themselves continually bound to an 
unresolved political history and sometimes even interfacing with the very people from 
whom they were trying to separate themselves. 
The novel opens with Ka Bienaime, a first-generation Haitian American woman, 
discovering that her father- who she had always thought escaped to New York after 
being imprisoned in Haiti - was actually a prison guard and a member of Fran <yo is "Papa 
Doc" Duvalier's Tonton Macoutes. Members of this militia were referred to in Creole as 
dew breakers - a term that became synonymous with torturer - because they often 
disrupted the dew during early morning raids in which they either killed or captured their 
targets. Ka's father was such a figure before he immigrated to New York with her mother 
Anne. He remains unnamed throughout the text, but it gradually becomes clear that 
several of the characters in the various vignettes are either related to someone he killed or 
were themselves tortured by him or one of his fellow Macoutes. Together, the vignettes 
not only illustrate the heterogeneity of the Haitian immigrant community in the US and 
the porous borders of the nation, but they also undermine the legitimacy and political 
efficacy of categorizing people as either victims, perpetrators, or saviors. 
By introducing the figure of the dew breaker from the perspective of his 
unsuspecting daughter Ka and then disclosing his past as she herself finds out about it, 
the novel challenges the reader's expectations for its characters. Before Ka finds out the 
truth about her father's past, she is in the process of selling the image that she has 
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carefully crafted of him in the form of a sculpture. In this "three-foot mahogany figure" 
her father is "naked, kneeling on a half-foot-square base, his back arched like the curve of 
a crescent moo~, his downcast eyes fixed on his very long fingers and the large palms of 
his hands" (6). This is, Ka explains, "the way I had imagined him in prison" (6). Both as 
his daughter and as an artist, Ka is emotionally invested in this image of her father as a 
dignified victim. But as it turns out, there are cracks in this figure. Ka recalls, "I'd 
thought these cracks beautiful[ ... ] as they seemed like the wood's own scars, like the one 
my father had on his face. But I was also a little worried about the cracks[ ... ] Would the 
client be satisfied?" (7). Ka not only transforms her father as heroic victim into an 
aesthetic representation but also participates in the commodification of this persona. In 
her eagerness to create an object of beauty and then to sell it, Ka is concerned about the 
cracks in the sculpture to the extent that they might hinder the marketability of her 
artwork. She does not yet understand the connection between the cracks in the figure she 
has crafted and the scar on her father's face, which is actually from a wound inflicted by 
his last prisoner. 
There is a clear parallel between Ka's artistic rendering of her father and the 
literary representation of such a figure. By staging Ka's realization about her father's past 
in the opening scenes of the text, Danticat immediately indicates that this novel will 
complicate the sort of one-dimensional representation that identifies individuals 
according to types (such as victim) and turns them into sellable objects. After Ka finds 
out her father was not a prisoner but a murderous prison guard, she re-evaluates the 
significance of the pose in which she has imagined him. She envisions him now as "a 
praying mantis, crouching motionless, seeming to pray, while actually waiting to strike" 
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(26). As it turns out, there are multiple ways to see the figure ofKa's father, and the text 
will not allow the reader to settle on one singular reading of his character. He is the 
question the novel continually poses and the enigma that propels the reader's curiosity. 
To a certain extent he motivates the reader to labor through the textual puzzle of the 
disjointed narratives and detect the many subtle connections that link this network of 
stories. Yet, the reader is ultimately prevented from reaching a definitive verdict about 
his character. The text never fully names him, and the reader's search for answers about 
the dew breaker is continually diverted by the questions that the various stories raise 
about him. 
Ka' s story of her father is one of loss and confusion; it is paradigm shifting for her 
and for the reader. When her father admits to her, "Ka, your father was the hunter, he was 
not the prey" (20), all ofthe truths she relied on to make sense of her own and her 
parents' lives are suddenly distorted. Along with Ka, who as an artist recognizes, "I have 
lost my subject, the prisoner father I loved as well as pitied" (31 ), the reader also 
experiences the loss of a lovable and pitiable subject for whom the narrative expectation 
of testimony was building. Instead of foregrounding a story of the imprisoned victim, the 
reader is immediately faced with the confession ofthe perpetrator. Furthermore, this 
confession does not signal a cathartic exchange wherein the truth leads to atonement and 
healing. This is clear as Ka, laments, "I wish I could give my father whatever he'd been 
seeking in telling me his secret. But my father, if anyone could, must have already 
understood that confessions do not lighten living hearts" (33). The purpose of this novel 
is not to provide the testimonies of heroic victims or the confessions of inhuman 
perpetrators. In fact, the novel completely undermines such essentialist categorizations, 
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and rather than portraying the dew breaker as inherently evil, the novel confronts the 
reader with his shocking humanity. Through the sympathetic character of his daughter 
who dares to think, "maybe my father was wrong in his own representation of his former 
life[ ... ] maybe his past offered more choices than being either hunter or prey" (24), the 
novel compels the reader to engage in a more complex reading of the dew breaker. 
If the dew breaker is more than "either hunter or prey" (24 ), it is because Ka and 
her mother Anne have enabled him to mask "his former life" (24). The break between his 
life as a prison guard and his afterlife as Anne's husband and Ka's father occurs when he 
meets Anne outside of Casemes prison. He has just disobeyed orders by losing control 
over and shooting a prisoner - a preacher whom the Duvalier regime wanted to subdue 
but not turn into a martyr. Fearing his own arrest and possible execution, the dew breaker 
is relieved when the gatekeeper - nicknamed Legba after the gatekeeper between worldly 
and spirit realms- allows him out of the prison gates back into the world of the living. 
When he meets Anne he has just "managed to cross the threshold alive" (230), but he is 
bleeding from a gash the preacher dug into his cheek. Meanwhile Anne has been 
frantically running toward the prison "like a large, blind animal" (231) in an effort to find 
her stepbrother - the very preacher who the dew breaker just killed. Instead Anne collides 
into the dew breaker, and they immediately speak the same word to each other at the 
same time- '"Tanpri,' Please" (231). In this moment he "remember[s] how his mother 
used to say that when you spoke the exact same words as someone else at the exact same 
time, it meant that the two of you would die on the same day. He hoped that his plea 
merging with hers wouldn't lead to her dying sooner than she was supposed to" (231 ). In 
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a way their union does bring Anne abruptly to the end of her life, and it is on this day that 
they both experience a sort of death. 
The rupture in both Anne's and the dew breaker's lives occurs when she asks this 
bloodied man "What did they do to you?" (237). In this instant the distinction between 
victim and persecutor is upended. The dew breaker recognizes, "This was the most 
forgiving question he'd ever been asked. It suddenly opened a door, produced a small 
path, which he could follow" (237). In response he declares, "I'm free[ ... ] I finally 
escaped" (237). Through Anne he sees a way to escape his life as a dew breaker, and the 
very next day they flee to the US where they each attempt a rebirth. Ka later wonders, 
"At what point did she decide that she loved him? When did she know that she was 
supposed to have despised him?" (23). Though Anne and her husband do discuss the fact 
that he was a prison guard after Ka is born, it is likely that Anne knew from the very first 
day. Perhaps she attempts to redeem her husband because she herself has sought 
redemption most of her life. When she was a young girl her baby brother drowned under 
her care during one of her epileptic seizures, and now each time she has a seizure she 
thinks of herself as returning from the dead. She is also a devout Catholic, and she 
believes the union between her husband and herself is "a miracle, be it a sad one" (240). 
She even tells Ka "you and me, we save him" (25). Together, Anne and Ka are the dew 
breaker's "good angels, his masks against his own face" (34). As the child of this 
troubled pair, Ka has inherited a grave responsibility. In fact, her father chooses the name 
Ka for his daughter, because "[a] ka is a double of the body[ ... ] the body's companion 
through life and after life. It guides the body through the kingdom ofthe dead" (17). Ka 
has allowed her father, and her mother as well, to live past death; she has given them an 
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afterlife. Thus, the dew breaker appears throughout the novel as a ghostlike specter who 
seems to have slipped into a new life. 
The novel causes an ethical dilemma for the reader by exhibiting the dew 
breaker's humanity and vulnerability through Anne and Ka as well as illustrating his 
incredible brutality toward others in the vignettes throughout the novel. It unsettles the 
reader's expectations about the refugee system by revealing that Ka's father did not 
simply flee the tyranny of Jean-Claude Duvalier under fear for his life, but was also one 
of the Macoutes who tortured and killed his fellow Haitians under the regime. This man 
not only carried out the orders of the regime, he enjoyed the power he felt in terrorizing 
others. In fact, "He was the one who came up with the most physically and 
psychologically taxing trials for the prisoners on his block" ( 197). The reader is forced to 
acknowledge the dew breaker's satisfaction as the narrative details, 
He liked questioning the prisoners, teaching them to play zo and bezik, stapling 
clothespins to their ears as they lost and removing them as he let them win, 
convincing them that their false victories would save their lives. He liked to 
paddle them with braided cowhide, stand on their cracking backs and jump up and 
down like a drunk on a trampoline, pound a rock on the protruding bone behind 
their earlobes until they couldn't hear the orders he was shouting at them, tie 
blocks of concrete to the end of sisal ropes and balance them off their testicles if 
they were men or their breasts if they were women (198). 
He revels in the power he experiences in manipulating the prisoners, and he engages in 
torture as a sport. The reader is left to reconcile his horrific actions as a prison guard in 
Haiti with his peaceful life of domesticity in the US. Ultimately, it becomes clear that 
while the dew breaker's life in the US masks the crimes he committed, it does not erase 
or resolve them. Though he moves to a new space and attempts to inhabit a new life, his 
crimes follow him. Not only is Ka's mother the stepsister of his last prisoner who left him 
forever marked by the scar on his face, but also many others in the immigrant 
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community, in which he lives and works as a barber, carry with them memories of the 
violence to which he and his fellow Macoutes subjected them. 
The close proximity in New York between the dew breaker and those he 
terrorized is disconcerting, especially from the perspective of those who fled Haiti to 
distance themselves from the Macoutes. This is the case with Dany, one of the three men 
who live in the basement apartment below Ka' s parents. Though Ka' s father does not 
remember Dany, in Haiti he murdered Dany's parents. When Dany was a boy, the dew 
breaker set fire to Dany' s home and shot his parents as they emerged from the flames. 
Dany escaped the fire, which also blinded his aunt Estina who raised him after his 
parents' death. When he was old enough he left Haiti at his aunt Estina's urging- "she'd 
insisted that he go so he would be as far away as possible from the people who'd 
murdered his parents" (115). Yet, in the US he ends up literally living under the man who 
murdered them. Like Dany, many of the text's characters experienced profound death in 
Haiti and came to the US in pursuit of a new life. However, they are unable to find refuge 
simply by seeking rights in a new space because this does not actually address the crimes 
that caused them to leave. 
Even when Dany finds himself in a position in which he might punish the dew 
breaker, he is powerless to stand up to this man. Finding his landlord asleep one night, 
Dany imagines choking him or at least waking him up "to ask him 'Why?"' (1 07). 
However, 
Looking down at the barber's face, which had shrunk so much over the years, he 
lost the desire to kill. It wasn't that he was afraid, for he was momentarily feeling 
bold, fearless. It wasn't pity, either. He was too angry to feel pity. It was 
something else, something less measurable. It was the dread of being wrong, of 
harming the wrong man, of making the wrong woman a widow and the wrong 
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child an orphan. It was the realization that he would never know why - why one 
single person had been given the power to destroy his entire life (1 07). 
Dany feels the dread of being wrong about this man, for the person he sees is Anne's 
husband and Ka's father. Though Dany recognizes physical traces of the dew breaker 
who murdered his parents, he experiences doubt that the husband and father before him is 
a murderer. What is more, he realizes that killing the dew breaker or even waking him up 
to interrogate him will not provide him with a sufficient explanation as to how one person 
could exert such power over another. This scene illustrates the fact that justice is not 
delivered through revenge or through confession alone. Justice for Dany would mean 
attending to the systemic problems that enable one person to exert complete power over 
another person's entire life. 
Many of the characters in The Dew Breaker fled Haiti because of fundamental 
inequalities that allowed some to dominate others. Yet, these inequalities persist, and the 
new lives the characters seek are impaired in the US by unresolved conflicts and new 
eruptions of violence. The text contains multiple references to racial profiling and police 
violence against the Haitian immigrant community in the US, indicating the occurrence 
of human rights abuses within the nation of 'refuge.' Eric, one of the other men living in 
the Bienaime' s basement apartment recalls how they used to go dancing at the Rendez 
Vouz until "a Haitian man named Abner Louima was arrested there then beaten and 
sodomized at a nearby police station" (3 8). 108 And, in the first days after Eric's wife 
finally arrives in New York from Haiti after being separated from her husband for seven 
years, she is petrified as she listens to a story on the radio about "a Haitian American man 
named Patrick Dorismond who'd been killed. He had been shot by a policeman in a place 
called Manhattan" ( 45). 109 Danticat' s incorporation of these real crimes into the novel 
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draws on the public outrage surrounding these events and undermines the image of the 
US as a safe haven for Haitian refugees. Within Danticat's fictional narrative, Eric's 
newly arrived immigrant wife follows news reports about Dorismond, and chants along 
with the voices from her radio, "No justice, no peace" as she is "stewing chicken and 
frying fish" ( 4 7). Meanwhile, unbeknownst to her, the basement apartment in which she 
is cooking is rented from a former dew breaker who murdered the parents of one of the 
men with whom her husband has been living. Putting all of these details together, the 
reader is able to recognize the text's many-layered critique of the human rights regime 
and US exceptionalism. 
The text shows that three decades after Ka' s father and his fellow Macoutes 
terrorized the Haitian population, causing many to take flight, violence against the 
Haitian population continues. What is more, in the US the diasporic community continues 
to include both those who took part in various waves of violence and those who were 
subjected to it. For instance, at a Christmas Eve midnight mass with her parents, Ka 
believes she sees Emmanuel Constant, the Haitian leader of a death squad and former 
CIA operative, amongst the congregation.11° For Anne, Constant is a reminder ofher 
husband's offenses, and the flyers in their neighborhood that advertise Constant's crimes 
intensify her fear that her husband will be taken away from her. The text explains, 
They'd never spoken about the flyer, even when, bleached by the sun and 
wrinkled by the cold, it slowly began to fade. After a while, the letters and 
numbers started disappearing so that the word rape became ape and the 5 
vanished from 5,000, leaving a trio of zeros as the number of Constant's 
casualties. The demonic-looking horns that passersby had added to Constant's 
head and the Creole curses they'd scribbled on the flyer were nearly gone too, 
turning it into a fragmented collage with as many additions as erasures (79). 
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Like Ka's father, Constant has been able to evade justice in Haiti by going to the US. The 
text also explains that Constant was "tried in absentia in a Haitian court and sentenced to 
life in prison, a sentence he would probably never serve" (79). Furthermore, a community 
group, not the US government, has posted the flyer. And, already, the image of Constant 
as a rapist and murderer has "slowly beg[un] to fade" (79). As a result the word "rape 
became ape" (79) - a seemingly comical difference that transforms a serious crime 
against individual women into a racist dehumanization of all Haitian men in the US. The 
"trio of zeros" (79) that stand in for Constant's casualties emphasize the erasure of each 
of these individuals in a death that has not only taken their lives but has also been 
allowed to annihilate evidence of their existence as their murders have gone unpunished. 
Even the horns and Creole curses are beginning to recede into the layers of signification, 
turning this palimpsest into a "fragmented collage with as many additions as erasures" 
(79). The flyer is like the fragmented text whose disjointed vignettes crisscross to form an 
unruly amalgamation of diverse, sometimes contradictory, reflections. This messy 
layering of narratives resists a consistent, uncomplicated viewpoint and requires a 
different way of reading. 
The Dew Breaker's fragmented narrative style compels the reader to do the work 
of identifying connections, detecting gaps, and interpreting silences in order to see 
beyond the facades that mask systemic political problems. Moreover, the text deters the 
reader from relying on rigid juridical categories (victim, persecutor, and savior) to make 
sense of the deep-rooted political issues that it illustrates. The reader is continually made 
to inhabit the various positions of characters who undermine the easy categories the 
reader relies upon in order to cast judgment and exert moral authority. This is the case 
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with Claude, a Haitian teenager who has been "expatriated twice, from both his native 
country and his adopted land" (100). Having immigrated to New York with his parents as 
a child, Claude became addicted to drugs there, and at fourteen shot and killed his father 
when he took his drugs away. After being released from juvenile detention in New York 
and then from an overcrowded prison in Port-au-Prince, he came to Beau Jour where his 
mother's family took him in. Now he finds himself being rehabilitated within the familial 
structure from which he had been previously detached. He muses, "It's like a puzzle, a 
weird-ass kind of puzzle, man[ ... ] I'm the puzzle and these people are putting me back 
together, telling me things about myself and my family that I never knew or gave a fuck 
about" (1 02). This diasporic figure, now twice-exiled, has returned to origins he did not 
even know about, and here, despite a grave crime, he has found peace. 
Like Ka's father, Claude poses an ethical dilemma for the reader. Both are "like a 
puzzle" ( 1 02) - Claude to himself and the dew breaker to the reader. At the same time, 
the novel's depictions of these two characters undermine an uncomplicated reading of 
either one. Claude realizes, "I've done something really bad that makes me want to live 
my life like a fucking angel now" ( 119), and so he "speak[ s] his nightmares to himself as 
well as others" (120). In contrast, the dew breaker relies on "his kas, his good angels" to 
be "his masks against his own face" (34). Furthermore, even when he explains to Ka that 
the "nightmares [he was] always having" were about what he "did to others" (23), he 
understands that "confessions do not lighten living hearts" (33). It is possible to put a 
person back together, but this does not necessarily make them whole or lessen their guilt. 
Furthermore there is a distinction made here between Claude's family "putting [him] 
back together" (1 02) and an anonymous global reader assembling the various narrative 
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details about the dew breaker into a consistent identity. The text ensures that the latter is 
simply not possible. For the reader, Ka's father remains like those statues that he brings 
Ka to museums to see as a child - he is forever missing parts, and the reader does not 
have the capacity to make him whole. 
The Dew Breaker asks the reader to accept that it is not possible to rescue its 
characters by making them whole, and to consider that the purpose of literature perhaps 
lies elsewhere. Rather than try to fix the characters by fitting them into pre-given 
categories, the reader might instead set out to learn from their incomplete forms. 
Danticat's portrayal ofthese heterogeneous characters, both as individuals and as part of 
the new diaspora, does not allow the reader to take on moral superiority by judging the 
characters or acting as a witness within a purportedly cathartic literary exchange. Instead 
it compels the reader to detect the deep-rooted political inequalities of which the new 
diaspora is a symptom. 
Together, The Dew Breaker and By the Sea expose the problems with narrating 
and reading the new diaspora through a human rights framework that masks historical 
and contemporary imperialism. By the Sea demonstrates how cultural narratives about the 
refugee deploy the language of human rights to cast the postcolonial state as persecutor, 
the refugee as victim, and the host country as savior. It exposes the stories that are 
projected onto the refugee as extensions of the master narrative that supported slavery 
and colonialism. Furthermore, it challenges the assumption that crises in the postcolony 
are exceptions in an otherwise functional nation-state system. While By the Sea 
challenges claims of European benevolence in the face of 'failed' postcolonial states, The 
Dew Breaker undermines assertions of US exceptionalism. The latter novel shows that 
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attempts to simply reincorporate the new diaspora into the nation-state system compound 
injustice and mask the systemic problems that continue to haunt the refugee. What is 
more, both novels not only present multiple narrative perspectives and possible truths, but 
they also destabilize the boundaries of victimhood, undermining any authority the reader 
might have assumed in redeeming a subaltern 'victim' through a humanitarian textual 
exchange between a narrator-testifier and reader-witness. In place of this testimonial 
structure, these novels offer many-layered stories that require readers to both sharpen 
their critical senses and confront undesirable and contradictory truths. 
By the Sea and The Dew Breaker transform the conversation about injustice from 
a testimonial narrative that reinforces the rigid classification of individuals and states as 
either persecutors, victims, or saviors to an unguarded discussion that includes the unique 
points of view of multiple speakers and an unknown global reader. In this way they not 
only challenge the dominant discourse of human rights, but they also test contemporary 
literature's capacity to engage in political critique. Rather than extending the juridical 
into a literary space, these novels expose how storytelling defines the juridical. As they 
expose the structural inequalities that the language of human rights masks, they 
demonstrate how narrative analysis may serve a political function. Ultimately, By the Sea 
and The Dew Breaker prove that literature offers unique opportunities to analyze the 
narratives that structure concepts of justice. 
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CONCLUSION 
This dissertation has examined how political violence in Africa, the Caribbean, and the 
India subcontinent is narrated and read in contemporary Anglophone literature. It has 
shown how the literary incarnation of narrator as testifier and reader as witness generates 
unequal subjects, and it has interrogated literary testimony for its attempts to unite these 
subjects in the image of a 'universal' human that undermines the humanity ofthe 
subaltern. As literary humanitarianism projects a 'universal' human subject that is in 
actuality a national citizen-subject, it exhibits the ethical tum that occurs in literature and 
politics when the nation-based system to guarantee rights reaches its limits. I have argued 
that the resulting proliferation of human rights discourse fetishizes suffering and 
dislocates it from histories of colonialism, inequitable development policies, and the 
growth of transnational capital. 
Rather than approaching literature as a way to extend the juridical, I have 
demonstrated how literature may encourage critical analysis of the inequitable cultural 
narratives and limiting discursive frameworks that define the juridical. The political 
potential of literature in the postcolony is not in staging humanitarian resolutions but in 
interrogating the frameworks that sustain imperialism. I have engaged a posthumanist 
mode of reading in order to critique the way that the discourse of human rights reinforces 
a false universal that masks global inequalities and to ask how political violence and 
economic and cultural imperialism might otherwise be represented. I have found that 
transnational capital undermines the rights that universal humanism and national 
citizenship promise to deliver in the postcolony. Furthermore, it is not just post-
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independence states that serve transnational capital; this is a systemic problem on a 
global scale. Human life is structured by inequitable socioeconomic and political 
realities. Literature is in a unique position to challenge the cultural narratives and 
discursive frameworks that sustain global inequalities. It may expose, interrogate, and 
rethink the logic that enables injustice, and it may imagine innovative ways of engaging 
in political activism by remaining open to unknown narrative possibilities. 
Literature offers a space within which to examine the narratives that orient the 
human in the world, and it offers a way to intervene in those narratives by facilitating 
critical conversations. The relationship between narrator and reader sets the parameters 
for such conversations. When this dialectic is structured by a testimonial narrative and 
restricted within the discursive framework of human rights, it forecloses critical 
possibilities by fetishizing suffering and depoliticizing socioeconomic crises. Analyzing 
the narrative mechanics of literary humanitarianism reveals how human rights discourse 
operates not only in literature but also as part of a broader network of cultural narratives 
that sustain global inequalities. For instance, this project touches on the connection 
between literary humanitarianism and contemporary forms of journalism in its analysis of 
Philip Gourevitch's and Antjie Krog's texts. Contemporary representations of political 
violence increasingly share a common testimonial narrative structure across mediums 
ranging from literary fiction to international news reports. It is crucial to recognize how 
the increased circulation of human rights discourse in such forms of representation 
together shape the way the English speaking public understands political and economic 
crises. 
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This dissertation began with the words of a refugee whose story of survival as "a 
helpless human" (Eggers xiii) exemplifies the way that literary humanitarianism - and the 
human rights framework more broadly- reinforces a global hierarchy. Eggers' novel 
What Is the What: The Autobiography of Valentino Achak Deng relies on a humanitarian 
reader not only to witness the suffering of this "helpless human" (xiii) but also to 
accompany him on his harrowing journey and celebrate his ultimate triumph when help 
finally arrives. After analyzing the power dynamics of such a testifier-witness dialectic 
and examining alternative narrative strategies, this dissertation closes with a chapter that 
discusses the story of a refugee who acknowledges that he "no longer know[ s] who is 
listening" (Gurnah 16, 30). In contrast to the literary ,humanitarian model, this method of 
telling a story without knowing who is listening allows for variable and innovative ways 
of reading. It also recognizes that literature itself circulates to unknown readers along 
channels carved out by transnational capital. Every reader that contemporary literary 
narratives reach is implicated in a global market that is currently redefining the national-
international order. While literary humanitarianism seeks to unite this readership 
according to the false ideal of 'universal' humanism that renders some "helpless" (Eggers 
xiii), this dissertation has argued that literature may also facilitate critical analysis of 
structural inequalities and imagine new possibilities for the human. 
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NOTES 
1 The human rights regime relies on a distinction between human and inhuman that marks 
certain forms of violence as exceptions by constructing them as 'inhuman.' 
2 I borrow the phrase "literary humanitarianism" from Joseph Slaughter who uses it to 
describe Third World Bildungsromane that stage humanitarian interventions (314). I 
expand his definition beyond a discussion of the Bildungsroman and use this term to refer 
to literature that seeks to extend the scope ofthejuridical and the influence ofhuman 
rights projects by way of a relationship between text and reader that treats literature as 
testimony. 
3 On trauma theory see Shoshana Felman and Dori Laub (57-8, 70-74, 114). For more on 
the relationship between trauma theory and literature see also Dominick LaCapra's 
History, Theory, Trauma: Representing the Holocaust; Cathy Caruth's Unclaimed 
Experience: Trauma, Narrative, and History and Writing History, Writing Trauma; 
Laurie Vickroy's Trauma and Survival in Contemporary Fiction; and Anne Whitehead's 
Trauma Fiction. 
4 As Inderpal Grewal suggests, the problems faced by 'underdeveloped' nations that 
cannot be resolved through accumulation of capital are resignified as human rights issues 
rather than political or socioeconomic matters (132). 
5 Spivak calls attention to a particular "extra-state collective action" that emerged in the 
late twentieth-century, and she names "The World Trade Organization [as] its economic 
arm; the United Nations, the political, and the UDHR, the juridico-legal" (Butler and 
Spivak 83). 
6 For a review of the issues around which debates over human rights have been organized 
see Ian Balfour and Eduardo Cadava (280, 283, and 288-9). 
7 See Agamben (82, 84). 
8 For a historical discussion of the emergence of human rights as a new form of idealism 
that has emerged since the late 1970s, see Moyn (119, 173). 
9 For more on this transnational privileged class see Spivak's "Righting Wrongs" (171). 
1° Cary Wolfe makes a similarly useful distinction about posthumanist criticism. He 
writes, "the point is not to reject humanism tout court- indeed, there are many values 
and aspirations to admire in humanism - but rather to show how those aspirations are 
undercut by the philosophical and ethical frameworks used to conceptualize them" (xvi). 
11 Hannah Arendt recalls, "We became aware of the existence of a right to have rights 
(and that means to live in a framework where one is judged by one's actions and 
opinions) and a right to belong to some kind of organized community, only when 
millions of people emerged who had lost and could not regain these rights because of the 
new global political situation" (294). I use Arendt's term "right to have rights" (294) to 
refer to the right bestowed upon the 'fully developed' human person recognized as a 
rights-bearing subject. In this way I acknowledge that one must occupy a particular 
subject position to appeal for rights. 
12 The humanist idea of the subject as agent overlooks Louis Althusser's argument that 
"the individual is interpellated as a (free) subject in order that he shall submit freely to the 
commandments of the Subject, i.e. in order that he shall (freely) accept his subjection; i.e. 
in order that he shall make the gestures and actions of his subjection 'all by himself" 
(182). 
13 For more on this line of criticism see Marais's "From the Standpoint" (229). 
203 
14 See Marais's "From the Standpoint" (229) for a review of scholarship that argues 
Coetzee's fiction does address apartheid. 
15 A now classic work heralded as an exemplar of the life narrative genre is I, Rigoberta 
Menchu: An Indian Woman in Guatemala co-authored by Rigoberta Menchu and 
Elisabeth Burgos-Debray. More recently, Dave Egger's What is the What: The 
Autobiography of Valentino Achak Deng continues the practice of presenting a life 
narrative as part of a humanitarian effort. 
16 Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths, and Helen Tiffin discuss writing back as "the rereading 
and the rewriting of the European historical and fictional record" ( 196). 
17 For example, Jean Rhys's Wide Sargasso Sea (1966) and Aime Cesaire's Une Tempete 
( 1969) are two foundational texts that establish the practice of writing back. 
18 See Salman Rushdie's "The Empire Writes Back with a Vengeance" and Ashcroft, 
Griffiths, and Tiffin's The Empire Writes Back. 
19 Badiou observes, the "return to the old doctrine of natural rights of man is obviously 
linked to the collapse of revolutionary Marxism, and of all the forms of progressive 
engagement that it inspired" ( 4). He charges, "Rather than seek out the terms of a new 
politics of collective liberation they [intellectuals and the public] have, in sum, adopted as 
their own the principle of the established 'Western' order" (5). 
20 While Arendt challenges natural rights by revealing the subject's "right to have rights" 
is tied to the state (297-8), Badiou exposes the subject with the "right to have rights" as a 
construct. 
21 Badiou points out, "Evil is always that which, in a particular situation, tends to weaken 
or destroy a subject[ ... ] It is the subject who prescribes what Evil is, not a natural idea of 
Evil that defines what a 'moral' subject is" (Christoph Cox, Molly Whalen, and Alain 
Badiou). 
22 Coetzee's Foe changes the spelling of Crusoe to Cruso. 
23 Daniel Defoe was born Daniel Foe. The novel Foe uses his original name. 
24 Slaughter details the way Robinson Crusoe forms the "novelistic subtext of Article 29" 
of the UDHR and "underwrites the law" (54), which reads in its first part: "Everyone has 
duties to the community in which alone the free and full development of his personality is 
~ossible" (UDHR). 
5 As Slaughter recalls, "In the UN committee's reading of Defoe's novel, books and 
other instruments of culture supplied Crusoe with an archival substitute for society, an 
alternative literary means for developing his human personality" (53). For a discussion of 
the UDHR drafters' debate about Crusoe's development see Slaughter (48). 
26 For further analysis of the conception ofthe human person in the UDHR see Slaughter 
(61-2). 
27 According to Arendt, "The paradox involved in the loss of human rights is that such 
loss coincides with the instant when a person becomes a human being in general -
without a profession, without a citizenship, without an opinion, without a deed by which 
to identify and specify himself- and different in general, representing nothing but his 
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own absolutely unique individuality which, deprived of expression within and action 
uron a common world, loses its significance" (297-8). 
2 For his commentary on the UDHR drafters' inattention to Friday, see Slaughter (53). 
29 For his articulation of the connection between human rights law, the bildungsroman, 
and the development of the human personality, see Slaughter ( 4 ). 
30 Spivak recommends "seeking to speak to (rather than listen to or speak for) the 
historically muted subject ofthe subaltern woman" ("Can the Subaltern Speak?" 295). 
31 Of course, those rendered subaltern by histories of colonialism and contemporary 
imperialism are not the only subjects without the right to have rights, and rights 
violations do not always bear a connection to colonialism or imperialism. This is, 
however, my focus. 
32 I borrow the phrase "literary humanitarianism" from Slaughter who uses it to describe 
Third World Bildungsromane that stage humanitarian interventions (314). 
33 Spivak's point here echoes Badiou's description of the split subject: "On the side of the 
victims, the haggard animal exposed on television screens. On the side of the benefactors, 
conscience and the imperative to intervene" (Badiou 12-13). 
34 Desmond Tutu describes ubuntu as "a central feature of the African 
We/tsanschauung[ ... ] It speaks of the very essence of being human[ ... ] It is to say, 'My 
humanity is caught up, is inextricably bound up, in yours.' We belong in a bundle of life. 
We say, 'A person is a person through other persons.' [ ... ] I am human because I belong. 
I participate, I share.' A person with ubuntu is open and available to others[ ... ] for he or 
she has a proper self-assurance that comes from knowing that he or she belongs in a 
greater whole and is diminished when others are humiliated or diminished" (31 ). 
35 Because the TRC offered amnesty to perpetrators who testified, it is criticized for 
failing to punish those who committed human rights violations. While the TRC's 
protection of rights is questionable, it is still the case that the language of human rights 
pervaded the TRC hearings. 
36 Choosing a traditionally Jewish name for Disgrace's main character, Coetzee alludes 
to the lineage of human rights. Contemporary human rights law was adopted following 
the holocaust in a post-World War II environment in which displaced persons, many of 
whom were Jews, found themselves without "the right to have rights" (Arendt 294). 
37 Analyzing Susan and Lucy (as well as Melanie, the student who brings charges against 
David) also reveals Coetzee's unfavorable representation of women and feminist 
perspectives. Both Foe and Disgrace depict friction between women's rights and the 
rights of a racialized group. In a sense, this challenges the logic of rights by showing that 
it puts different groups in contention, but at times Coetzee's work inhibits women's 
empowerment. For more on Coetzee's representation of women and feminism see 
Spivak's A Critique (174-97); Pamela Cooper's "Metamorphosis and Sexuality;" and 
Lucy Valerie Graham's "Reading the Unspeakable." 
38 Critics generally acknowledge the likeness between Disgrace's university hearings and 
the TRC hearings. See Sue Kossew (159) and Isidore Diala (57). 
39 The fact that Lucy only challenges her rapists in her confrontation with David locates 
sexual violation in a white man. It also depicts a white woman refusing to make a claim 
for her own violation by two black men. This speaks to the friction in the text between 
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the rights of gendered and raced groups and evidences Coetzee's unsettling depiction of 
feminist voices. 
40 See Coetzee's Foe (32, 55, 80-1) for instances in which Friday is compared to a dog. 
41 Likewise, the novel also never explicitly says David rapes Melanie, and it provides 
conflicting hints in either direction. David, who is not a reliable source, denies it in his 
description, "Not rape, not quite that" (Coetzee, Disgrace 25) but admits that for Melanie 
it is clearly "undesired to the core" (25), and the presence of the Women Against Rape 
pamphlet (43) indicates other information may be circulating to which the reader is not 
privy. This ambiguous representation of rape is troubling because, to some extent, it 
discounts the very valuable and necessary attempts by feminists to identify and prosecute 
rape. 
42 In addition, Lucy insists on carrying her pregnancy to term and raising the child, but 
Disgrace abstains from framing her choice within a right to life argument. This can be 
read as resistance to human rights logic, which elicits a problematic mathematics of rights 
that debates a woman's right to choose against a fetus's right to life. Whereas, Susan 
attempts to speak for Friday as a "child unborn" (Coetzee, Foe 122) to establish his rights 
in Foe, Disgrace declines to speak for Lucy's unborn child by invoking a right to life 
argument. 
43 In 2003 the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda convicted Pastor 
Ntakirutimana for his role in the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. 
44 Originally published in South Africa as Country of My Skull, the subtitle of Krog' s text 
was added for the US publication, which also includes plot and informational changes. 
This chapter takes issue primarily with Country of My Skull: Guilt, Sorrow, and the 
Limits of Forgiveness in the New South Africa, the edition printed internationally. I refer 
to this edition throughout as Country and, unless otherwise indicated, page numbers refer 
to this edition. 
45 According to the Bhopal Medical Appeal "Half a million people were exposed to the 
gas and 20,000 have died to date as a result of their exposure. More than 120,000 people 
still suffer from ailments caused by the accident and the subsequent pollution at the plant 
site" (Bhopal Medical Appeal Summary). 
46 The distinction I make between attending to historically situated circumstances and 
testifying about suffering as a function of trauma is indicative of a historical difference 
between a human rights tradition that emerged in the 1970s in order to create a record of 
political violence and the humanitarian movement that has grown since the 1990s. For 
more on this historical trajectory see Samuel Moyn' s The Last Utopia: Human Rights in 
History. 
47 I use the terms "nation" and "nation-state" purposefully to refer to the "imagined 
community" (Benedict Anderson 6) with which the people of a state collectively identify. 
I distinguish between the "nation" as an idea and the "state" as a political entity. 
48 As Gourevitch notes, "ethnographers and historians have lately come to agree that 
Hutus and Tutsis cannot properly be called distinct ethnic groups" ( 48). Rather, as 
Gourevitch explains, "Hutu and Tutsi identities took definition only in relationship to 
state power" (50). 
49 This refers to The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, which the United Nations General Assembly adopted on December 9, 1948. 
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50 The region now called Rwanda was controlled by Germany from the last years of the 
nineteenth century until 1916 when Belgium occupied it during World War I. Then in 
1946 Ruanda-Urundi became a UN trust administered by Belgium, whose policy it was to 
exert control through the Tutsi dynasty. The years Gourevitch mentions in this passage 
are important because in 1959 a Hutu revolution began in which Tutsis were killed and 
because of which many left Rwanda; in 1960 a provisionary government was established; 
in 1961 elections were held; in 1963 after Tutsi refugees from Burundi attempted an 
invasion there was mass violence against the Tutsi population within Rwanda; and in 
1994 the genocide occurred. 
51 Further commenting on Odette's account, Gourevitch muses, "We are, each of us, 
functions of how we imagine ourselves and of how others imagine us, and, looking back, 
there are these discrete tracks of memory: the times when our lives are most sharply 
defined in relation to others' ideas of us, and the more private times when we are freer to 
imagine ourselves" (71). 
52 Both the South African edition and the US edition of Country of My Skull were 
originally written in English. 
53 For the sake of clarity within this chapter, I used "Krog" to refer to the author of 
Country and "Antjie" to refer to the character who narrates the text. 
54 Krog is the author's given name, under which she writes poetry in Afrikaans; Samuel is 
her married name, under which she reports for the South African Broadcasting 
Corporation (SABC); and the text's glossary lists Antjie Somers as an "androgenous 
figure of Afrikaans folklore who catches naughty children" (Krog 389). For more about 
the various iterations of the narrator's names see Laura Moss (90-1 ). 
55 For more on Calata and Krog's controversial representation of her see Moss (94-7). 
56 It is such a toxic past that Animal literally contains within his body in Animal's People. 
In that novel, Elli, a humanitarian doctor from the US tries to assist him in having an 
operation that would straighten his spine and effectively remove visual evidence of this 
toxic contamination. I elaborate on this discussion of toxicity in relation to Animal later 
in this chapter. 
57 Harris notes, "It appears that Krog's poetic interpretation of the horrors that she has 
borne proxy-witness to becomes a way for her to validate her own voice and quilt it into 
the broader national narrative" ( 43) and she charges, "Krog, the ambiguously defined 
poet, is in danger of witnessing testimony in her role as poet-as-witness, but then 
reassigning the testifier's cosmologies to nothing other than her own personal truth" (46). 
Carli Coetzee also criticizes Krog's preoccupation with establishing her own voice, 
writing, "she seems to be concerned with the question of what kind of voice she is 
allowed to have, how many layers of skin and identity she will need to shed before she is 
audible" (694). 
58 Harris clarifies her argument, explaining, "I am not suggesting that poetic language and 
fiction should not, therefore, bear witness to historical trauma. Indeed, I am suggesting 
that it is precisely because the poetic register is able to render traumatic pasts in an 
emotionally affective manner and articulate that which is otherwise unutterable that 
makes the need for an accountability in poetry all the more pressing. Such a poetic 
accountability would acknowledge the historical and textual sources from which it 
departs, or that it transforms into a poetic register" ( 48). 
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59 For example, Antjie speaks of betrayal when she discusses writing this narrative (50, 
66); the text quotes Constable William Harrington who says he betrays himself and his 
people by telling the truth in his testimony (89); and it quotes a nomadic poet explaining 
the role of the poet amongst his people and the punishment for this poet's betrayal (292). 
6° Carli Coetzee notes that "the addressee of the text is not stable" (686), and she 
identifies "a crisis around who the addressee of a text produced by a white South African 
could be" ( 688). 
61 See Carli Coetzee (686, 688) and Laura Moss (92). 
62 Carli Coetzee notes, "This divided identity, this double signature, is more than a case 
of a married woman making a choice to publish under her maiden name (which is, of 
course, always still her father's name). The nature of the signature in this text points to a 
series of displacements and sometimes uncomfortable divisions: K.rog uses the work 
written by An~ie Samuel, publishing it here under her own name, her other name, but in 
English, which is not the language associated with the signature 'K.rog"' (686). 
63 Moss observes that the narrator exhibits "a desire for the text to be read as a micro-
Truth Commission with many of the central parts played by K.rog/Samuel/Antjie who slip 
uneasily between beneficiary, commentator, victim, perpetrator, witness, tribunal, and 
audience" (92). 
64 As Taiwo Adetunji Osinubi recalls, "As critics run up a list ofK.rog's failures, they 
repeatedly point to her use of victims' testimonies as building blocks for a postmodem 
collage in which she shuns factual analysis of the moment and afterlives of human rights 
violations for the sake of impressionistic vignettes that convey her pained reactions to 
narratives of physical and psychological violence" (109). 
65 For further analysis ofwww.khaufpur.com see Heather Snell, who suggests, "In using 
K.haupfur' s website to humorously implicate himself in the series of exploitative acts 
Animal imagines to have occurred in the production of the book, Sinha at once highlights 
the need for authorial accountability and places in check the pleasure some readers might 
take in consuming, and subsequently exotifying, the tragic and ostensibly true account of 
a traumatized young man living in the socalled 'Third World"' (3). 
66 Snell notices how the novel, "draws attention precisely to the uneven relations of 
power that persist between postcolonial texts and their readers at a moment when 
culturally-diverse commodities circulate widely in global markets" (Snell1). She 
elaborates, "Reproducing the global circuits of exchange in which it is caught up, 
Animal's People dramatizes the unevenness of power frequently embedded in relations 
between storytellers, story collectors such as the journalist, and their consumers" (5-6). 
67 The Kampani remains otherwise unnamed in the novel. But, just as K.haufpur is 
generally understood as a fictional Bhopal, the Kampani is representative of Union 
Carbide India, Ltd. (now Dow), the corporation responsible for the toxic contamination 
of Bhopal in December 1984. Union Carbide India, Ltd., which was bought by Dow in 
2001, operated the pesticide plant where the chemical leak occurred. For over two 
decades no trial took place, and it was only in June 2010, that Union Carbide India, Ltd. 
was convicted of death by negligence along with seven of its former senior employees. 
These employees were sentenced to two years each in jail. Neither the company nor the 
Indian government has cleaned up the toxic chemicals at the plant. 
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68 Meg Samuelson argues, "If the damage performed on bodies [rape and torture] remains 
unutterable in available discourse, it is spoken through the fragmented and damaged form 
of the novel itself, which, in turn, creates such allusive echoes and mimetically presents 
the disfigured bodies that cannot be represented" (846). Michael Marais reads the 
unutterable as a sign ofthe failure ofthe discourse of race ("Bastards and Bodies" 21, 
28-30); Annie Gagiano suggests the novel's ambiguity reflects the inadequacy of"'new' 
South African national narratives" (817); and Derek Attridge reminds that "[t]he 
troubling of representational certainties in the novel[ ... ] is a direct product of the 
ambiguities and conflicts of the historical time and place" (161). 
69 See, for example, Andrea Spain (174, 187); Samuelson (848); and Marais ("Bastards 
and Bodies" 30-1). 
7° For instance, while Shane Graham insists the "'talking cure' paradigm of the TRC is 
inadequate in itself to account for the complex dynamics that emerged from and shaped 
South Africa's revolutionary transition due to that paradigm's tendency toward a 
depoliticized individualist psychology" (127-8), he tries to rescue trauma as a way to 
discuss the novel by suggesting, "[t]hrough symbolic motifs such as the birth caul and the 
steatopygous rear end, then, Wicomb establishes links between David, Dulcie, and Sally 
(in the present) and Andrew and Rachelle Fleur and Sara Baartman (in the past). In 
doing so, she emphasizes the extent to which the historical traumas embodied in those 
figures from South Africa's past continue to echo in the late twentieth century, haunting 
the lives of the entire cape coloured population, and especially those who identify as 
Griqua" (134). 
71 The Griqua descended from the Khoi people - some of South Africa's earliest 
aboriginal inhabitants- and a mixed European ancestry. They are included among the 
ethnic group of mixed-race people referred to as coloured. 
72 Saartje Baartman, a Khoi woman who lived from 1789 to 1815 or 1816, was in her 
lifetime displayed in a cage in Europe as the "Hottentot Venus." After her death and up 
until the late twentieth century, her brain, genitals, and skeleton were exhibited at the 
Musee de l'Homme. In the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries activists and 
intellectuals called for Baartman's remains to be removed from the museum's storage 
space and relocated to Africa. For more on Baartman see Sander Gilman's "Black 
Bodies, White Bodies: Toward an Iconography of Female Sexuality" and Zine 
Magubane's "Which Bodies Matter? Feminism, Poststructuralism, Race and the Curious 
Theoretical Odyssey of the the 'Hottentot Venus.'" 
73 At the TRC hearings, the stories of many ofthe victims' who died were told by their 
surviving female relatives. Antjie Krog describes those who deliver what she calls "the 
first narrative" of the TRC hearings - the testimony from victims and their families -
recalling, "She is sitting behind a microphone, dressed in beret or kopdoek and her 
Sunday best. Everybody recognizes her. Truth has become Woman. Her voice, distorted 
behind her rough hand, has undermined Man as the source of truth. And yet. Nobody 
knows her" (74). Furthermore, Krog associates this first, generically feminine narrative of 
victims' suffering with "an indefinable wail" (75) from Nomande Calata (see my critique 
ofKrog's depiction of the political activist, Calata, in chapter two). 
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74 While historiography is the writing of history and the body of literature that this 
produces, historiographic metafiction revises an accepted history by fictionalizing it. For 
a detailed discussion of historiographic metafiction see Linda Hutcheon (114-22). 
75 Driver explains, "the Le Fleur that David is striving to recover is the figure uncorrupted 
by racism[ ... ] David needs this recuperated, nonethinic Le Fleur as a model to live by" 
(225). Additionally, Marais notices "David's story repeats Le Fleur's story[ ... ] both 
narratives are about their respective protagonists' desire to belong: in Le Fleur's case to 
return to the ancestral home of the Grigriquas and, in David's case, to trace his Griqua 
roots" ("Bastards and Bodies" 26). And, Fiona McCann observes, "In the case of David, 
the gradual discovery that le Fleur, who initially claimed unity of purpose between black 
and coloured in the fight against discrimination and land issues, became a 'sell-out', 
calling for a separatism that prefigures the discourse of apartheid, is a corollary to the 
situation in 1991 where the issues of the search for a specifically coloured identity once 
afain comes to the fore" (McCann 34). 
7 Andrew Le Fleur (born Andries Abraham Stockenstrom le Fleur in 1867) was a Griqua 
chief who attempted to establish a Griqua nation and land rights for the Griqua. 
77 For a reading ofBaartman as an "ur-text" that functions as a "phantom" (Graham 130) 
and "the very embodiment ofunrepresentable trauma" (131) within the narrative, see 
Graham's "'This text deletes itself': Traumatic Memory and Space-Time in Zoe 
Wicomb's David's Story" (Graham 130). For a critique ofWicomb's use ofBaartman 
and the way this is used in the marketing of the book see Kai Easton's "Travelling 
through History, 'New' South African Icons: The Narratives of Saartje Baartman and 
Krotoa-Eva in Zoe Wicomb's David's Story." 
78 In South Africa coloured is a commonly accepted term that refers to mixed-race 
people. 
79 In his reading of Dulcie, Graham points out "Dulcie is a linguistic construct or lacuna 
only from the point of view of the narrator, who does not remember meeting Dulcie" 
(131). Whereas I see Dulcie as a messianic figure, he reads Dulcie in terms oftrauma 
suggesting, "For David, on the contrary, it is Dulcie's very realness- the materiality of 
her body and the devastating violations perpetrated on it- that makes her story so 
essentially untellable. It is Dulcie's role as 'pure body' that makes her such a powerful 
illustration ofthe spatial-material dimensions of trauma" (132). 
80 Wicomb' s own commentary about writing is in line with my suggestion that writing 
functions as a way to think things through in David's Story. In an interview that occurred 
before she wrote David's Story, Wicomb reflects, "that is what's exciting about writing: 
finding out, after you've written something, that a certain aspect actually is relevant. This 
makes writing not an entirely coherent process. I often find myself going off on a 
descriptive trail and later discover that in fact it links up, which is extraordinary. It is that 
process of writing which is exciting, but it's also what inhibits one because I think of it as 
an act of faith, that you have to just push through, and believe that what you're doing will 
work. And one doesn't of course always have that faith" (Craig MacKenzie 95). 
81 Spivak analyzes a-chrony in her reading ofTayeb Salih's Season of Migration to the 
North. She writes, "Mustafa Sa'eed's story played out in an interim time with no staged 
listener. The reader has to deal with the fact that it is reported speech outside the 
encompassing frame of the novel that is silently resumed in the last section. It is an a-
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chrony that keeps the event's status narratalogically undecidable" (Death of A Discipline 
64). See Mieke Bal (66-8) for the definition of a-chrony that Spivak cites (64, n38). 
82 Multiple critics comment on the novel's use of"middle voice." See, for example, 
Graham (142) and Samuelson (840). 
83 David's opinion of intellectuals and their concern with language is further evidenced in 
a conversation the amanuensis describes between the two of them: "A fine word, he 
smirks, li-be-ra-tion, beating out the syllables with his fist on the table. And fine people 
just prefer to believe such nonsense as the Cry Freedom vision of schoolkids bursting 
into a spontaneous rebellion over the Afrikaans language. Get real, old girl, without a 
military movement orchestrating the whole thing there would not and could not have 
been a Soweto '76. Brilliant isn't it, how your arty lot just love these lies about 
irrepressible human nature and the spirit of freedom bubbling in the veins of the youth" 
(79-80). 
84 My reading of gender as a metaphor in David's Story takes a cue from Heh~ne Cixous 
who presents an opposition between male and female writing as a metaphor to discuss 
prevailing power structures and the possibility that some other way of thinking might 
emerge to interrupt the status quo. Cixous observes, "sexual opposition, which has 
always worked for man's profit to the point of reducing writing, too, to his laws, is only a 
historico-culturallimit. There is, there will be more and more rapidly pervasive now, a 
fiction that produces irreducible effects of femininity" (253). And she argues, "If woman 
has always functioned 'within' the discourse of man, a signifier that has always referred 
back to the opposite signifier which annihilates its specific energy and diminishes or 
stifles its very sounds, it is time for her to dislocate this 'within,' to explode it, tum it 
around, and seize it; to make it hers, containing it, taking it in her own mouth, biting that 
tongue with her very own teeth to invent for herself a language to get inside of' (257). 
85 Note that in the South African context images of black women and coloured women 
correspond to two different racial categories. 
86 For more on Arendt's "right to have rights" see Chapter One. For critique of 
representations of political violence as trauma see Chapter Two. 
87 This literary tradition spans from C.L.R. James and Claude McKay to Samuel Selvon, 
Jean Rhys, and George Lamming to Earl Lovelace, Kamau Brathwaite, and Erna 
Brodber. 
88 For more on the split subject of universal humanism see Chapter One and Alain Badiou 
(12-13). 
89 Transformations in the contemporary literary field are evidenced by a flood of 
scholarship that analyzes the relationship between literature and globalization. At the tum 
of the century the globalization of literature in English was a primary concern for literary 
scholars - P MLA and South Atlantic Quarterly published special issues on literature and 
globalization in winter and summer 2001, respectively. 
90 The tension between the rights of the tourist and "native" takes on further complexity 
in the context of the increased promotion of gay and lesbian travel packages in the 
Caribbean. Gay and lesbian friendly cruises and tours have become ways for Americans 
and Europeans to exercise the right to engage in same-sex relationships (which may or 
may not be openly permitted in the daily lives of many Americans and Europeans). Yet, 
such tourism also contributes to the exploitation of "natives" in the Caribbean, and it is 
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often framed in terms of a consumer's right to participate in the capitalist system. The 
conflict between the rights of "natives" and the rights of gay and lesbian tourists further 
reveals the limits of a rights-based framework. 
91 Kincaid's commentary on the army that shoots at its own national citizenry is 
particularly relevant to my reading of the army in No Telephone to Heaven later in this 
chapter. 
92 For more on the paradoxes of just being human see Hannah Arendt's discussion of the 
refugee (271, 284, 288-97) and Giorgio Agamben's analysis of the homo sacer (82-4). 
93 To a certain extent the group on the truck bears similarities to the maroon communities 
of runaway slaves, but such an identification also overlooks the distinctions between the 
subjugation of slavery and the postcolonial condition. 
94 Because Omeros is written in verse but does not include line numbers, I use a forward 
slash to indicate line breaks and provide page numbers in citations. 
95 As a mode of analysis posthumanism "forces us to rethink our taken-for-granted modes 
of human experience, including the normal perceptual modes and affective states of 
Homo sapiens itself, by recontextualizing them in terms of the entire sensorium of other 
living beings and their own autopoietic ways of'bringing forth the world'[ ... ] But it also 
insists that we attend to the specificity of the human- its ways of being in the world, its 
ways of knowing, observing, and describing- by (paradoxically, for humanism) 
acknowledging that it is fundamentally a prosthetic creature that has coevolved with 
various forms oftechnicity and materiality, forms that are radically 'not-human' and yet 
have nevertheless made the human what it is" (Cary Wolfe xxv). My posthumanist 
reading of Omeros explores how this particular mode of "recontextualizing" may 
challenge contemporary imperialism. 
96 It is uncertain if Walcott has purposefully inserted the Greek "Achilles" here in place 
of his St. Lucian character "Achille" or if this is a typographical error. Reading this as an 
evocation of the Greek tragic hero, it is possible to interpret this as a suggestion that the 
canoe both serves the St. Lucian fisherman Achille and in his dependency on it, signals 
his principle weakness. He, after all relies on a simple canoe and cannot easily compete 
with the "offshore trawlers" (290) to whom "traitors I in elected office" (289) have 
"rented the sea" (290). 
97 For her discussion of the refugee, see Arendt (271, 284, 288-97). 
98 For an analysis of the relationship between anti-colonialism, Marxism, and human 
rights see Moyn (106-7, 116, 119, 173). For additional commentary on the connection 
between human rights and the decline of radical Marxism see also Alain Badiou (4-5). 
99 For more on the "financialization of the globe" (364) and the strained relationship 
between the nation and the state see Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak's A Critique of 
Postcolonial Reason. 
100 See Inderpal Grewal for more on the connection between the limitations of 
development and the expansion of the human rights regime (132). 
101 For more on the rogue state, see Jacques Derrida ("The Last" 325, 339). 
102 For a discussion of conventional refugee narratives, see Sissy Helff (333-5, 344). For 
analysis of the terms "refugee" and "asylum" in By the Sea see David Farrier (122, 126). 
103 According to Damrosch "world literature is not an infinite, ungraspable canon of 
works but rather a mode of circulation and of reading, a mode that is applicable to 
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individual works as to bodies of material, available for reading established classics and 
new discoveries alike" (5). This chapter asks what this means in the context of 
postcoloniality and human rights. 
104 For more on the features of the old and new diasporas see Spivak ("Diasporas Old and 
New" 245). 
105 For a discussion of the various journeys that the objects in the text signify see Brenda 
Cooper (83-4, 94). 
106 Wendy Brown writes, "substituting a tolerant attitude or ethos for political redress of 
inequality or violent exclusions not only reifies politically produced differences but 
reduces political action and justice projects to sensitivity training[ ... ] a justice project is 
replaced with a therapeutic or behavioral one" (Regulating Aversion 16). 
107 For an incisive critique of reviews and criticism that misread The Dew Breaker as a 
confessional account of trauma see Jo Collins's "The Ethics and Aesthetics of 
Representing Trauma: The Textual Politics ofEdwidge Danticat's The Dew Breaker." 
108 On August 9, 1997 Abner Louima was implicated as part of a confrontation between 
New York City police officers and patrons ofClub-Rendez Vous nightclub. He was 
mistakenly identified by a police officer who said he punched him in the head during the 
struggle, and he was arrested for disorderly conduct, obstructing government 
administration, and resisting arrest. He was tortured and sexually assaulted in a bathroom 
at a New York City police precinct by Officer Justin Volpe. Volpe was sentenced to 
thirty years in prison. The convictions of several other officers involved in the attack and 
its cover up were overturned though one has served jail time for perjury during a related 
trial. See New York Times's "Times Topics: Abner Louima" and Sewell Chan's "The 
Abner Louima Case, 10 Years Later." 
109 In the early morning of March 16, 2000 undercover New York City police officers 
approached Patrick Dorismond and a friend outside of a bar and asked where they could 
obtain Marijuana. Dorismond responded that he was not a drug dealer. There was a 
struggle and Anthony Vasquez, a plain clothed police officer, shot the unarmed 
Dorismond. Vasquez was not indicted and the shooting was ruled accidental. See Bill 
Vann's "The Killing of Patrick Dorismond" and William Glaberson's "City Settles Suit 
In Guard's Death By Police Bullet." 
110 Constant organized a death squad called Front for the Advancement and Progress of 
Haiti (FRAPH) in 1993 to violently challenge supporters of exiled president Jean-
Bertrand Aristide. He was also a paid agent of the CIA from 1992 to 1994 and escaped to 
the US when Aristide returned to power in 1994. Rather than being deported to Haiti in 
1995 to stand trial for his role in the Raboteau Massacre, he was allowed to remain in the 
US after he threatened to disclose information about his involvement with the CIA. In 
2001 a Haitian court convicted him in absentia and sentenced him to life in prison. He 
has remained in the US, and in 2008 was convicted by a US court for mortgage fraud and 
sentenced to serve a twelve to thirty-seven year sentence in a US prison. See Larry 
Rohter's "A Haitian Set for Deportation Is Instead Set Free by the U.S.," Tim Weiner's 
"'93 Report By C.I.A. Tied Haiti Agent To Slaying," and Kirk Semple's "Ex-Militia 
Chief From Haiti Is Sentence to Up to 37 Years for Fraud." 
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